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Educational philosophies frequently col­
lide with some violence but without mak­
ing much impact on the educational com­
munity and on its practices and policies. 
That such collisions are inconclusive is 
seen to result from the absence of accept­
able criteria for rationally judging be­
tween conflicting educational proposals. 
Mr. Bandman seeks to demonstrate the 
relevance of philosophy to education by 
undertaking a philosophical examination 
of the crucial question in education "What 
should be taught?" His purpose is to de­
termine what, if anything, qualifies as a 
rational argument in helping us to answer 
this fundamental question. 
In his examination of the scope and 
limits of reason in education, Mr. Band-
man attempts to locate pertinent canons 
of criticism by which an educational argu­
ment may be assessed, on the assumption 
that it is quite possible to deal rationally 
with arguments that are employed in edu­
cational controversy. He imposes no single 
philosophical standard for making such 
an assessment, and though he offers criti­
cism of metaphysical and moral assump­
tions in education, he neither accepts nor 
rejects any philosophical doctrine in toto. 
An evaluative argument in education, 
Mr. Bandman finds, is one that may be 
used either as a quarrel or debate, as a 
proof or demonstration, or as a set of 
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Foreword 
In sponsoring the "Studies in Educational Theory,'' the John 
Dewey Society has had as its major objective to bring to the 
attention of thoughtful educators, hard at work in classrooms 
and administrative offices, and in the preparation of teachers, 
technical scholarly works that apply relevant philosophical 
tenets to current educational problems and concerns. 
Readers who have not followed recent developments in 
formal academic philosophy will find that some parts of this 
book are devoted to what seem to be the purely technical and 
special concerns of formal philosophy, and that others belabor, 
elaborately and unduly, what at first appear to be quite obvious 
matters. The book is vulnerable to both charges inasmuch as 
the answer to the fundamental question, What should be 
taught?, is at once patently obvious and anguishingly complex. 
For even when we are certain of what it is exactly that we 
believe is right and true, we continue to face questions that 
relate, in a complex network of interconnections, to the prob­
lem of what, indeed, should be taught. It is to these disturbing 
questions that Professor Bandman addresses himself by apply­
ing some of the techniques of modern analytical philosophy 
to the study of education. 
Foreword 
Professor Bandman's position is that what we believe about 
reality, knowledge, and goodness can make a good deal of 
difference in education, and that a carefully reasoned educa­
tional program will draw, quite properly, on both moral and 
metaphysical notions. He insists, however, at the same time, 
that pedagogical conditions must also be satisfied; for, he 
argues, the problem of whether a subject can be taught 
meaningfully—that is, so that it is genuinely learned and not 
merely memorized—is a consideration as important as whether 
the subject itself is true and valuable. And this is really a 
most remarkable argument to emerge from an investigation 
such as we have here, for it dignifies pedagogy by maintaining 
that its findings are necessary and crucial in educational 
decision-making. 
Professor Bandman's investigation into the place of reason 
in education is in the grand tradition of philosophy as a 
search for measure or principle. To those who respond to the 
question, What should be taught?, capriciously and according 
to the prevailing fashion of the day, it will seem a thoroughly 
unnecessary and precious enterprise. For those educators who 
suffer in the search for a just measure by which judgment 
can be rendered, however, it will prove to have profound 
meaning. Important questions, such as What should be taught?, 
need to be given reasoned answers if we are to maintain a 
modicum of freedom; for decisions involving the public good 
that are based on capricious adherence to fashionable theories 
that are widely held rest solely upon power; and justice, in 
this instance, becomes merely service to the interests of the 
stronger. 
The Commission on Studies in Educational Theory of the 
John Dewey Society, which recommended publication of The 
Place of Reason in Education to the Society's Executive Board, 
xi Foreword 
has played a considerable part in the critical evaluation of the 
manuscript during its final revision for publication. With the 
author, the members of the Commission are grateful to other 
consultants who evaluated the work in progress and made 
suggestions for its improvement. Of particular value has been 
the advice of Professor Arno Bellack, of Teachers College, 
Columbia University; Professor James McClellan, of Temple 
University; and Professor Joe Burnett, of the University of 
Illinois and president of the John Dewey Society. 
ROBERT E. MASON 
University of Pittsburgh 
June 24, 1966 

Preface 
I tried to write this book in the conviction that reason has 
a role to play in human affairs and that the way of all flesh 
is not the only one for the schools to follow. The world of 
Orwell's 1984 approaches, and Big Brother's approving chants 
of Doublethink threaten to make a mockery of schooling. The 
schools have a role to play and a chance in the struggle if 
teachers (and others into whose hands the young are brought) 
are themselves taught to use reason in education. 
By way of acknowledgment, I wish to thank the members 
of the Commission on Publication of the Studies in Educa­
tional Theory of the John Dewey Society for their help and 
encouragement. Specifically, to Professor Robert E. Mason, 
its chairman, for laboring over the manuscript, offering sug­
gestions, and encouraging me with unusual steadfastness. 
Professors Frederick Ellis and Ward Madden, also of the 
Commission, commented critically on the entire manuscript; 
and the latter, in particular, helped me to qualify my criticisms 
of Dewey and Raup (in Chapter III). My thanks also to 
Professor Israel Scheffler, of the Commission, for encourage­
ment and enlightening criticisms, particularly on one of my 
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sample arguments (early in Chapter I); and to Professor Joe 
Burnett, president of the Society, for continuing encourage­
ment and helpful criticism of my argument in Chapter II. 
Deep personal gratitude goes to Professor James E. Mc­
Clellan, true friend and philosopher, who more than anyone 
else, I believe, taught me—if it can be taught at all—what it 
means to do a little philosophy. I am indebted to Professor 
Philip Phenix who, besides teaching me the importance of 
Vision'7 in philosophy of education, ingeniously showed me 
in an earlier version of this work why it is that not even 
truth-telling is under all conditions sacrosanct. Professor Arno 
Bellack, friend and mentor, drew my attention to actual prob­
lems of teaching and tried to keep me from the philosopher's 
trick of speculating too much about education in general. My 
gratitude to Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson for her most 
helpful comments on an earlier version (especially Chapters 
III, IV, and V), and, in particular, for suggesting a telling 
example of an overriding reason in education; and to Pro­
fessor Sidney Morgenbesser, also for his comments on an 
earlier version and particularly for suggesting the rebuttal 
notion used in Chapter VI. 
I am grateful to the following publishers and authors: The 
editors of the Journal of Philosophy for permission to quote 
from H. Broudy, "How Philosophical Can a Philosophy of 
Education Be?" Volume LII, No. 22 (October 27, 1955); J. E. 
McClellan, "Why Should the Humanities Be Taught?" Vol. 
55 (November 6, 1958); and B. Othanel Smith, 'Views on 
the Role of Philosophy in Teacher Education," Vol. LIX 
(October 25, 1962), and to these authors for granting per­
mission to quote. 
To Professor William R. Frankena for permission to quote 
excerpts from an unpublished paper, "McMurrin and Smith on 
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the Philosophy of Education," read at the 1962 meeting of 
the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. 
To the University of Chicago Press for permission to quote 
excerpts from W. J. McGucken, "A Catholic Philosophy of 
Education," and H. Home, "An Idealist Philosophy of Edu­
cation," in the Forty-first Yearbook of the National Society for 
the Study of Education, 1942. 
To Rand McNally and Company for permission to quote 
excerpts from Smith and Ennis, Language and Concepts in 
Education, 1961. 
To the Syracuse University Press for permission to quote 
excerpts from Othanel Smith, "Basic Issues in American 
Secondary Education," in I. P. Halverson (ed.), Frontiers of 
Secondary Education, 1956. 
To Prentice-Hall for permission to quote excerpts from H. 
Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education (2nd ed., 1961). 
To the editors of the Harvard Educational Review for 
permission to quote excerpts from S. Hook, "The Scope of 
Philosophy of Education", Vol. XXVI (Spring, 1956). 
In writing this book, I benefited also from discussions with 
colleagues in the Department of Philosophy, both at the 
C. W. Post and Brooklyn Center branches of Long Island 
University. Thanks particularly to my friend and colleague 
at the Brooklyn Center, Alex Orenstein, for suggesting a 
biconditional statement designed to strengthen an argument 
(early in Chapter I). 
My thanks also to the C. W. Post College of Long Island 
University for a small college research grant that defrayed the 
cost of preparing the manuscript for publication; to Mrs. Betty 
Hogan and Mr. Robert Demorest (the latter of the Ohio State 
University Press) for their valuable editorial help; and to 
Mrs. Jean Meeker for superb typing. 
Preface xvi 
I happily dedicate this book to Elsie, my wife and true 
friend, who in so thoughtfully helping to bring up our daugh­
ter Nancy shows me in this and countless ways how vitally 
education can affect us all for the better. 
BERTRAM BANDMAN 
Long Island University 
]une 24, 1966 
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The Place of Reason in Education 
I grant that the tendency of the times is to exagger­
ate the good which teaching can do, but in trying 
to teach too much, in most matters, we have 
neglected others in respect of which a little sensi­
ble teaching would do no harm. 
Samuel Butler 
Introduction 
Educational philosophies often collide without making much 
impact on the educational community. The inconclusiveness 
of such collisions may result from the absence of any court 
of appeal where arguments for or against educational proposals 
may be rationally assessed. This study seeks to clarify the 
relevance of philosophy to education through a philosophical 
examination of the crucial educational question 'What should 
be taught?" Some of the main philosophical arguments pur­
porting to answer that question will be evaluated in our quest 
for the constituents of good philosophical reasoning about 
what should be taught. 
The purpose of this study is to determine what, if any­
thing, qualifies as a rational argument to help us decide what 
should be taught. Are there any philosophical guidelines to 
help us assess an argument that is directed toward answering 
some form of the question "What should be taught?" Since 
there are usually at least two sides to an educational issue, 
the problem is to judge among opposing arguments and con­
tradictory conclusions. (Issues, for example, might involve 
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teachings for or against patriotism, for or against some sectarian 
belief, for or against a particular moral, political, or economic 
way of life.) 
To implement the process of judgment, this study will 
search out philosophical canons of criticism by which alterna­
tive educational arguments may be assessed. Such canons of 
criticism are designed to provide a rational basis, comprising 
the necessary and sufficient conditions, for deciding what 
should be taught. There is no guarantee, of course, that these 
canons of criticism cannot, themselves, be criticized or even 
that these criteria answer all requirements. The aim here is 
really to sharpen our awareness of the need for competent 
criteria to do the job of appraising philosophical arguments 
in education. To this end, sustained effort will be made to 
distinguish a good reason from a not so good reason for 
deciding what should be taught. 
First, it should be made clear that the question "What 
should be taught?" was prompted primarily by the importance 
to the philosophy of education of Plato's question "How ought 
we to live?" 1 and secondarily by the closely related educational 
question of R. M. Hare, "How shall I bring up my children?" 2 
The belief is shared with Plato that a consideration of how we 
ought to live is no trivial matter; and the belief is shared 
with Hare that a consideration of how we ought to bring up 
our children is also of the highest philosophical importance. 
Some concentration on the question of what to teach may 
remedy the lamentable indifference, noted by Hare, that most 
philosophers since ancient times seem to have manifested 
toward the subject of how man should bring up his young. 
This study will scrutinize philosophical arguments about 
the subjects to be learned, with a view to locating the place 
of reason in education (i.e., identifying the scope and limits 
of reason in education). If in searching for the place of reason 
Introduction 
in education pertinent canons of criticism can be found, they 
can be used to identify a rational argument and to refute 
as unacceptable an opposing argument. Relevant canons of 
criticism can also be used to distinguish among arguments 
worthy of attention and those deserving to be ignored or 
rebutted. Such criteria may not be able to furnish us with 
formal proof, but they could give us a gauge. If, however, 
applications of canons of criticism should actually be demon­
strated as unsatisfactory or limited in usefulness, it would be 
edifying to know that, too. It is assumed here that it is 
possible to deal rationally with arguments used in educational 
controversy. 
The intention here is not to impose any single philosophical 
standard upon the assessment of educational arguments. If a 
fixed formula for resolving an educational argument were 
presented, one might look upon this study as being like a 
book of etiquette or a style manual or an engineer's handbook, 
promising "the sure way' of doing something. The proposal 
here is less rigid and less simple—it is to turn to analytic 
philosophy for advice as to appraising evaluative arguments. 
There is no promise that the advice will be either good 
or satisfactory. We may be left with sundry unresolved alterna­
tives. Nevertheless, we need advice drawn from philosophical 
analysis, with a bearing on educational problems, more than 
we need injunctions deduced from philosophical doctrines 
that may be irrelevant to the problems of education. Let us 
explore, then, the possibility of finding some advice in 
philosophical analysis that may help us to determine a sound 
basis for judgment among contradictory educational arguments. 
First, let us discover the obstacles. In Part One (Chapters 
I, II, and III), some main philosophical difficulties—specifically 
metaphysical and moral—are cited as obstructing the use of 
rational arguments to draw educational conclusions, generally, 
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and to answer the question of what should be taught, par­
ticularly. Then let us surmount the obstacles. In Part Two 
(Chapters IV, V, and VI), some rational canons of criticism 
are presented for the assessment of metaphysical and moral 
arguments about what should be taught. 
The attempt is made to criticize metaphysical and moral 
arguments in education, without either accepting or rejecting 
any philosophical doctrine in toto. This study does not advo­
cate the abolition of metaphysics, nor does it urge the preser­
vation of any particular metaphysical doctrine. The need to 
criticize metaphysical assumptions in education does not imply 
a wish to throw out the baby with the bath. Similarly, in moral 
philosophy, criticism is directed against even those positions 
that are too tempting to be discarded entirely. Following the 
example of J. W. N. Watkins, the attempt is made here to 
subject metaphysical and moral arguments in education to a 
maximal criticism of their unsatisfactory implications. The 
philosophical activity of so doing, without accepting or re­
jecting particular viewpoints in toto, may offer a way to assess 
alternative arguments concerning what should be taught. 
The fruitfulness of this activity depends on the relevance 
and importance of this kind of philosophical criticism. What 
is known in analytic philosophy as an approach has influenced 
the modes of criticism used here, which are adaptations of 
principles and techniques of approach, not as a school of 
thought or movement, but as a way of doing philosophy. 
Philosophical analysis of this kind need not be either sterile 
or unilluminating, nor need it be irrelevant to the rational 
activity of appraising what should be taught. 
1. F. M. Cornford (ed.), The Republic of Plato (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1945), 352D. 
2. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (London: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1952), p. 74. 
Part I. The Dilemma of the "Great Debate" 

/. The Two Senses of "Argument' 
Everyone who talks about education seems to agree that 
something is wrong with it. But few people agree on what 
the wrong thing is, and even fewer agree on how to set it 
right. A well-known philosopher of education writes: 
Education is something men argue about. Often it is 
praised; more often it is blamed for what happens to 
men and nations. The words "ought" and "must" pervade 
educational discussions, giving them an imperative and 
urgent mood. One feels that something can and should 
be done—presumably something different from what is 
being done.1 
The one certainty is the clamor over the aims, content, and 
methods of education. Writers with widely divergent perspec­
tives agree that there is major disagreement. Sidney Hook, 
for example, writes that "American education today is marked 
by confusion, uncertainty, and heated debate." 2 Paul Wood-
ring writes that "we are engaged in a great national debate over 
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the aims and purposes of education." 3 A recent book about 
schools is titled The Great Debate.4 James Conant opens 
a recent book with a chapter called "A Quarrel among 
Educators." 5 
The debate is described on occasion in terms of war. Robert 
Hutchins concludes a book, Conflict in Education, with a 
chapter on "Education at War," 6 and another author opens 
her book with a chapter on "Education under Fire." 7 
The use of violent metaphors, the note of urgency, the 
emphasis on crisis—these symptoms are not missing from the 
writings of philosophers of education. Many a philosopher 
of education is susceptible to the hysteria that must by now 
be part of the initiation for beginning students of education. 
Theodore Brameld, a well-known philosopher of education, 
opens his book on educational philosophy with a chapter 
entitled "A Time of Great Debate"; and (perhaps to dramatize 
the social function of the philosophy of education) writes 
that "philosophy deals with matters of life and death." 8 
Despite the general agreement that there is a debate going 
on in education, it is difficult to discover just what all the 
shouting is about. Some writers and philosophers contend 
that the debate is and ought to be about the meaning and 
purpose of education. Others contend that the question con­
cerns not the purposes of education, but the intellectual trans­
formation of the content, organization, and method of teaching 
in various subjects and the political structure in which such 
transformation can best occur.9 
James Conant, who has grown tired of debating the mean­
ing or purpose of education, writes: 
When someone writes or says that what we need 
today in the United States is to decide first what we 
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mean by 'education,' a sense of distasteful weariness 
overtakes me. I feel as though I were starting to see a 
badly scratched film of a poor movie for the second or 
third time. In such a mood, I am ready to define educa­
tion as what goes on in schools and colleges. I am more 
inclined to examine present and past practices of teachers 
than attempt to deduce pedagogical precepts from a set 
of premises.10 
In a similar vein, Martin Mayer writes: 
I had some sense of the unreality of the "great contro­
versy" in education. The controversy has been enter­
taining to watch. The critic shouts that the schools are 
lazy and the educators are fools; the educators shouts 
back that the critics are reactionaries and their criticisms 
are ignorant and each can prove his case by quoting 
from the statements of the other. Both parties play 
before well-organized cheering sections: wrestling fans 
are not the only people who find relish in a fight when 
neither side fights fair.11 
And about the aims of education, Mayer writes: 
It is well to rid oneself immediately of the business of 
"the aims of education." Discussions on this subject are 
among the dullest and most fruitless of human pursuits. 
Whatever the ideal general aims of education may be, 
they certainly cannot be accomplished in schools.12 
Whether the debate is about the purpose or the content 
or the political structure of education or about something else 
 12 The Place of Reason in Education
may not be clearly differentiated, but it does seem reasonable 
to suggest that the debate fundamentally concerns the question 
of what ought to he taught. 
All sorts of proposals are made in answer to this question. 
Some advocate more religion; others, more science; others, 
more mathematics; and still others, more attention to socializa­
tion. There is an endless diversity of courses proposed and 
opposed. One writer characterizes the controversy over the 
curriculum as a sort of St. Vitus' dance. Books, articles, and 
orations continue to flow over the problem of what ought to 
be taught. Yet little effort is made to settle the controversy 
by rational argument. Is the decision on what is taught a 
mere matter of caprice? 
According to Israel Scheffler, the decision on what to teach 
need not be arbitrary. He writes: 
We do not . consider it a matter of indifference or 
whim just what the educator chooses to teach. Some 
selections we judge better than others. Nor [do] we 
discuss issues of selection as if they hinged on personal 
taste alone. We try to convince others; we present ordered 
arguments.13 
If there are such arguments, then how do they resolve the 
controversy over what should be taught? 
How Are Educational Arguments Settled? 
As an example of an educational argument, we may con­
sider the following, by Robert M. Hutchins: 
13 The Two Senses of "Argument" 
Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. 
Knowledge is truth. The truth is everywhere the same. 
Hence, education should be everywhere the same.14 
How do you assess an argument of this kind? Is the con­
clusion really proven, in the sense that it necessarily follows? 
Now we may consider a classic counterargument by Sidney 
Hook: 
Everyone needs to be healthy. . The definition of 
health is the same for all men. But who will there­
fore deduce that all men must eat the same things . 
or exercise in the same way in order to be healthy? Just 
as there are different dietary roads to health, there are 
different curricular roads to educational maturity.15 
One can question Hook's argument by trying to break down 
the analogy between education and eating or exercising. But 
does it break down? How does one decide which of these 
arguments is right? 
It may be instructive at this point to test several criteria 
for usefulness in solving this problem. Let us look first at the 
formal logician's criterion. If formal logic would suffice to 
distinguish a good argument from a bad one in education, 
then we should have a rational criterion for accepting one 
educational argument instead of another. If distinguishing a 
logically valid argument from an invalid argument would not 
suffice, then we should have to look for a different criterion. 
Many scholars are addicted to the notion that the final 
court of appeal in all things rational is formal logic. It is 
tempting to apply the formal logician's precise and elegant 
rules to messy or troublesome educational arguments and to 
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pronounce the verdict in favor of those arguments that are 
amenable to the rules and against those that are not. But if 
the criteria of formal logic should not prove the case, it would 
be necessary to look for some less formal method of putting 
an argument on trial. To anticipate the position taken here, 
the formal ideal of logic will be found insufficient in some 
respects but adequate in others as a way of assessing educa­
tional arguments, and will not be altogether discarded. 
Smullyan differentiates the validity, soundness, and rigor 
of an argument. An argument is valid when the premises 
logically imply the conclusion; the premises, if true, cannot 
logically imply a false conclusion. An argument is invalid 
when true premises imply a false conclusion. In addition to 
being valid, an argument is sound when its premises are in 
fact true. To be valid, an argument need not be sound, but an 
argument cannot be sound when it is not valid. Finally, an 
argument is rigorous when "it is correctly annotated." The 
annotation, though no part of the argument, is "a gloss or 
commentary, which explains the steps and cites the logical 
principles by which we may justify the advance from the 
premises to the conclusion of the argument.'' A rigorous 
argument must be valid. But a valid argument need not be 
rigorous "for it may not be annotated or its annotation may 
not be correct." According to Smullyan, logic 'seeks to formu­
late the principles which are used in the construction and 
criticism of the annotations of arguments.'' Arguments are, 
finally, either conclusive or inconclusive; formal or logical 
arguments are conclusive, but empirical arguments are in­
conclusive.16 
Difficulties arise when one attempts to apply these defini­
tions to philosophical arguments about education. An argument 
must be valid and sound if it is to be acceptable, but one 
15 The Two Senses of "Argument" 
cannot always know whether the premises are true. More­
over, evaluative premises, required in an evaluative argument, 
are not generally regarded as either true or false. "Correct" 
annotation, which has to do with methods of gloss or com­
mentary, is also difficult to ascertain because in philosophy, 
as in philosophy of education, there is no known correct 
method of annotation. Whether any educational argument 
can be rigorous therefore awaits philosophical study. 
Do we consider that evaluative arguments in education 
follow the argument form? To what extent do educational 
arguments deviate from the standard argument form? Validity 
is a criterion for an educational argument in so far as the 
truth and falsity of its premises and conclusion are in question. 
When the premises are true in a valid argument, the con­
clusion is likewise true. When the premises are false and the 
conclusion is true, the argument may be valid—but it is not 
sound. For an argument to be both valid and sound, both the 
premises and the conclusion must be true. 
The difficulty of applying the tests of validity and sound­
ness can be seen in the following example: 
Subjects should be taught if and only if there is appre­
ciable transfer of training. 
There is no appreciable transfer of training in Latin. 
Therefore, Latin should not be taught. 
The minor premise is factual—empirically true or false. But 
the major premise is a value judgment and is therefore not 
empirically true or false in the same sense as a factual state­
ment. The conclusion is an evaluative decision and therefore 
it also is not true or false in the empirical sense. When a 
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premise and the conclusion of an evaluative argument in 
education are neither true nor false, how are we to apply the 
tests of validity and soundness? 
In Smullyan's terms, rigor presupposes both validity and 
soundness. Rigor in a philosophical argument need not have 
these prerequisites, since one premise and the conclusion in 
a philosophical argument may be neither true nor false. But 
though a rigorous argument in philosophy or in the philosophy 
of education need not, strictly speaking, be either correctly 
or incorrectly annotated, the annotation of an evaluative argu­
ment (in education, at any rate) is nevertheless intended "to 
explain the steps and to cite the logical principles by which 
we may justify the advance from the premises to the con­
clusion of the argument.'' In both formal and evaluative 
arguments the attempt is made to justify one conclusion 
rather than any other (especially contradictory) conclusion. 
Thus annotation is focused on the type of evidence or reason­
ing adduced to buttress a conclusion. 
We have seen that application of the validity and soundness 
standards to an evaluative argument cannot be done satis­
factorily because evaluative statements are not either true or 
false. And there does not yet seem to be a satisfactory criterion 
for judging the rigor of an evaluative argument in education. 
How then can we choose between opposing arguments about 
what should be taught? 
The field of education would be singularly blessed if there 
were a criterion (or set of criteria) for distinguishing a good 
educational argument from a poor one. 
Idealized logic will not do it. An alternative, recently put 
forward by Stephen Toulmin, would relocate logic from the 
exclusive domain of mathematics to the arena of jurispru­
dential analogy for use in the critical assessment of actual 
17 The Two Senses of "Argument" 
arguments.17 Logic, in its practical application, deals with the 
justification of conclusions.18 Viewed as generalized rational 
criticism, logic is concerned with "the soundness of claims 
we make—with the solidity of grounds we produce to support 
them, the firmness of the backing we provide for them—or 
with the sort of case we present in defense of our claims.'' 
Logic, then, is a kind of "generalized jurisprudence." 19 
Rules of logic are applied as standards of achievement 
whereby a man's argument can be judged. A sound, well-
grounded argument measures up to standards and meets 
criticism. There is a notable difference between Toulmin's 
and Smullyan's notion of a sound argument: for Smullyan, 
the premises of a sound argument must be true; for Toulmin, 
they need not be true. 
According to Toulmin, practical logic needs a "hypothetical 
bridge'' to authorize an inference from a set of premises to a 
conclusion. To express this, Toulmin suggests a special 
formula or model (not entirely unlike some of Dewey's 
terminology) in which D stands for data or premises and C 
stands for the claim or conclusion. The bridge to authorize 
the inference from D to C is W, or warrant, a canon of 
argument.20 
The practical logician's concern is the study of proper 
inferring procedures, that is, rational canons of inference. 
Logic, for Toulmin, is no "if-then"' craft technique.21 The 
logician is an argument assessor who does not apply invariant 
technical tests, such as one might to measure the endurance 
of metals, but must apply various rules to various types 
of argument. 
Toulmin furnishes several examples for his models. Here 
is one of them: D denotes "Harry was born in Bermuda.1' 
W denotes "A man born in Bermuda is a British subject," 
The Place of Reason in Education 
authorizing the claim, C, that "Harry is therefore a British 
subject.'' The argument model looks like this: 
D—>SoC

Since W

Since not all arguments are the same, Toulmin adds modal 
terms like N (for "'necessarily") or P (for "probably") to 
qualify the claim. The qualifier, "if P," makes provision for 
exceptions, permitting the addition of degrees of force. Appeal­
ing to the legal analogy, Toulmin notes that some cases come 
directly under the law and others come under it with quali­
fications.22 The features of ordinary arguments are made more 
complex than is the mathematician's ideal "Q.E.D." Added 
to the modal qualifier, Q, are the conditions of rebuttal, R, 
showing the circumstances under which a given conclusion 
or claim is liable to defeat (or, to borrow a term used by 
H. L. A. Hart, is made "defeasible"). While Q indicates the 
strength of W on the inferring step between the data and 
the claim, R indicates those circumstances that would set 
aside the otherwise general authority of W. R is, accordingly, 
capable of defeating the original claim, which is now prefaced 
"'unless R." The revised model is then written: 
D —> So £>! C 
Since W Unless R 
In the example, the conclusion that Harry is a British subject 
is now prefaced with the qualifier, "So presumably''; and the 
rebuttal condition, R, says, "Unless both his parents are aliens, 
or become naturalized Americans."23 
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Standing behind W, there is a certain backing, B, meaning 
in Harry's case "On account of the following statutes and legal 
provisions. " 
Toulmin distinguishes "field-invariant'' from "field-depend­
ent" factors in arguments: Q, R, W, and B are field-dependent 
because they vary from field to field, depending on the con­
text and circumstances of argument; the inference from D 
to C, in its abstraction, is field-invariant.24 
Note again how Toulmin's and Smullyan's views diverge. 
According to Toulmin, neither truth nor validity is a neces­
sary criterion for soundness.25 For Smullyan, both truth and 
validity are necessary for a sound argument. 
Arguments are either analytic or substantial. Toulmin 
suggests that we abandon the analytic ideal because its criteria 
(truth conditions) are beside the point in dealing with sub­
stantial arguments.28 He says we need criteria of appraisal 
for judging each field by its own relevant standards. In this 
connection, the traditional appeal to the analytic ideal tempts 
one to demand the mathematical logician's ideal to apply to 
arguments in practical fields, since some of his standards 
depend on the field rather than on mathematical logic alone.27 
There is no entailment in substantial arguments or the 
mathematician's ideal of validity in substantial arguments. 
Logic is not designed exclusively for the mathematician.28 
Validity, however, according to Toulmin, is an intrafield 
notion, not an interfield one. Toulmin calls for a comparative 
logic, comprising actual forms of argument current in any 
field. The starting point in this logic is admittedly empirical. 
Logic in the wider sense can be seen at work if one pays 
attention to substantive arguments, including their historical 
development in various fields. 
One critic of Toulmin's use of arguments, John C. Cooley, 
points out that the Toulmin framework does not help us 
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to decide between contradictory conclusions. According to 
Toulmin, (D) "Petersen is a Swede,1' (W) "90 per cent of 
all Swedes are non-Catholic" implies that (C) "Petersen is 
non-Catholic.'' Cooley sets up this counterexample: (D) 
"Peterson visited Lourdes," (W) "90 per cent of the visitors 
to Lourdes are Catholic." How does Toulmin's framework 
help us any more than dispensing with deductive framework 
and leaving to ordinary inductive procedures the decision as 
to whether Petersen is Catholic? 
The Toulmin view is nevertheless an effective rejoinder 
to those (like Smullyan and Cooley) who hold that the 
analytic ideal will suffice as the sole method of performing all 
sorts of proper inferring procedures or of drawing sound 
conclusions in all kinds of arguments; for Toulmin draws 
attention to the problems that beset various fields and are 
not solved by applying the invariant standards of the mathe­
matical ideal of logic to all sorts of non-mathematical problems. 
Toulmin does not deny the force and importance of formal 
logic. He reminds us, however, of a view recognized earlier 
by Mill and Dewey and alluded to still earlier by Aristotle 
that logic has also a larger, more general use—the rational 
appraisal of arguments in fields other than mathematics and 
science. Logic is not just formal; it is also informal, and 
practical as well as theoretical. 
Which model or paradigm of argument should one use in 
assessing educational arguments? Smullyan and Toulmin pro­
vide different logical postures. Much of what follows will 
reflect an effort to take advantage of the strength of each 
stance in logic—the one too strict, the other, perhaps, too 
flexible. Formal logic, it seems, cannot be used alone to decide 
between contradictory evaluative arguments in education, nor 
can the scarcely visible strictures from actual arguments in 
education comprise an adequate guide. 
21 The Two Senses of "Argument" 
Two senses of an argument might be distinguished. Formal 
logic, which rigorously demonstrates the conclusion, could be 
called "Sense II"; and "Sense I" could denote the special 
evaluative type of argument, which does not intend to demon­
strate the conclusion, and is used in giving (probably inade­
quate) intellectual backing to decisions about ''what should 
be taught." The following dialogues, F and E, may help to 
make the distinction: 
Fi: 1. A is older than B. 
2. B is older than C. 
3. Therefore, A is older than C. 
Fi>: Yes, 1 and 2 are true, but I doubt 3. 
Fi: All I can do is recoil at your remark. 
Contrast that with the following: 
Ei: There is no appreciable transfer of learning in 
teaching X; therefore, X should not be taught. 
E2: True, but there are other, overriding reasons for 
teaching X anyway, as follows: Y, Z.29 
Ei: All I can do is recoil at your remark. 
Here, Ei's final response is quite out of place; at any rate, 
it does not carry the logical weight of Fi's final response, 
which is in place. 
There is no impropriety in either of these types of argu­
ments, but one should not confuse them. On occasion an 
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argument that looked at first like an E (evaluative) argument 
is suddenly treated as though it were an F (formal) argument. 
The conclusion of a formal argument is not debatable, not 
a matter of opinion; it is necessary. Empirical arguments, 
similarly, are not "mere"' matters of opinion. To deny that 
fluorides help prevent tooth decay or to assert that there is 
an appreciable transfer of learning in declaiming Latin verbs 
is simply to be unenlightened. Nevertheless, educational dis­
cussions are sometimes carried on without careful attention 
to the pertinent factual evidence. 
Confusion of evaluative argument with formally demon­
strable argument is caused, in part, by the philosophers of 
education who present their views as forcefully as possible 
(as will subsequently be illustrated). The strong determination 
of educational philosophers to present ironclad arguments for 
their conclusions makes their efforts resemble those of the 
legal advocate who wishes, similarly, to have an ironclad case. 
Educationists and philosophers of education advocate con­
tradictory conclusions, much as lawyers do; and two con­
tradictory conclusions cannot both be right. 
A special philosophical difficulty seems to occur when 
philosophers of education, using an evaluative argument of 
the type of Sense I (not intended to demonstrate conclusions), 
suddenly assert a conclusion as though it were derived from 
a formal argument. Sometimes an argument that begins in 
the manner of Sense I seems to move by nearly imperceptible 
degrees out of Sense I and into Sense II. The resulting diffi­
culty is reminiscent of Hume's observation that philosophers 
often speak for a while as though their propositions were 
built on some form of "is," only to confront one suddenly 
with "no proposition that is not connected with an ought 
or an ought not." 30 
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Thus far alternative models of argument forms have been 
sketched. The question is how they will work in deciding 
what should be taught. Smullyan and Toulmin cannot both 
be right, one asserting that true premises are a necessary 
condition for a sound conclusion, and the other that truth is 
not a necessary condition for a sound argument. Each appeals 
to a different type of language—Smullyan to the technical 
logician's language, Toulmin to the less precise, more elastic 
language of the lawyer, for whom truth and validity are not, 
in every case, the necessary criteria for sound argument. 
One must know what constitutes a sound argument in 
education in order rationally to appraise alternative answers 
to the question of what should be taught. If true premises 
and validity are not to be our criteria, what will be? 
To anticipate, the attempt will be made to show that 
Smullyan's paradigm, ideal as it is for the logician, will not, 
for several reasons, be suitable for the evaluative inference in 
which educationists engage when they try to decide what to 
teach. The attempt will also be made to show that Toulmin's 
interpretation of arguments is not suitable as a criterion for 
use in deciding what to teach. The principal contention will be 
that, whereas Smullyan's notion of a sound argument is too 
taut, Toulmin's is too loose. From both views, we can hope 
to draw some appropriate advice later on how to appraise 
an educational argument; but neither model of argument will, 
itself, provide us with our needed criterion. 
How Do Educational Arguments Answer Educational 
Questions? 
The difficulty of resolving or settling educational arguments 
may be seen by examining the way philosophers of education 
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answer their own questions in contrast to the way mathe­
maticians or physicists answer theirs. One writer in philosophy 
of education notes this relationship between question and 
answer in connection with the question "Why should the 
humanities be taught?" 
There are some questions that can be answered by a 
simple affirmation or negation, others that can be 
answered by a proper name or statement. But 'Why 
should the humanities be taught?" requires an argument 
for its answer, a set of premises fitted to some assumed 
logical model in such manner that they constitute good 
reasons for assenting to 'The humanities should be 
taught.31 
This study concerning the kind of argument required to 
answer the question "What ought to be taught?" will concern 
itself first with kinds of questions. 
Isaiah Berlin and some other English philosophers have 
distinguished among formal, empirical, and philosophical ques­
tions. This distinction, which will be adopted here, is based 
on the different methods involved in answering these three 
kinds of questions. (For the purposes of this discussion, moral, 
metaphysical, and other philosophical questions are included 
in the rubric of 'evaluative'' questions.) The three questions 
"Is the word 'cat' a three-letter word?", "Is there any gold 
in the Sahara?", and "Is it good to spank children for thumbing 
their noses at adults?" are examples, respectively, of formal, 
factual, and evaluative questions. (A similar distinction is 
made by Renford Bambrough between "inquisitive"' and 
"deliberative' questions. "Where is the nearest telephone 
booth?" is an example of the first; "Shall I vote Labor or 
Conservative?" is an example of the second. Techniques of 
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proof or evidence are used to answer inquisitive, that is, formal 
or factual, questions, whereas techniques of persuasion are 
used in answering deliberative, that is, evaluative, questions.)32 
Of formal, factual, and evaluative questions, the evaluative 
are the most troublesome. Although such factual questions 
as 'What are the boundaries of the universe?" and 'What 
is the cause of cancer?" may have no answers, there do exist 
techniques of proof or evidence that would enable us, should 
the occasion arise, to cry "Eureka!" We generally know what 
conditions must obtain in order for us to answer a formal 
question. We know, for example, that "forty-two" is the 
answer to the question 'What is six times seven?" We know 
this by knowing the system of numbers in which six, seven, 
and forty-two are formally related. 
An empirical question is clearly answerable, in the sense 
that we know what conditions must obtain in order to find 
the answer. We know, for example, that "the Empire State 
Building'' is the answer to the question 'What is the tallest 
building in the world?", and we know that the conditions for 
the answer are the measurement of the relative height of 
buildings. Similarly, we can answer a factual question in 
education, such as, "Does the teaching of driving in high 
school result in a decrease of juvenile traffic fatalities?" We 
answer this, as we do all other factual questions, by examining 
the pertinent evidence. 
Thus a question in mathematics or in science can usually 
be considered answerable in that conditions indicate the 
necessary procedures and criteria for obtaining the answer. 
But with an evaluative question, the conditions for answering 
do not appear to be as plain as those for answering a formal 
or factual question. 
The difficulty is illustrated by Herbert Spencer's question 
'What knowledge is of most worth?" Educators of differing 
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persuasions acknowledge the significance of this question. 
They even agree that if we knew what knowledge is of most 
worth, we would know what to teach. 
Herbert Spencer answered the question as follows: 
Thus to the question we set out with—what knowledge 
is of most worth—the uniform reply is—Science. That is 
the verdict on all counts. For direct self-preservation, or 
the maintenance of life and health, the all important 
knowledge is—Science. For that indirect self-preservation 
which we call gaining a livelihood, the knowledge of 
greatest value is—Science. For the due discharge of 
parental functions the proper guidance to be found is to 
be found only in—Science. For that interpretation of 
normal life, past and present, without which the citizen 
cannot rightly regulate his conduct, the indispensable 
key is—Science. Alike for the most perfect production 
and present enjoyment of art in all its forms, the needful 
preparation is still—Science, and for the purposes of 
discipline—intellectual, moral and religious—the most 
efficient study is once more—Science.33 
Father William J. McGucken also asked the question 
"What knowledge is of most worth?" He answered it as 
follows: 
This question the Catholic answers in straightforward 
fashion: religious knowledge, knowledge of God and 
man's relation to God as made known through reason 
and revelation—that is the knowledge that is of most 
worth. Not that the Catholic schools of any type are 
concerned merely with knowledge of Christian doctrine. 
The point is academic; it is conceivable that in a more 
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primitive civilization some Catholic schools might confine 
themselves almost, if not exclusively, to religious knowl­
edge. The thing to be insisted on is that religion perme­
ates all Catholic education from arithmetic to zoology, 
just as ideally it impregnates all of Catholic life and 
living. Naturally, there is no such thing as Catholic 
chemistry; yet in a chemistry class taught in a Catholic 
school to Catholics by a Catholic, there will be an 
awareness of and a reverence for God and supernatural 
values. The Catholic scientist will never make the mis­
take of becoming so absorbed in test tubes that there is 
no room for a higher loyalty.34 
If S (Spencer's question) had meant to ask, "What knowl­
edge (do you think) is of most worth?", then it would be 
like a question intended in Sense I, such as, "How do you 
feel about peach pie?" In that case, Spencer could have his 
answer and Father McGucken his, and neither would be 
wrong. But if S did not mean to ask, 'What do you think? 
" (or, "How do you feel? . ") , then S would be 
more like a question intended in Sense II, such as, 'What 
is the tallest building in the world?", which can be answered 
by reference to measurements. Interpreting Spencer's question 
as having the intention of Sense I seems specious. We some­
times seem to have in mind an intention other than Sense I 
when we ask S—an intention that seeks an answer at least 
more like Sense II than like Sense I. 
The Catholic answer is X; some other group (Lutheran, 
Idealist, Marxist, Experimentalist, etc.) may answer Y, which 
is logically incompatible with X. The problem is: How do we 
answer such a question? If one man says X and another says 
Y, who is right? How do we choose between X and '—' X as the 
answer to the question 'What knowledge is of most worth?" 
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To the question about the tallest building, someone answers, 
"the Woolworth" (or W) ; and someone else says, "the Empire 
State Building'' (or <—• W ) . We can readily settle this question 
because we do have a way of choosing between W and — W. 
But how do we choose between X and — X in answer to S? 
Can we say Spencer's question is "answered" when we give 
the Catholic or some similar reply to it? Or does the very 
presence of opposing answers to an educational question of 
this sort constitute the answer to the question? 
It would be very satisfying if we could determine the 
"correct" answer to an evaluative, educational question with 
as much facility as we do the answer to a formal or factual 
question. But as we have seen, in response to the question 
'What knowledge is of most worth?", Spencer has his answer 
and Father McGucken has his; and we have no way of 
knowing which is right. 
How we answer an educational question may depend on 
what we mean by the word "answer." "Answer'' need not be 
limited to the sense in which "George Washington'7 answers 
the question "Who was the first President of the United 
States?" To say, "George Washington was the first President 
of the United States,1' gives a true answer to that question. 
Call it Sense II. Consider Sense I, in which the answer "There 
are bodies and minds, as well as relations between bodies and 
minds governed by a Deity,'' may be given to the metaphysical 
question "What is there?"; other answers might be given to 
that question. There are logically incompatible answers to 
the same question. Thus, to the questions of what and how 
to teach, Hutchins gives his answers and Dewey gives his, 
just as to the question 'Whom shall we teach?", segregationists 
give one answer, desegregationists another. The two sets of 
answers are logically incompatible or inconsistent with each 
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other because we cannot put both sets of answers into action 
simultaneously. (Of course, if A says, "My answer is X.", and 
B says, "My answer is Y.", little difficulty arises so long as 
neither A nor B intends to assert that X or Y is true.) But 
these two uses of the word ''answer"—sometimes as a synonym 
for "'response" or "'reply'' and at other times as a synonym 
for "solution" or "true statement"—are not always clearly 
distinguished, nor is the word 'answer'' used in all cases in 
only one sense. Answers to formal and factual questions are 
usually capable of being tested as true statements or solutions, 
but answers to philosophical questions do not seem open to 
similar tests. Philosophical questions, then, are not answered 
in Sense II but in (or more like) Sense I. 
The distinction between these senses is important enough 
for further elaboration. When your telephone rings and you 
lift the receiver to reply, you may be said to answer the 
telephone in Sense I, even though what you say in answer to 
some question may be utterly false. If an answer is false, or 
neither true nor false, then the question has not been answered 
in Sense II. If, however, a question is answered in Sense II 
as a "true statement" or as "the correct solution to a problem,'' 
it is self-contradictory to say that it is the wrong answer or 
a false answer, for it cannot be both "true" and "false"' or 
"'wrong." While it is in order to say of an answer in Sense I, 
"X answers the question, but X is wrong,' it is logically 
odd to say of an answer in Sense II, "X answers the question, 
but X is wrong.' What serves as an answer in Sense I does 
not necessarily serve as an answer in Sense II. 
An answer in Sense II must do more than satisfy the 
condition of truth. If it is to be taken as cognitive, an answer 
in Sense II must also satisfy the further conditions of relevance 
and credibility.35 If an answer in Sense II were required to 
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satisfy only the condition of being a true statement, the 
following dialogue might occur: 
A:	 'What's your name?" 
B:	 "My kitten is a small cat.'' 
C:	 "That's no answer." 
D:	 "According to the above condition of what counts 
as a cognitive answer, it is. It's a true statement, 
isn't it?" 
A:	 "Well, I'll be 
An answer in Sense II fulfils the following three conditions 
of a cognitive statement: 
1. It is true. 
2. It is believed. 
3. It is relevant. 
(The concealed phrase "do you think" in "What knowledge is 
of most worth?" may be shown to lack relevance, when we 
distinguish our two senses of "answer.'' Without that phrase, 
the question is presumably intended to be answered in 
Sense II.) 
We may also speak of Senses I and II as the "intentional" 
and "'successful" uses (respectively) of the word "'answer." 
Although these are not, strictly speaking, the same as "re­
sponse" and "solution'' in the question-answer relation, a 
successful answer is a solution to a problem or question; an 
unsuccessful answer may "intend" to solve the problem but 
is no solution. (Note how this distinction can be applied to 
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the so-called Final Solution of the Jewish Question, which, 
had it been successful, might well have been the factual 
answer to the question "How to exterminate European Jewry?" 
The moral ignominy of the phrase "final solution'' in such 
a context does not affect the factual propriety of that phrase, 
given the depraved moral setting and background of the 
Nazis.) 
Not every response, however intended, is successful. This 
distinction roughly parallels Ryle's distinction between "'task" 
and "'achievement'' words as well as Scheffler's distinction 
between "task" and "achievement" uses of words. In this case, 
the word "'answer" may be used for either. That is, the 
intentional sense does not imply the success sense. And yet 
these two senses of the word "answer"' (sometimes as a syno­
nym for "'response,'' sometimes as a synonym for "solution") 
are not always clearly distinguished. Consequently, the use 
of the word in Sense I ("response") slides imperceptibly into 
its use in Sense II ("solution"). Yet a philosophical question 
is often asked with the intention of obtaining, as the result 
of asking and of some form of proof or demonstration, a true 
statement as an answer. This may be called the dilemma of 
the philosophical question. 
A question may be asked either with or without the 
intention of obtaining a true answer. If we do not care 
whether the answer to our question is true, our use of 
questions can only serve the view that ours is an Alice-in-
Wonderland world where there are no true answers known 
(or knowable) to questions and no sensible reasons for asking 
questions (such as to find out what is true or to decide what 
is the right thing to do). 
If, on the contrary, we set out to arrive at true answers 
to our questions, but find others saying that their answers— 
which are logically incompatible with ours—are true, we have 
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contradictory answers. How are we to find out which of 
several logically incompatible "true'' answers is true? 
We may have too many answers, none of which is intended 
to be regarded as true—a situation in which any answer is as 
good (or as bad) as any other. Or we may have just two 
logically contradictory answers, with no way of choosing 
between them. Either situation makes philosophical questions, 
deep and interesting though they may be, fundamentally futile. 
This seeming dilemma of the philosophical question is 
shared by questions in the philosophy of education. Here 
problems of education—such as what, how, and whom to 
teach—urgently demand solution, with proper consideration 
for philosophical rationale. Here the point in asking an im­
portant question is to get, in answer, the same sort of (true) 
statement that we use in answering the question 'Who was 
the first President of the United States?" But our many 
answers are of the Sense I type. 
Will answers of the Sense I type do for evaluative ques­
tions? If questions in philosophy of education do have answers, 
are they like the answers to "How do you feel about peach 
pie?" or like answers to "Is peach pie nice?" Will we not 
have a conflict among answers, one of which contradicts 
another? Now, there is no contradiction in "I like peach pie'' 
and "I don't like it"; but there is a contradiction between 
"Peach pie is nice" and "No, it's not,'' unless one adds "for 
me'' or "in my opinion." Is the "do you like" form characteristic 
of questions in education? Not quite. Questions in education 
are asked with the intention of being answered in quite 
another sense, or so it seems. For example, are questions like 
Counts's "Dare the school build a new social order?", Spencer's 
"What knowledge is of most worth?", or Brameld's "Where 
are we going?" 36 intended to obtain answers more like Sense I 
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or like Sense II? Not altogether like Sense I, apparently. Both 
Counts and Brameld try to show, partly in polemical fashion 
and partly through a dialectical argument, what the answer 
is; they also make clear their belief that no other answer, 
especially its contradictory, will do. Brameld's philosophy can 
be interpreted as his own detailed answer to his question 
"Where are we going?" He clearly intends that, among the 
four alternatives—Perennialism, Essentialism, Progressivism, 
and Reconstructionism—we should choose the last, for among 
these alternatives this alone offers a worthy guide for the 
process of education. 
Here, then, is the rub. Brameld, Counts, Spencer, Mc-
Gucken—and, perhaps, almost all other philosophers of edu­
cation—intend their answers to be true or somehow right; yet 
the test question for all of them arises: Does this answer 
succeed? How can any one answer succeed when there are 
so many, and among them some, at least, are clearly incom­
patible and competitive with the others? If one answer can 
succeed, which one is it, and how are we to tell? 
The method of proof or evidence exists to check the 
correctness of an answer to a formal or factual question, but 
there is no similar method for answering philosophical ques­
tions (in Sense II). One writer notes that "we find it hard 
to answer such questions, and if a philosopher propounds one 
answer, another philosopher offers a different one." He adds, 
'What is worse, we do not know how to choose among various 
answers." 3T A recent writer in educational philosophy expresses 
the same difficulty in this way: "One man's metaphysics is 
another man's nonsense, and where there is a dispute among 
metaphysicians or theologians, particularly on moral concerns, 
there is no court of appeal to which we may repair to settle 
the question." 38 
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A philosophical question may be asked with the intention 
of being answered in Sense I, causing no basis for misgiving. 
But sometimes a question in the philosophy of education that 
is asked in Sense I (seeking response) is answered with a 
shift of ground to Sense II (solution). The shift may be only 
dimly apparent, but it seems (to adapt a remark of Hume's 
in a similar connection), ''of the last consequence.1' 
For each man to say that he has the true answer to the 
main philosophical questions is somewhat ludicrous, especially 
when he has no way of showing conclusively that those who 
disagree with him are wrong. The effect of a steady stream of 
such answers, each claiming infallibility, is to give every 
answer (intended in Sense II) a somewhat will-o'-the-wisp air. 
The absence of a court of appeal—of a standard for choosing 
among rival answers, each of which intends to be taken in 
Sense II, and each of which has its own source of authority-
presents problems of caprice. An answer intended to be taken 
in Sense II, when rival answers make the same claim, and 
when there is no universally accepted standard for choosing 
among them, is not a responsible "answer.'' If there is no 
standard, then Spencer, McGucken, and others have their 
various answers; while each intends his to be accepted as 
true, so long as there are no criteria as to what counts (in 
Sense II), and therefore no basis for choice, the title of 
"'answer'' can only be used capriciously. It is not that Mc-
Gucken or anyone else intends his answer to be taken so. 
It is simply that until a standard for settling philosophical 
questions is established, capriciousness will continue to be a 
chronic condition of philosophical questions and answers gen­
erally—Spencer's and McGucken's and all others of that kind. 
The question-answer dilemma in philosophy and in philoso­
phy of education lies, then, in intending or purporting to 
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give answers (in Sense II) without having standards to justify 
the exclusion of opposing answers. 
We have what may be called the Purist versus the 
Capricious use of the word "'answer."39 The Purist use is 
based on a strict standard of the sort used, for example, by 
those who support the Verification Principle; by and large, 
this is the standard used to arrive at answers to factual ques­
tions, such as, "What is the tallest building in the world?" 
The Capricious use of the word "answer" occurs in relation 
to certain disquieting philosophical questions—moral, meta­
physical, and epistemological—and also in relation to troubling 
questions in philosophy of education. Here, for example, 
Spencer can "'answer" the question "What knowledge is of 
most worth?" in one way, while Father McGucken "'answers'' 
this very same question in quite another way. 
The difficulty with the Purist use of the word "'answer" 
is that it invokes an idealized standard, a counsel of perfection 
that is inapplicable to those truly difficult and important 
educational questions that come before us, such as Spencer's. 
The Purist use eliminates philosophical answers altogether-
Spencer's as well as McGucken's—as 'meaningless"; it admits 
indicative assertions only. The Purist use of "answer"' is of 
no more help here than is the Capricious. Both are employed 
in this study to illustrate caricatures; neither will do to guide 
our choice of answers to evaluative questions in education. 
We may, however, consider something from each of these 
two uses. The Purist use provides an example of what an 
idealized answer would look like, even though the idealized 
answer that does not apply to our educational questions does 
us no good. A counsel of perfection may just be too remote 
to settle our questions. Yet we cannot have pedagogic chaos 
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(witness educational debates), with no way to bring order 
from among competing answers. 
The comments on the two uses of "answer'' may be applied 
to the different uses of argument in the field of education. 
The use of argument, for example, by formal logicians like 
Smullyan seems to be rigorous and yet overly restrictive. A 
less restrictive use of argument certainly occurs in the court­
room, the strategy room, in labor-management relations, 
domestic and foreign negotiations, in national and international 
forums, and, perhaps, in every area of human discussion. 
Because the Smullyan ideal is overly restrictive, it cannot 
be used to differentiate good and bad evaluative arguments 
in education. Since evaluative premises are not either true 
or false, all evaluative arguments, in Smullyan's view, are 
without exception unsound. If we were to apply Smullyan's 
idealized standard, therefore, there is no evaluative argument 
that would not have to be judged unsound. 
The Purist criterion thus seems to exclude many arguments, 
metaphysical and moral, that ought to be included; the 
Capricious use of argument, by contrast, includes many argu­
ments that we should have some way of excluding, and yet 
we have none. Whereas the Purist use of argument would 
indiscriminately eliminate all evaluative arguments in edu­
cation, the Capricious use of argument indiscriminately admits 
them all. The Purist, in short, eliminates too much; the 
Capricious admits too much. It follows, then, that neither the 
Purist nor the Capricious use of argument provides a satis­
factory basis for judging evaluative arguments in education. 
Is the Purist ideal altogether impossible of realization? Is it 
only a mathematical logician's dream? Lest one think that the 
logician's restrictive criteria for rational argument amount to 
a counsel of despair (as to some educational arguments), one 
should note that the Purist use of argument provides a 
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formally desirable example of univocity and a model of a 
satisfactory argument. The Purist use does not, however, 
furnish any criterion for deciding which evaluative arguments 
in education to heed and which to ignore. It is consequently 
of little direct practical help to us. 
Shall we settle for "democracy1' among arguments? Shall 
we unharness ourselves from the Purist use of argument, only 
to be saddled with the Capricious use? Is nothing, after all, 
to qualify as an evaluative argument that may finally put 
Spencer's type of question to rest? Is there no way out of 
the impasse between the Purist and the Capricious use of 
argument? 
In the chapters to follow, whether or not we find a way 
out of the Purist-Capricious impasse, we may begin to discern 
what counts as a rational argument in answer to the question 
'What should be taught?" The challenge, to sum up, will 
be complex. Apparently we must adopt either the Purist or 
the Capricious use of "argument."' The Purist conception of 
the word, which would exclude every evaluative argument 
as 'unsound," is too restrictive to be a criterion for judging 
arguments in the philosophy of education. The Capricious 
conception, on the other hand, would admit any argument 
at all. We are at an impasse as long as we attempt to adopt 
either of them for deciding questions about what to teach. 
Besides the Purist and the Capricious uses, is there some 
other use of the word "argument" that may eliminate the 
difficulty inherent in either? What, specifically, counts as a 
rational argument to answer the evaluative question of what 
should be taught? Or, more generally, what is the place of 
reason in education? 
The solution, if there is one, may consist in suitably 
modifying and applying both the Purist and the Capricious 
ideal to assess evaluative arguments in education. Adapting 
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a famous remark of Kant's, educational arguments without 
any standards (say, arguments in philosophy of education) 
are blind; and a standard that does not take account of the 
use of evaluative arguments in education is empty. 
Our predicament is this: Educational philosophy depends 
on the use of arguments; we have seen some of the arguments, 
and we have also seen that, to settle them, we need a standard 
or criterion for choosing among rival arguments. We can 
respond to educational arguments, if we will, in our different 
ways (Spencer's or McGucken's, etc.); but that will not settle 
the arguments, in the sense of providing a solution or rational 
settlement. A criterion must allow for formal and factual 
arguments and for evaluative ones too. 
The philosophy of education is in need of a rational 
criterion (or set of rational criteria) to guide our choice among 
contradictory evaluative conclusions. A satisfactory criterion, 
if there is one, will give us rational grounds for accepting 
some evaluative arguments and rejecting others. 
The remainder of Part I of this study will seek out some 
main philosophical difficulties—specifically metaphysical and 
moral—that lie in the way of using rational arguments to 
answer the question of what should be taught; Part Two 
will employ rational canons of criticism in assessing meta­
physical and moral arguments to be used in deciding what 
should be taught. 
This study has attempted, at the start, not to prove which 
of several contradictory arguments in education is valid or 
sound but, instead, to note the difficulties that are encountered 
in drawing an evaluative conclusion in education. In this, the 
effort has been made to follow the example of George Edward 
Moore who, in a similar connection, wrote: 
39 The Two Senses of "Argument" 
. With regard to the question "What ought we to 
do?", I have endeavored rather to show exactly what is 
the meaning of the question and what difficulties must 
consequently be faced in answering it, than to prove that 
any particular answers are true.40 
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/ / . The Use of Metaphysical Arguments in 
Education 
How a metaphysical argument is used in the philosophy of 
education often depends on how the word "argument" is 
used. An argument in education (as we noted in Chapter I) 
may plead a case as a trial lawyer does or may express a 
verdict as a judge does. This advocacy-verdict distinction, 
suggested in another connection by Nowell-Smith in his 
Ethics, resembles the response-solution distinction between 
the Sense I (response) answer to a philosophical question in 
education and the Sense II (solution) answer. The resem­
blance is modified importantly in so far as a verdict may be 
wrong and still be a verdict, but an answer or 'solution" in 
Sense II that is wrong is no longer an answer. Although the 
suggestion by Nowell-Smith may thus be closer to Toulmin's 
jurisprudential paradigm than to the response-solution dis­
tinction, a verdict is, in a sense, impartial by assumption. A 
similar distinction is seen in the two senses of the word 
"argument," which we sometimes call "persuasion'' and some­
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times call "demonstration." The "intend-succeed" distinction 
used in discussing certain verbs is also seen, with qualification, 
in Senses I and II of "answer'' and "argument." 
An argument may be used at first in Sense I, in order to 
persuade, to plead for a position, to express advocacy, and 
then may be changed in treatment to Sense II, as though it 
were being used to render a verdict. This, again, may arouse 
misgiving. 
Such an argument may be said to be concluded in one 
sense when it is actually being concluded in another. A form 
of the reductio ad absurdum (similar to that used by Ryle) 
can test an argument purportedly concluded in Sense II as 
to whether it was indeed concluded in that sense. 
Spencer's conclusion in answer to the question 'What 
knowledge is of most worth?" is one of many examples of 
the difficulty of concluding an argument, when one has the 
intention of concluding it noncapriciously. The following 
metaphysical questions have been asked in philosophy of 
education by Harry Broudy: 
Are there any truths about the world, about man or 
about goodness, that are universal, eternal and valid for 
all men in all circumstances? If so, then do not these 
constitute the basis for a fixed curriculum ? Or is 
all this talk of truth (and eternal values) moonshine? 
Is truth relative, like the weather or the Dow-Jones 
averages and the peculiarities of our ancestral super­
stitions? If so, then does not the newer school with and 
for the individual to develop his own truth and his own 
destiny seem the logical and sensible alternative?1 
The problem (as with Spencer's question) is how one 
answers such questions as: "Are there any truths ?" "Do 
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not these constitute the basis for a fixed curriculum ?" 
"Or is all this talk about truth moonshiner1" Which kind of 
argument will do? If one man says X and another says Y, 
who is right? 
Has any answer in Sense II been found? It would seem not. 
It is with this difficulty in mind that consideration will 
now be given to how an argument is used to answer a meta­
physical question in education. 
Educational Definitions 
Several kinds of arguments are used to "answer'' meta­
physical questions in education (like those raised by Broudy). 
One kind uses definition to give conceptual clarification to 
puzzling terms or expressions.2 This use seeks conceptual clari­
fication of such terms as "'religion,'' 'education,'' "method,"3 
"learning,'' ''experience,1' "'mind," ''professional," "theory," 
"discipline,1' and expressions like "the logical order of knowl­
edge," or "meeting the needs of youth,'' or "'equal educational 
opportunity.1' 
One may, for example, seek a conceptual clarification of 
religion that is intended to bear on the question of whether 
religion shall be taught. In clarifying the concept of religion, 
one may make a distinction between teaching about religions 
and indoctrinating on behalf of a religion (or teaching people 
to be religious).4 Or one may argue that clarification of the 
concept of religion must make the religious experience in­
tellectually defensible. Or one may argue that religion is a 
private and solitary experience, not subject to argument 
or refutation.6 
But a booby trap is concealed in efforts to answer questions 
by clarifying concepts in philosophy of education. Inherent 
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in these efforts lies the limitation that the device of a shift 
from a metaphysical argument to a conceptual analysis may 
clarify the issue but does not settle it. This method does not 
answer questions in Sense II. In philosophy of education, a 
residual question remains after conceptual clarification,6 and 
that is: Which among competing usages shall be adopted?7 
The shift from an argument that is out-and-out metaphysical 
to one that is conceptual may clear the ground a little, but it 
does not dispose of the deliberative question. The philosopher 
of education still has to make up his mind which usages among 
competing concepts (although clarified) he shall adopt. This 
question remains as to "'religion," "'educational theory," "cur­
riculum," "method," "excellence," "the logical order of knowl­
edge,'' "equal educational opportunity," and "'meeting the 
needs of youth." 
The limitation of conceptual clarification may be most 
dramatically illustrated in the debates over social and political 
terms such as "democracy," "states' rights,'' 'civil rights,'' and 
"'social change." These debates, hedged around with arguments 
in defense of various proposed usages, still leave open the 
question of which usage ought to be adopted.8 One can see 
the deliberative aspect of conceptual studies and definitions 
in education, which intend to coax, goad or guide, inspire, 
move—in short, to get educationists to act. This kind of defini­
tion is akin to the persuasive defintions described by Charles 
Stevenson, which were used to persuade someone to think or 
act in the way intended by the speaker.9 
Definitions in the field of education are important means 
of clarifying concepts and problems, even though they do not 
settle them. On occasion, however, an educational definition 
purportedly settles a difficult issue, as if it had the nature of a 
conclusive argument. Mortimer J. Adler, for example, writes: 
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The philosopher of education is primarily concerned 
with the educational ideal, with answering the question, 
"What is the best education absolutely for any man 
according to his essence?" This is the problem he solves 
by defining the ultimate ends as the absolute 
and universal principles of education. This can be 
proved.10 
G. E. Moore cites the source of the paradox of attempting to 
prove an argument by definition: 
One man says a triangle is a circle. Another replies: 
"A triangle is a straight line, and I will prove to you that 
I am right, for a straight line is not a circle." "This is 
quite true," the other may reply: "but nevertheless a 
triangle is a circle and you have said nothing whatever 
to prove the contrary. . Which is wrong, there can 
be no earthly means of proving, since you define a tri­
angle as a straight line and I define it as a circle." u 
The same difficulty occurs when one tries to answer the 
question 'What is education?" with a definition. Hutchins 
answers, "Education is the cultivation of the intellect'; Dewcy 
answers, "Education is growth.' Although, for either Hutchins 
or Dewey, education is not at all what the other says, neither 
of the two has any earthly means of proving which is right. 
(A similar difficulty occurs in attempts to settle by definition 
the question "What is man?" 12 Hence, an educational defini­
tion (being nonreportive, whether it be persuasive or pro­
grammatic)13 can be used by anyone to suit his own pur­
poses.14 A metaphysical argument that is "'settled" by defini­
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tion is, accordingly, an argument only in Sense I and not in 
Sense II. 
The foregoing criticism of definitions is not intended to 
deny their importance but solely to point up one use of 
definitions that is inadequate (for the reasons cited) to 
demonstrate conclusions in education. (See Chapter IV for 
a further consideration of educational definitions.) 
Metaphysical Beliefs 
In addition to the efforts to settle metaphysical arguments 
in education by means of definition, attempts to settle them 
are made even more commonly through whole systems of 
beliefs or isms, such as Realism, Idealism, Thomism, Marxism, 
or Experimentalism.15 A metaphysical belief or ism is used 
by some philosophers of education to answer a metaphysical 
question, such as, "Are there certain truths and principles 
which hold for all times and places" 18; or, "Can man live 
adequately in time without thought of Eternity?" 1T; and also 
to imply answers to such educational questions as 'What 
shall be taught?" 
Since the use of implication is prominent in educational 
arguments, one may well consider how, or in what sense of 
"implication," a given philosophical position can "imply"' 
conclusions for education. 
According to one prominent writer, Professor Harry Broudy, 
either the derivative or the constructive approach18 is usually 
used to show how a metaphysical belief implies answers to 
educational questions. 
According to the derivative approach, conclusions for 
education are deduced from a given philosophical position. 
According to the constructive approach, educational issues rise 
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to successively higher grounds of argument, until, finally, 
they reach the last court of appeal—metaphysics—beyond 
which there is no rational means of resolving unsettled edu­
cational questions. A philosophy of education is thus built 
up from consideration of educational questions that cannot 
be settled by either emotive of factual appeal. Such questions 
are taken to the philosophical, including the metaphysical, 
level for resolution. Professor Broudy, who uses this approach, 
avers: 
As we seek the answers to a number of educational 
issues, it will become clear that we have to resort to 
views about reality, about knowledge, about goodness, 
and about beauty, and what views we have about these 
may determine our choice in these practical issues.19 
According to the constructive approach, educational 
questions that are not settled on an emotive, factual, or theo­
retical level become philosophical questions. These questions 
are answered by metaphysical beliefs or isms, which in turn 
imply answers to practical educational questions.20 
In Broudy's view, the derivative approach consists in 
answering the question "What does a given position imply 
for education?" On this basis, Sidney Hook charged that 
"to encourage philosophers, as Mr. Broudy does, to derive 
[a philosophy of education] from some philosophical position 
such as Idealism, Realism, Thomism, Pragmatism, or Exis­
tentialism is to encourage them to perpetrate garrulous ab­
surdities." 21 Professor Joe Burnett thereupon responded to 
Hook's contention with the observation that while this is one 
way in which philosophy of education works, Broudy does not 
necessarily endorse the practice. Burnett said that "following 
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almost immediately on the heels of this expression to which 
Hook refers," Broudy pointed to some serious logical difficulties 
involved in attempting to derive educational principles and 
practices from a philosophical position. Broudy indeed holds: 
Logically, it may he impossible to make more than 
plausible guesses, because educational theory takes into 
account existential factors that have the brutishness of 
particulars and do not necessarily follow any principle. 
Thus Thomist educators do not agree on which methods 
or even which type of curriculum would be implied by 
a curricula seem to be compatible with that philosophy.22 
Yet Broudy then says: 
Instrumentalism comes off best in this type of derivation. 
Whatever difficulties and shortcomings the derivative 
method may harbor, to carry it on demands 
a high order of technical competence both in philosophy 
and education. The mental processes used in effecting 
the derivation, moreover, are indistinguishable from those 
used by philosophers qua philosophers.23 
This hardly sounds as though Broudy regards such derivation, 
"the milking of a philosophical position for its educational 
implications," as a logical impossibility or in any way disclaims 
the value of the derivative approach. As Broudy says: 
Whatever the merits of these methods (the derivative 
and the constructive), the contention of this paper is 
that they can qualify as philosophical, both with respect 
to content and method.24 
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Moreover, between the very heels that Burnett spoke about, 
one finds two sentences. The first reads: "Philosophical points 
of view may imply much or little for education." Whether 
it is little or much that a philosophical position or ism implies 
for education, this sentence does not at all deny that a 
philosophical position has implications for education. The 
second sentence reads: "Every position implies at least the 
value of studying and stating that position, and to that extent 
would favor an education that would encourage such study 
and statement." -'' If Broudy means that the advocates of 
each ism believe that their position is worth studying, then 
the advocates of a position may believe either (1) that it is 
worthwhile for themselves to study it, or (2) it is worthwhile 
not only for advocates, but also for many or all others, to 
study the position, or (3) it is worthwhile for others to adopt 
the position. 
As to (1), how could advocates of a philosophical position 
believe in it without thinking it worth their while to study 
and know something about it? Broudy apparently does not 
intend to deny (1). But to assert (1) is tautological, trivial, 
and hardly interesting. 
While (2) includes mention of (1), it says also that it 
is worthwhile for others to study the position, meaning that 
the position should be studied by others. But should all others 
really study a given philosophical position? This has certainly 
not been shown; more is implied in the conclusion than there 
is in the premises. Concretely, Thomism or Marxism (et al.~) 
may imply the value of teaching that doctrine either to 
Catholics or to Communists (assuming a definition of teach­
ing). But to suggest that Thomism ought to be taught to 
others or to everyone (either historically, as a way of life 
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chosen by millions for nearly two thousand years, or per­
suasively, as a way of life to which others should be con­
verted), adds more to the conclusion than there is in the 
premises. Such a suggestion is a clear-cut case of using a 
particular premise to "imply'' a universal conclusion (a viola­
tion of the logical rule that there cannot be more in the 
conclusion than there is in the premises). 
Moreover, the contention that a philosophical position 
implies the imperative that it should be studied is again a 
case of implying more in the conclusion than there is in 
the premises. 
A comparable difficulty is cited by Anthony Flew. To say, 
"God wills X" does not imply that "one ought to obey God's 
will." "One ought to obey God's will" is needed as an addi­
tional premise in order to imply that one ought therefore to 
do X.26 To say that "Thomism says X" similarly does not 
imply that one ought either (2) to study or (3) to follow 
Thomism. The additional premise "One ought to study (or 
follow) Thomism'' is needed, if one wishes to imply that one 
ought therefore to study or follow it. But Broudy nowhere 
suggests this among the logical difficulties of deriving an 
educational conclusion from the statement of a philosophical 
position. The implication in (3), of course, is even more 
extreme than in (2), for (3) commands us to follow or to 
embrace an ism. Broudy is surely aware of the difficulty of 
implying (3) since, among the isms, one could not simul­
taneously embrace rivals. At any rate, the tenor of his article 
indicates that he does not wish to suggest the third alternative. 
But this difference between (2) and (3), while affecting the 
assumed definition of teaching, does not diminish the logical 
difficulty of choosing (2), since either one concludes more 
than is included in the premises. So much, then, for the 
derivative approach. 
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Broudy prefers to use the constructive approach. Broudy's 
question "What [italics added] does a given position imply 
for education?" proposes that a given position imply an answer 
to a set of practical educational questions like, "Shall religion 
be taught as part of general education?" Broudy adds the 
following qualification: "Although the starting point of the 
discussion was an educational problem' (whether to back 
religion or to expand college education), "and its terminus, 
it is to be hoped, will be an educational solution, the dis­
cussion both in content and in method [italics added] will 
be throughout philosophical." 2T 
This approach still means either that an educational pro­
gram based on the principles of a given philosophical doctrine 
shall be taught to those who already share the same belief 
or that the same program should be taught to many others 
or to all. Use of a metaphysical belief or ism to imply answers 
to evaluate questions (whether one prescribes or proscribes the 
teaching of religion as the conclusion from a philosophical 
position) is no different from use of the metaphysical belief 
that "God made us and therefore has an absolute claim on 
our obedience" to imply that we ought ''to do and be what 
He desires." 28 
According to D. J. O'Connor: 
It is not possible to deduce statements about the aims 
of a system of education or its curriculum from any 
purely philosophical statements. This follows from an 
obvious extension of Hume's principle that the 
evidence for any conclusion must contain statements of 
the same logical sort as the conclusion itself.29 
Whether we go from education to philosophy or come to 
education from philosophy, it is on philosophy that Broudy 
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relies to settle practical educational controversies,30 such as, 
"Shall religion be taught as part of general education?" 31 To 
begin with, avers Broudy, the physical and social sciences 
provide factual evidence to answer this sort of practical ques­
tion. But the controversies involved ''cannot be decided by 
facts.'' Questions of fact are settled only 'when agreement 
on norms or objectives has been achieved." Broudy states: 
If, therefore, the controversy is to continue in rational 
fashion, both parties will have to take the issue to a 
higher level. Each position will have to be justified in 
terms of value schemata which, in turn, depend on 
epistemological, ethical and metaphysical theory.32 
On the question of religion, for example, Broudy says: 
The issue as to whether religion should or should not 
be a part of general education, can be stated in economic, 
sociological, political or psychological terms to begin 
with, but sooner or later it has to be fought out on 
epistemological grounds. Either the religious categories 
have truth value or they do not . for unless the 
educator can have superior knowledge in these matters, 
his claim to autonomy and authority is empty.33 
Similar educational issues also have ''to be fought out'' on 
philosophical grounds and settled, if at all (that is, when 
every other rational or evidential recourse fails), philosophi­
cally. What, then, is the difference whether a philosophical 
position implies answers to basic educational questions or the 
educational questions rise to be "fought out on epistemological 
grounds"? 
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With either approach, a philosophical statement is used 
to imply an answer to an evaluative question in education. 
To deduce "statements about the aims of a system of education 
or its curriculum from purely philosophical statements'' com­
mits the fallacy, long ago noted by Hume, of deriving what 
ought to be from what is. This fallacy is more than a matter 
of grammar; it is a matter of a conclusion that contains more 
than there is in the premises. 
Broudy may not abstain from deriving answers to educa­
tional questions from philosophical positions such as Idealism, 
Realism, Pragmatism, or Existentialism. The derivative and 
constructive approaches go around the same circle, even 
though apparently in different ways. Whether a philosophical 
position "implies" answers to educational questions or educa­
tional answers must be derived from a philosophical position 
makes no essential difference because both routes lead to the 
difficulty, raised by the open question, of using a philosophical 
position or an ism to determine evaluative conclusions for 
education.31 
It is possible that Sidney Hook is guilty of the very "'crime'' 
he accuses Broudy of committing, encouraging philosophers 
"to derive (a philosophy of education) from some philosophical 
position."30 How does one answer Hook's question "What 
are the ends of education?" If the answer is not to be sought 
in metaphysics or epistemology, where then? Assuming that 
it is found in ethics or social philosophy, the values are either 
derived or underived. If they are underived, how do we justify 
them? If they are derived, how do we derive them? Though 
derivation "is no easy task,' says Hook, "it involves detailed 
study of the biological, psychological, and historical nature of 
human beings, their culture and traditions and focal problems, 
in short, anything which is relevant to settling'' the question, 
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"What is of worth in human life?" 36 But are such concepts 
as " 'Being is one' or 'Being is many,' 'God created the world' 
or their denials" irrelevant to Hook's question "What is of 
worth in human life?" And are they irrelevant on Hook's 
own grounds of study, especially culture, traditions, and 
focal problems? 
According to Hook, an answer to the question "What are 
the ends of education?" follows from an answer to the prior 
question "What is of worth in human life?" How does one 
answer this prior question? Does the detailed study that he 
describes exclude philosophy, particularly epistemology or 
metaphysics? Whatever Hook's objections to transcendent 
metaphysics, attention to such concepts as "Being is one,'' etc. 
is surely not irrelevant to all the studies involved, even though 
it may not imply anything about these studies. Hook uses 
this conclusion, "A philosophy of education will develop when 
philosophers and educators concern themselves with ques­
tions of education, explore their bearing on conflicting value 
commitments and seek some comprehensive theory of human 
values to guide us in the resolution of conflicts," 37 to answer 
the question "What is of worth in human life?" and hence 
to answer the question "What are the ends of education?" 
But on what grounds does his conclusion exclude any con­
sideration of the metaphysical concept "Being is one" or its 
denial? What makes metaphysics irrelevant to all the fields 
of study that he mentions, especially culture, traditions, and 
focal problems, as well as the biological, psychological, and 
historical nature of human beings? What makes metaphysics 
irrelevant to his conclusion that involves a ''comprehensive 
theory of human values'' in answer to the question "What is 
of worth in human life?" and finally to the question "What 
are the ends of education?" 
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Hook may dislike Broudy's derivative approach, but he 
has one of his own—from the fields of study to the conclusion 
that answers first the "human life1' question and thus the 
'education1' question. The conclusion uses studies that sup­
posedly exclude philosophy for answering the questions. But 
is it not apparent that Hook derives a philosophy of education 
from a philosophical ism, Pragmatism (rather than Realism 
or Idealism, etc.)? Witness the language of the study areas, 
the conclusion, the exclusion of metaphysics. Does he not 
continue—in his own particular fashion—precisely what he 
condemns in Broudy and others? This is nowhere so evident 
as in his concern about derivation in others. Yet neither 
derivation, his or that of others, escapes the open question, 
the fallacy noted by Hume. 
In the derivative or the constructive approach (or in 
disclaiming them), when one uses a metaphysical belief to 
imply conclusions for education, one is confronted by the 
open question of how something can be in the conclusion— 
an educational "ought"—that is not in the premises. The 
trouble with the "isms'' approach is that its inevitable reduc­
tion to a particular doctrine leaves us with a philosophical 
particular used to imply a universal conclusion. Thus, whether 
one adopts the derivative or the constructive approach (or 
denies doing so), a metaphysical argument in education may 
properly be used in one sense but not in another. 
The sort of educational implication that falls outside the 
four known kinds of implication—formal, definitional, causal, 
or material—38 is indeed a curious sense of "implication." How 
can one characterize this save as persuasive? 
Just as a persuasive definition39 expresses a favored usage 
of a word and exhorts others to adopt that usage, so a philo­
sophical position may imply persuasively or programmatically 
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a favored curriculum that one exhorts others to favor. While 
a persuasive definition is used occasionally to propose an 
illuminating distinction, so a philosophical position may be 
used to distinguish one sort of justification for a curricular 
proposal from some other. Each ism makes a distinction by 
attempting to show that it offers the best way to educate, both 
because of its curricular program and because of its justifi­
cation, which answers the question of why that particular 
curriculum is proposed. 
Persuasive or programmatic implication expresses the intent 
of implication in philosophy of education. The intent is not 
logical implication because this implication is not formal, 
nor definitional, nor causal, nor material, nor really any 
sort of implication at all; the intent is justification of an 
educational conclusion. What is being asked all along is not 
"How does the philosophy of X imply educational conclusion 
Y?". but "How does the philosophy of X justify educational 
conclusion Y?" What is stated reads: Ism X implies "Teach Y"; 
what is intended, however, is: Ism X justifies the demand 
"Teach Y." There lies the heart of the problem. 
The question arises: Is the ism a rationalization, or is it 
a philosophically adequate justification capable of implying, 
albeit persuasively, a curricular program? The answer has to 
be shown for each case; on the heels of it steps a second 
question, "Does this answer succeed?" Does the ism justify a 
given curriculum as the best and, on those grounds, support 
the claim that it should be taught to everyone? If the answer 
to the second question is negative, then the open question that 
we have seen in the two preceding cases is confronted again. 
The question "What does a given philosophical position 
imply for education?" may now be restated, "How does a 
given philosophical position imply conclusions for education?" 
(That is, "In what sense does the philosophy of X imply 
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answers to basic educational questions such as "What shall 
we teach?', 'How shall we teach?'. Whom shall we teach?'" 
The restated question no longer asks, "Does a given philo­
sophical position imply conclusions for education, and if so, 
what conclusions?" but, "How does it imply conclusions?" 
One significant difference is that while the question "Does 
X imply Y?" is answered by 'Yes'' or "No," the question 
"How does the philosophy of X imply conclusion Y for 
education?" is answered by argument. If the answer to the 
question "Does X imply Y?" has been 'Yes,'' one can and 
must ask the "How'' question, "In what sense of 'imply'"}" 
Although the question "How does X imply Y?" may seem 
to lack the advantage of leading to an answer that tells us 
once and for all whether X implies Y, it has an important 
advantage of drawing attention to the meaning or manner of 
implication. There may, in the end, be more found out by 
asking "How?" than by asking "Whether?" "How?" demands 
some form of demonstration or argument for justification. 
Furthermore, in the process of showing how X implies Y, 
what X is finally shown to imply may turn out to be the 
same as though nothing (cognitive) were being implied at all. 
In that case, we would have a perfectly legitimate method of 
refutation (a reductio ad absurduni*), without thereby pro­
hibiting to educationists (whether they are for or against 
metaphysics) the use of the persuasive sense to draw practical 
conclusions for education. 
Deeper questions are pressing. The purpose of studying 
the question "How does a given philosophical position (the 
philosophy of X) imply conclusions for education (that we 
should teach Y)?" has been to show that although a meta­
physical argument, derivative or not, may intend Sense II, 
a persuasive implication cannot succeed in concluding a meta­
physical argument in that sense. 
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A metaphysical argument in education is said to be settled 
by an educational definition or by a metaphysical belief. Either 
way, an argument is given—although not in the sense of 
"argument'7 that is being sought. A metaphysical question 
answered either by definition or by metaphysical belief is 
answered in the persuasive rather than the demonstrable sense 
of argument. Two approaches, the derivative and the con­
structive, show how metaphysical beliefs are used to ''settle'' 
educational arguments. With both, however, the philosophy 
of X can only be said to imply an argument to answer Y in 
one sense, although quite another sense of "answer"' is being 
sought. 
Examination of metaphysical arguments in education illumi­
nates an obstacle to ''settling'' such arguments that perhaps 
was formerly not recognized. The effort has been made to 
show the essential difficulty that arises when they are "settled" 
by definition or belief. In either case, misgiving arises when 
the sense of intent in the word "argument" is shifted to the 
sense of success ("solution" 40 or "'conclusion"). (If one sup­
poses that one has established the certainty of one's conclusion 
to an educational argument, in the sense that one establishes 
the certainty of an answer or solution to a question, then one 
is misapplying an educational argument in one of the senses 
of "argument" that does not in fact apply it. This indistinguish­
ability between two senses in some philosophers' minds tempts 
one to repeat Wittgenstein's remark that "one can only 
stammer about such things."") 
Understanding how a metaphysical argument answers a 
metaphysical question may keep Home's question "Can man 
live adequately in time without thought of Eternity?"; or 
Heidegger's question "Why is there anything at all?"; or 
Broudy's question "Are there any truths or principles for all 
times and places?", from seeming to be foolish, meaningless, 
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unanswerable, or unarguable—so long as one does not confuse 
one sense of an argument with another. 
The mite that may be thrown into the receptacle as a 
contribution to the proper evaluation of metaphysical argu­
ments in education is this: We have neither to affirm nor to 
deny that the arguments noted settle metaphysical questions, 
but we have rather to show, in each case, how—whether in 
Sense I or Sense II. The metaphysical argument in education, 
for all that it may seem to be used in or like Sense II, is really 
used more like Sense I. 
Metaphysics may in the foregoing sense imply conclusions 
for education. Noteworthy, however, is that educational defini­
tions and metaphysical beliefs occasionally take on the charac­
ter of arguments that are Capricious rather than Purist; they 
are more like persuasive definitions and persuasive implications 
than like demonstrable arguments, principally because there 
is more in the conclusion than there was in the premises. The 
special difficulty with educational definitions and beliefs is 
that, in being reduced to particular doctrines, they become 
particular premises used to imply universal conclusions. Thus 
metaphysical arguments using educational definitions and 
beliefs are apt to be more like Sense I than Sense II. Is 
there no way out of the Sense I and Sense II dilemma? Are 
all our arguments more like Sense I than Sense II? The 
attempt has been made to reveal that there are no standards 
for judging metaphysical arguments in education. 
The next chapter turns to moral arguments in education 
to see what, if any, distinctive difficulties they may place in 
the way of drawing conclusions in education. 
1. H. S. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education (2nd. ed.), 
p. 18. Copyright © 1961. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J. It should not be construed from this that Broudy answers his 
metaphysical questions in as cavalier a fashion as either McGucken or 
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Home. Quite the contrary. In arguing for the philosophy of Classical 
Realism as the answer to these questions, he repeatedly qualifies his 
use of "answer" or "solution." But skilful and adroit as Broudy's 
answer is, like Spencer's answer, it, too, does not come off in Sense II. 
Hence both Spencer and Broudy, like other philosophical builders, 
have fallen victim to a philosophical dilemma. 
2. Analytic philosophers in education have been predominantly 
concerned with the clarification and consideration of the use of terms 
and expressions. See, for example, B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. 
Ennis (eds.), Language and Concepts in Education (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1961). 
3. For a philosophical clarification of method in education, see 
James E. McClellan, "Dewey and the Concept of Method: Quest for 
the Philosopher's Stone in Education," The School Review, LXVII 
(Summer, 1959), 213-28. The argument concerning method is 
shown in its relation to the metaphysical issue of the one and the many; 
and both in metaphysics and method the penchant for oneness is held 
futile, as this study in conceptual analysis of method sets out to show. 
4. See, for example, Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education 
(Springfield, III: Charles C. Thomas, 1960), pp. 100-101, in which 
Scheffler distinguishes the ambiguous phrase, "the teaching of re­
ligion" into a teaching-(/?ot (the fact-stating component in teaching 
that a given religion consists of such and such "historical institutions, 
doctrines, attitudes") and teaching someone to be religious. One may 
favor the "teaching of religion" in either sense while consistently op­
posing it in the other. "To be clear about debates over religion in the 
curriculum requires elementary clarity with respect to the construction 
to be put on the phrase 'the teaching or religion.'" 
5. For a discussion of this approach, see Morton White, "Religion, 
Politics, and Higher Learning," in Israel Scheffler (ed.), Philosophy 
and Education (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1958), p. 244. 
6. Perhaps akin to the "open texture" F. Waismann discusses 
("Language Strata/' in Logic and Language, Second Series, ed. 
A. G. N. Flew [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953] pp. 11-31) in an 
effort to show how the meaning of terms can and cannot be exactly 
tied down—a sort of Heisenberg indeterminacy or underdefinability 
principle. 
7. For example, one writer clarifies the concept of an educational 
theory by comparing it with a scientific theory; showing that educa­
tional theory comes off badly in this comparison, he argues for the 
usage of "educational theory" as a 'courtesy title."—Daniel J. O'Connor, 
An Introduction to Philosophy of Education (London: Routledge and 
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Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 92-110. Another writer argues that, because 
educational theory is to be autonomous, the comparison between educa­
tional and scientific theory is invidious; that educational theory can 
effectively guide educational pratcice, even though it is value-neutral 
with respect to philosophical systems. (Foster McMurray, "Preface to 
an Autonomous Discipline of Education," Educational Theory, V [July, 
1955], 129-40.) Still another aims to make clear the function of educa­
tional theory by showing that it is not nearly so independent of philos­
ophical systems or value-neutral. (Joe Burnett, "On Professor Mc-
Murray's Autonomous Discipline of Education," Educational Theory, 
VII [January, 1956], 18-21.) The controversy as to what it means 
for theory to guide practice continues more recently with other con­
troversialists entering the fray, viz., D. Bob Gowin and H. Perkinson 
in Educational Theory (1964). "Science," "discipline," and "profes­
sion" are other terms about which philosophers of education argue. 
The intent seems to be to show education in analogy with science, 
profession, or discipline, to exhibit a preferred usage in a good or 
favorable light. 
8. A deliberative question is one answered by a recommendation 
often expressed with the word "shall," as in "We shall adopt policy X" 
or "We shall teach Y in our school system.' The "shall" question in 
philosophy of education asks for an argument to show that one 
ought to adopt this definition (or purpose) rather than that, for ex­
ample, Dewey's definition of education rather than Hutchins' or 
vice versa. The educationist's arguments may not be rationally con­
vincing, but they are meant to be as attractive as possible, with a view 
to enticing members of the teaching profession to adopt a similar belief. 
But this is no exhortation, pure and simple, for the appeal made need 
not be wholly extra-rational. See Part Two for a further elaboration 
of how imperative or deliberative conclusions or decisions in education 
may be to some extent at least rationally buttressed. (See also my 
article, 'On the Fundamental Question of Ethics," Mind, LXXIV 
[January, 1965], No. 293. 
9. See Charles Stevenson, "Persuasive Definition,'' Mind, XLIX 
(1938), 339-40. The intent of a persuasive definition is to use a term 
in a certain way, so as to evoke either a laudatory or derogatory attitude. 
To suggest, for example, that Plato's "Republic," or the Soviet Union, 
or the state of Mississippi is a "closed society," is intended to evoke 
a derogatory attitude toward them. A persuasive definition may also, 
however, make an insightful comparison or distinction hitherto un­
noticed, as, for example, the one-time (now recognized to be over­
stated) remark "Metaphysics is nonsense," or "The meaning of a 
statement is the method of its verification." Or, to apply this to educa­
tion: "Teaching without learning is meaningless." See also SchefBer, 
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The Language of Education, Chapter I, especially pp. 20-21; and 
Komisar and McClellan, Preface to the American Education, in C. D. 
Hardie, Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory, especially p. xv, 
in which they argue that philosophical analysis of educational terms, 
contrary to the charges of some of its critics, is intended to eventuate 
in moral guidance and prescription. "It is the educator's occupational 
mandate to culminate his work in recommendations." 
10. Mortimer J. Adler, "In Defense of the Philosophy of Education,'' 
Forty-first Yearbook, National Society for the Study of Education 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 221-29. 
11. Principia Ethica, p. 11. 
12. For a related discussion, cf. O'Connor's criticism of Maritain's 
question "Who are we?" in which Maritain is said to offer "disguised 
conclusions of argument on natural religion and very debatable ones at 
that."—An Introduction to Philosophy of Education, pp. 115-18. For a 
paradoxical discussion, see Adler (op. cit.~), in which he asserts that 
the one true philosophy of education can be demonstrated only if all 
symposiasts affirmed the undemonstrable truths of metaphysics and the 
nature of man; but since they disagree, "they should not pretend to give, 
nor the readers expect to get, demonstrations" (p. 204). 
13. Scheffler, The Language of Education. See Chapter I for a 
discussion of programmatic definitions and how they compare with 
persuasive definitions. Schemer attempts to stress the cognitive import 
of programmatic definitions (p. 20): "Programmatic definitions raise 
moral issues" and, in particular, "they may be used to express serious 
moral choices" (p. 21). If one man defines eductaion by saying, 
"Education is a process of adjustment to life experiences" and another 
says, "Education is the cultivation of the intellect," a moral choice 
may very well be expressed; but if the one argues for X and the other 
for Y in this way, does the definition decide anything that warrants 
our calling it "cognitive"? 
14. See B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis, op. cit., p. 86. 
"It is well understood that words can be defined to satisfy the purpose 
of the individual who uses them. For this reason, many controversies 
center on the meaning of terms. The literature of education is filled 
with claims and counter-claims about the meaning of 'education.' One 
authority defines education as growth; another says it is the cultivation 
of intellectual virtues; and still another claims that education is the 
means by which civilization is transmitted from one generation to 
another. These definitions are controversial, because each one is 
packed with a set of preferences about what is to be taught, how it is 
to be taught, who is to be educated, and so on. And conducting the 
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controversy consists in unpacking the definitions, each side pointing out 
what to include, and at the same time claiming its own conception 
to be more defensible and desirable." 
15. See, for example, the Forty-first and the Fifty-fourth Yearbook, 
National Society for the Study of Education. 
16. See H. Broudy, "A Classical Realist's View of Education,'' in 
Philip H. Phenix (ed.), Philosophies of Education (New York: John 
Wiley, 1961), p. 21. 
17. H. Home, "Twenty-three Years Later," in Joe Park (ed.), 
Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Education (New York: Mac­
millan, 1958), p. 193. 
18. For a fuller account, see Harry S. Broudy, "How Philosophical 
Can a Philosophy of Education Be?", Journal of Philosophy, 52 (Oct. 
27, 1955), 615-18; also his Building a Philosophy of Education 
(1961), p. 13. 
19. H. S. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education (2nd ed.), 
p. 19. Copyright © 1961. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
20. Two yearbooks in the philosophy of education and, in particular, 
the work of Professor Harry Broudy, a charge by Sidney Hook, and a 
response by Professor Joe Burnett clearly show the use of "implication" 
in metaphysical arguments in education. 
21. Sidney Hook, "The Scope of Philosophy of Education," Harvard 
Educational Review, XXVI (Spring, 1956), 148. 
22. "How Philosophical Can a Philosophy of Education Be?" p. 617. 
23. Ibid., pp. 617-18. 
24. Ibid., p. 618. The following qualifications needs to be noted 
carefully. A metaphysical premise X logically implies an educational 
conclusion Y, only in the sense that Y is consistent with X. For 
example, Hutchins's emphasis on intellectual virtue would not stress 
a life-activities type of curriculum, and Dewey's emphasis on growth 
makes it inconsistent to endorse, to stress, and to put into practice a 
"St. John's University Great Books" type of curriculum. All that is 
at stake is whether what is proposed is consistent with a metaphysical 
belief. Thus it would, for example, be inconsistent if Hutchins, who 
believes in "the cultivation of the intellect" in the classical tradition, 
were to propose an educational curriculum which emphasized "life­
adjustment" experiences, which interfered with the study of the 
Great Books. But, since Hutchins proposes the teaching of the Great 
Books rather than life-adjustment experiences, his educational pro­
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posal may be said to be logically implied (in addition to other premises) 
by his belief in the development of the intellect. 
25. Hid.,-p. 617. 
26. See Anthony Flew and Alasdair Maclntyre (eds.) New 
Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 
101-8. 
27. Op. cit., p. 617. 
28. See O'Connor, An Introduction to Philosophy of Education, 
p. 128. 
29. Ibid., p. 106. 
30. Broudy s use of philosophy seems to make philosophy out to be 
a tribunal or Supreme Court, a function one would think philosophy 
had lost during this century. 
31. Broudy, "How Philosophical Can a Philosophy of Education 
Be?", p. 616. 
32. Ibid., p. 615. 
33. Ibid. 
34. A metaphysical belief does not imply an educational policy at 
least in this sense: that a metaphysical belief can be used to sanction 
both of two incompatible policies. Further, divergent and incompatible 
metaphysical beliefs do not necessarily imply incompatible educational 
policies. An example of the first: agreement on the belief in God does 
not necessarily resolve a disagreement concerning the teaching of 
reading. Nor, as an example of the second, does disagreement about 
the existence of God necessarily imply disagreement concerning the 
method of teaching reading. 
35. Hook, "The Scope of Philosophy of Education,' p. 146. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid., p. 148. 
38. Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York: Macmillan, 
1961), pp. 245-48. 
39. For an account of persuasive definitions in education, see 
Schemer, The Language of Education, Chapter I. 
40. Note that Broudy hopes that philosophy will bring about a 
solution to an educational problem. He does not say that philosophy 
does do so, although the hope that it does result in a solution may be a 
vain chimera, one no longer sought even in analytic philosophy. 
///. The Use of Moral Arguments in Education 
A metaphysical belief (a belief in a transcendent God or in 
a naturalistic world) may be invoked as an ultimate basis 
for decisions about what, how, or whom to teach. A philo­
sophical position is claimed, on this ground, to "imply'' prac­
tical conclusions for education. One difficulty in the appeal 
to metaphysical belief for implication of educational policy 
decisions is the kinship of educational argument to persuasive 
rather than to demonstrable argument. This permits a con­
clusion to appear on occasion as the "proven" conclusion of a 
metaphysical argument, while the argument is actually "con­
cluded" only in the persuasive sense and not at all in the 
demonstrable sense. 
Practical educational conclusions may be drawn from moral 
beliefs as well as from metaphysical beliefs. The effort to 
justify an educational program may be solely and overtly 
moral. Witness, for example, Sidney Hook's conclusion to an 
educational question where he tries to avoid involvement 
with metaphysics. 
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The dependence of curricular proposals on moral beliefs 
is not hard to see. Education is designed to be of some 
particular service to the society that creates it. The goals and 
values of a society are believed relevant to the ends of 
education—which in turn guide, if not imply, practical edu­
cational policies and programs. Reference is made, often glibly 
and inexactly, to "culture'' as a basis for deciding the ends, 
contents, and means of education. The inescapable fact of 
the existence of a culture makes it impossible to deny alto­
gether its goals and values that are meant to serve as the ends 
of education. The question is, which goals and values of the 
culture shall determine the ends of education? 
The appeal to this sort of justification is sometimes meta­
physical and sometimes moral. Different traditions have dif­
ferent and often conflicting concepts of what the ends of 
education should be. It may be meaningful to consider how 
a moral argument is used in the philosophy of education 
(whether such an argument is more nearly "persuasive"' or 
"demonstrable"). 
The effort to use a moral argument in philosophy of 
education runs up against the hurdle of drawing a valid 
ethical conclusion—a condition made plain by R. M. Hare, 
and before him by G. E. Moore. The problem is, in effect, 
that what ought to he cannot validly be deducted from what is. 
If "is" implied "ought" or "right," one could substitute "is"' 
for "ought" or "right," and say, "What is, is right"—which is 
not necessarily the import when one says that something is 
morally right. It would be self-contradictory—substituting "is" 
for "'ought"—to say, "X is so, but X ought not to be so." * One 
could not take moral exception to what actually happened. 
In a world where "is" equaled "ought," one could argue from 
"Hitler killed six million Jews" to "Hitler was right.'' Similarly, 
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one could point to an instance of segregated schooling and 
say, "See, that proves it's right." The method would be the 
same one that is used in observing the height of buildings; 
but it would not be possible to argue the case one way or 
the other or to deny what was morally wrong if "is" actually 
meant the same thing as "'ought.'' A satisfactory conclusion 
to a moral argument must at least be a validly derived 
"'ought" statement.2 
Several recent efforts have been made in philosophy of 
education to surmount the "is-ought" gap and to draw valid 
ethical conclusions. Three such efforts will be considered in 
a search for how (in what sense of an argument, whether 
in Sense I or Sense II, whether Purist or Capricious) a moral 
argument is used in philosophy of education, and what diffi­
culties, if any, stand in the way of drawing a valid conclusion 
in such a moral argument. 
The Instrumental Effort 
The first of these efforts is the Instrumental, which rests 
on a means-ends continuum. According to the Instrumental 
approach, the ends (aims or goals) of education are not 
isolable from the means (or methods) of education. One must 
take certain conditions into account if one wishes to achieve 
an end-in-view. John Dewey writes that "if a person aims to 
build a bridge, he must build it in a certain way, and of 
certain materials, or else he will not have a bridge but a 
heap of stones." 3 Similarly, ''given an end, say promotion of 
health, growth, psychological observations and reflection put 
us in control of the conditions concerned in that growth." 
He says, "We know that if we are to get that end, we must 
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do it in a certain way." 4 These means-ends valuations may 
be expressed in the "if-then"' form, e.g., "If you want to be 
healthy, then take vitamins.'' One recent Instrumentalist writer 
points out that if a certain kind of building maximizes learn­
ing opportunities for children—which is a desirable end-in­
view—then the construction of what kind of school is desirable. 
The end-in-view considered in the antecedent is ''to maximize 
learning opportunities for children." This remains merely a 
pious goal, however, until (or unless) it is taken in conjunc­
tion with the means necessary to achieve the end-in-view. 
One of the means (testable empirically) may be the construc­
tion of a school building in a certain way, with proper lighting, 
so many floors, etc. 
An evaluative decision, such as the desirability of putting 
up a new school building in a certain way, is justified by 
appealing to the antecedent desirability of maximizing learning. 
Thus, in the words of L. G. Thomas: 
Propositions of this (evaluative) type imply a conditional 
clause or the interest to be promoted: "You should do 
this, if you want that outcome." Or to use the "if-then" 
form of implication, "if I want this interest fulfilled, then 
I ought to do such and such." 5 
What is "worth having" becomes "the content of the 
conditional 'if clause.'' Thus, according to the Instrumental 
approach, "if you want to maximize learning experiences, then 
[you must] construct a school building in a certain way." 6 
But how are we to judge or test whether the desirability 
characterization or end-in-view is good? To say, "It is desir­
able to increase learning opportunities' (just as with "It is 
desirable to prevent or minimize automobile accidents") is 
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to make a value judgment that is not empirically verifiable.7 
Determining the desirability of a goal is not quite the same 
thing as wanting or prizing it.8 If there were not this differ­
ence, it would be self-contradictory to say, "X is prized" (held 
dear or wanted; "represents the consummatory focal point of 
a number of associated interests") on grounds A and B (where 
A and B are "'empirically ascertainable means"), but "'still X 
ought not to be done.'' That would surely be one instance of 
not noting the difference between "is" and "ought." 
Moreover, the end-in-view or desirability characterization 
may be incompletely delimited and so encompass value enough 
to subsume incompatible commands under it. For example, 
should we increase "opportunities to learn'' the evolutionary 
account of the origin of life on earth? Shall we "increase 
opportunities to learn'' how to annihilate others? Some despi­
cable regime might build schools to increase the learning 
opportunities for the young to become even more "despicable." 
And if that example were ruled out as not representing "con­
summatory focal points of a number of associated interests,1' 
one could ask what makes this goal despicable and some other 
aim praiseworthy? Is it not a persuasive identification of values 
or interests? 
The vagueness of the end-in-view and the resulting incom­
patibility of opposing ends-in-view (or desirability charac­
terizations) open wide the question "Learning to what end?" 
Only by a persuasive definition of the phrase "increase learning 
opportunities" to mean "learn X," together with a previously 
affirmed desideratum of values that people prize, can X be 
chosen over Y. The "is-ought" gap consequently remains, and 
while the answer to the question of how to choose an end-in­
view may satisfy one sense of an argument, it does not satisfy 
the one intended. 
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The Consensual Effort 
Another recent effort to draw a satisfactory or justifiable 
conclusion to a moral argument in education is the Consensual. 
The "is-ought" distinction is made; judgments of fact are 
recognized as different from practical (evaluative) judgments; 
statements in the indicative mood are not considered to be 
sufficient to imply practical judgments. An attempt is never­
theless made to deal with the difficulty that has stranded the 
Instrumental effort. What is special about the Consensual 
effort is the attempt to answer the question of the justification 
of ends, i.e., how to choose rationally among ends without 
ignoring the "is-ought" distinction. 
The Consensual effort is illustrated in the work of R. Bruce 
Raup and his associates. They contend that 'practical judg­
ments respond to . questions in which there is impli­
cation of moral responsibility—these questions can readily be 
given form around the word 'should.' " 9 
To argue for an imperative conclusion in philosophy of 
education, Raup and his associates have developed what they 
call the method of "practical intelligence" as a "criterion of 
community persuasion'' for deciding among competing ends-
in-view. The notion of "warranted assertibility'' proposed in 
the Instrumental model to conclude a moral argument does 
not, according to Raup, sufficiently justify a decision on what 
should be done. The criterion of Community Persuasion, 
which has been carefully spelled out in the writings of Raup, 
was designed to fill the gap left by the Instrumental effort 
and to provide a criterion for arriving at some warrantable 
desirability characterization. Applied to education, this criterion 
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is used to justify a moral decision based on a democratic and 
uncoerced social consensus. 
Raup's Consensual effort has influenced other philosophers 
of education as well as the social psychologists and guidance 
personnel of various human-relations groups who are not 
entirely satisfied with the Instrumental (or scientific) method 
of drawing moral conclusions. They also prefer not to appeal 
directly to metaphysical sanctions to justify moral judgments 
in education. Two versions of the Consensual effort will be 
considered, to show how it is used. One calls for a recon­
structed society, the other for a revival of a nearly authentic 
religious tradition; both are intended to support moral con­
clusions in philosophy of education. 
According to the Social Reconstructionist version of the 
Consensual effort, a criterion for choosing among conflicting 
desirability characterizations10 is called "the principle of de­
fensible partiality." u According to this principle, some ideals 
among others are worth defending; majority rule decides 
which they are when unanimity is unobtainable. The para­
digm of trial by jury is suggested as a court of final appeal 
in deciding difficult cases.12 
If all of mankind thought that X (say, capital punishment) 
was good, would that make it so? Nose-counting, indicating 
what is, does not imply what ought to be. The Consensualist 
might answer that consensus is not to be taken as extension 
but intension of the meaning of a moral community. In that 
sense, it is not self-contradictory to say, "X is believed by 
consensus to be right, even though it is wrong.'' But to define 
X persuasively as morally right under these circumstances 
amounts to ignoring the difference between "is" and "ought." 
The nearly religious version of the Consensual effort 
criticizes and sets out to supplement the Instrumental ap­
proach, according to one writer, I. B. Berkson, as follows: 
 74 The Place of Reason in Education
These many differences between . science and ethics 
disqualify the experimentalist method as a means 
of establishing the principles of conduct. But there is 
even a deeper difficulty. In science, objective evi­
dence is possible. In ethics, we can only refer to the 
opinions of other men. In science, we can have the 
impersonal evidence of an experimental test. In morals, 
we can only have testimony, the testimony of men of 
vision, of the poets, the saints, and the philosophers, of 
men whose lives and whose words evoke a response 
in us.13 
It may make for good literary cadence to say that science 
depends on impersonal tests, whereas ethics depends on the 
testimony of men. But it makes for rather questionable logic. 
A testimony is not another kind of test. Hume long ago 
observed, in his argument on miracles: 
Is the consequence just, because some human testimony 
has the utmost force and authority in some cases, when it 
relates the battle of Philippi or Pharsalia, for instance, 
that therefore all kinds of testimony must in all cases 
have equal force and authority? 14 
Even if testimony, as distinct from scientific tests, were 
relevant to morals, testimony that Lincoln was a great moral 
man might outweigh testimony on the moral greatness of 
Giordano Bruno or Mahatma Gandhi, or it might be the 
reverse; yet the weight and degree of testimony for or against 
a person do not necessarly imply—unless the "is-ought" dis­
tinction is waived—moral greatness. And if Berkson means 
only the testimony of wise or good men or ''men of vision," 
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then his argument is circular and begs the question of whether 
the testimony of men ought to be a basis for justifying moral 
judgments. 
Even if testimony were admissible as factual evidence of 
the values by which people prefer to live, such testimony 
would not furnish a test of the values by which people ought 
to live. The Social Reconstructionist version of the Consensual 
effort hangs by the same limb, whether it is the testimony 
of those who came before or trial by jury of one's peers (the 
consensus of others). Even though testimony may persua­
sively define 'what is morally right,'' that is not sufficient to 
establish any conclusion as to what people ought to believe 
or by what values they should live. For it is possible to say, 
without self-contradiction: "X is believed by consensus to 
be right, although it is wrong.'' To appeal to the Consensual 
criterion, therefore, is to put forward a moral argument that 
is persuasive rather than cogently demonstrable. 
The A Priori Effort 
A third effort to use a moral judgment in philosophy of 
education is the a priori approach. The logic is intended to 
be impeccable. A moral conclusion is intended to be true 
and to follow validly from the premises. The a priori effort, 
like the deontological (or Intuitionist) ethical viewpoint, 
emphasizes the cognitive character of ethical statements. Three 
different versions of the a priori approach will be considered. 
The first of these versions is illustrated by the contention 
of F. J. Sheed, a noted Catholic layman, that we cannot 
educate children without first knowing "the purpose of life'' 
and that this knowledge can come only from "the revealed 
word of God." Hence, in the words of one writer, Sheed 
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"has a certain and authoritative answer to the first problem 
in education, that is, the ends and purposes it should seek 
to serve." 15 
The following syllogism is designed to show how this 
conclusion would follow from its premises: 
The purpose of life and education is revealed by the 
word of God. 
One ought to believe in the revealed word of God. 
Therefore, one ought to believe in the purpose of life 
and education as revealed by God. 
In seeking to draw a valid and correct ethical conclusion, one 
begins by assuming the truth of the premises. The first 
premise states that the purpose of life and education is re­
vealed by the word of God—an affirmation that has not been 
proved or demonstrated in the philosophically conclusive sense 
in which it is intended to be taken. One always has to begin 
with this "if": that the major premise is what one believes. 
The difficulty is that one may not always believe it. Hence 
one could always mount an opposing syllogism with the 
negation of the original major premise and conclude with 
the contradictory of the previous syllogism—and there would 
be no way to choose between them. 
A second version of the a priori effort to use a moral 
argument in philosophy of education is illustrated by the 
following syllogistic reasoning from Mortimer Adler: 
Good habits (virtues) are the same for all men. 
Education should aim at the formation of good habits. 
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Therefore, education should aim at the same objectives 
for all men.16 
One feature of the impeccable logic here is seen in the 
observance of Hare's principle: 
No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a 
set of premises which does not contain at least one 
imperative.17 
The difficulty with this version of the a priori approach, 
however, is seen when one applies Hare's discussion of 
descriptive characteristics to the foregoing syllogism. Hare 
distinguished between the evaluative meaning of a word and 
the "'criteria of application." The evaluative meaning remains 
the same, but the criteria of application to various contexts 
may differ. (Toulmin's uses of argument suggest a similar 
view: see Chapter I.) A good sports car is not the same as 
a good tennis racket or a good executioner or a good man. 
These can all be called "good" because the general descrip­
tion of each makes use of evaluative meaning. The descriptive 
characteristics, however, provide criteria of application and 
furnish the answer to the follow-up question: "What is good 
about it?" 
In connection with the above syllogism, for example, one 
descriptive question would ask: Education should aim at the 
formation of what 'good habits (virtues)"? (Increasing acute­
ness of description entails increasing specificity.) 
Let us consider loyalty as an example of a "good habit." 
Substituting "loyalty" for "good habits," we have the following 
syllogism: 
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Loyalty is the same for all men. 
Education should aim at the formation of what is the 
same for all men. 
Therefore, education should aim at the formation of 
loyalty for all men. 
To keep the moral characteristic from lacking application, 
however, the further question arises: Loyalty to whom? In­
sertion of an additional descriptive characteristic may give 
rise to the following awkward conclusion: 
Loyalty (to the U.S.S.R.) is the same for all men. 
Education should aim at the formation of what is the 
same for all men. 
Therefore, education should aim at the formation of 
loyalty to the U.S.S.R. for all men. 
The difficulty with this version of the a priori approach 
is that although Adler's more general syllogism follows an 
impeccable logic, one can aways make new versions by apply­
ing descriptive characteristics to it and mount an opposing 
syllogism next to each new version. One could just as easily 
substitute U.S. for U.S.S.R. in order to draw a conclusion 
incompatible with that of the previous syllogism. Arguments 
that exhibit an impeccable logic, but lack relevance to prac­
tical problems, have no use.18 
The difficulty with the a priori approach (as noted thus 
far) is that it is either too abstract to have practical applica­
tion or, once abstractions are replaced by specifics, conclusions 
follow, if at all, awkwardly, even anomalously. One can, by 
merely substituting the negation of the major premise, mount 
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an opposing—and equally valid—syllogism next to the original. 
It is not self-contradictory to deny either the original or the 
opposing syllogism. Therefore, to define either of these as 
moral is once again to fail to take note of the difference 
between "is" and "ought." 
In another version of the a priori approach (different in 
most respects from the foregoing), J. E. McClellan tries to 
show that "if one is in doubt about the truth of a moral 
sentence'' such as Q, "The use of mechanical contraception is 
morally wrong,'' one can "seek evidence concerning the con­
sequences "by a moral truth" like P, "One ought to treat 
human beings humanely and justly/' about which one "is not 
in doubt." 19 P is analytically true in the sense that "ought'7 
means "treating human beings humanely and justly,'' and 
it is thus self-contradictory to say — P, "One ought to treat 
human beings inhumanely and unjustly.1' The reason for this 
is that 'ought" refers precisely to the sorts of acts that are 
humane and just; otherwise, "ought" would not have acquired 
the moral meaning it has. 
But, as Moore has shown about denning "'good," if P is 
true by definition, someone else can redefine P so that it 
is no longer true. (See Chapter II on educational definitions.) 
Declaring P true on grounds that "ought" means "doing what 
is humane and just" can be denied by redefining ''ought" as 
"doing one's duty' (like pulling the switch on the electric 
chair), regardless of whether "it is humane and just.'' Hence 
P can be denied without self-contradiction, and saying that P 
is by definition logically undeniable is not noting the differ­
ence between "is" and "ought" in the precise fashion called 
for by Moore. 
McClellan, well aware of the 'open-question'' argument, 
does not say that P is, strictly speaking, true by definition. 
Therefore, pressing the "open-question'' argument upon P may 
The Place of Reason in Education 80 
not be enough. He nevertheless does want P to do the job of 
a moral truth that is not in doubt and that can help him to 
judge moral statements such as Q, about which he is in doubt. 
There remains the problem of the minor premise. Since the 
conclusion is Q, the minor is, let us say, ~ R, "Not using me­
chanical contraception is a way of treating human beings 
humanely and justly." The practical syllogism, then, looks like 
this (changing only the original Q to read — Q, and vice 
versa, for notational convenience): 
Pi One ought to treat human beings humanely and 
justly. 
•—' Ri Not using mechanical contraception is a way of 
treating human beings humanely and justly. 
—• Qi Therefore, one ought not to use mechanical con­
traception ("ought" here means the same thing 
as morally wrong). 
But what happens if, instead, one were to use Ri to imply Q, 
as follows: 
P One ought to treat human beings humanely and 
justly. 
Ri Using mechanical contraception is a way of treating 
human beings humanely and justly. 
Q Therefore, one ought to use mechanical contracep­
tion. 
Granting the moral truth of P, how would this help one 
to choose between R and — R, in order to imply either Q or 
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^ Q  ? What has happened is that "treating human beings 
humanely and justly" is identified persuasively by believers 
of '—' R as not using mechanical contraception, whereas "treat­
ing human beings humanely and justly'' is identified per­
suasively by believers of R as using mechanical contraception. 
The difficulty has been relayed, as with some other a priori 
arguments involving the minor, but leaving the major anlayt­
ically intact. With which ought the phrase "treating human 
beings humanely and justly" be identified, "using" or "not 
using" mechanical contraception? (For this conflict over 
usage, see also Chapter II on educational definitions.) P is 
itself necessary, but when it is joined with either R or -—' R 
(each of which is a persuasive definition), it becomes insuffi­
cient to justify either Q or -—• Q as an answer to the moral 
question "Ought one to use mechanical contraception?" 
If we apply this use of argument to education, the same 
difficulty occurs. Using P as the major, the minor and con­
clusion are as follows: 
P One ought to treat human beings humanely and 
justly. 
R2 Segregated schooling is a way to treat human beings 
humanely and justly. 
Q2 Therefore, one ought to favor segregated schooling. 
Substitute —R2 (in place of R2); now the conclusion —Q2 
follows: 
P One ought to treat human beings humanely and 
justly. 
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— R2	 Segregated schooling is not a way to treat human 
beings humanely and justly. 
'—' Q2 Therefore, one ought not to favor segregated 
schooling. 
How	 to choose between Q2 and ~Q_2? 
Or consider: 
P3 One should teach children
humanely and justly. 
 to treat human beings 
R3 Respecting private property rights is a way t
human beings humanely and justly. 
o treat 
Q_3 Therefore, one ought to teach children respect for 
private property rights. 
But, in some other country, using P3 with — R3, "'revolution­
izing against private property rights'' implies —Q3 as follows: 
P3 One should teach children to treat human beings 
humanely and justly. 
—R3 Revolutionizing against private property rights is 
a way to treat human beings humanely and justly. 
—Q3 Therefore, one ought to teach children to revolu­
tionize against private property rights. 
Again, how is one to choose between Q3 and — Q3 on the 
basis of impeccable logic (observance of Hare's rule), given 
that each has the same true moral premise? 
In either case, a wedge R (or — R) is inserted between 
P and Q, in order to answer the question of what sorts of 
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acts ought to count as humane and just; and this insertion 
is in the nature of a persuasive definition. (See Chapter II.) 
Notice, finally, how this compares with Frankena's analysis 
of the syllogism: 
a. Pleasure is sought by all men. 
b. What is sought by all men is good. 
c. Therefore, pleasure is good.20 
In this argument, step b, just like R (note the analogy), com­
mits the 'naturalistic" (or more precisely the "definist") fallacy 
of using a persuasive definition to imply c or Q. 
The difficulties with the a priori approach, then, are that 
the major premise can be easily replaced by its negation, re­
sulting in a denial of the original conclusion, and that the 
minor premise is a persuasive definition. One may accordingly 
use a moral syllogism to "imply"' practical educational conclu­
sions—but only to suit one's own ends. Thus the a priori 
effort approaches a moral argument in philosophy of educa­
tion more in the manner of Sense I than in that of Sense II. 
Moral as well as metaphysical beliefs are used to imply 
conclusions to arguments in philosophy of education. The 
effort to use a moral argument encounters the "is-ought" 
obstacle—that an ethical conclusion of what ought to be 
cannot validly be deduced solely from what is. If "is"' implied 
or meant the same thing as "ought,' it would be tautological 
to say, "What is, is right," and self-contradictory to say, "What 
is, is wrong.' The identification of "is'' with "ought" would 
consequently rule out the possibliity of denying (or morally 
disapproving of) an existing state of affairs, on the grounds 
that to deny what is, is self-contradictory.21 
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Surmounting the "is-ought"' difficulty by validly deducing 
an ethical conclusion is necessary, though not sufficient, to 
justify a moral argument in education satisfying Sense II of 
the word "'argument.'' If "is'' meant ''ought," one could say: 
"Killing Jews is done. Therefore, killing Jews is right. This 
man is a Jew. Therefore, killing him is right.1' This will not 
do as a moral conclusion in Sense II, about which one 
cannot then raise the open question. 
Several efforts have been made to use a moral argument in 
the philosophy of education, taking note of the difference 
between "is' and "ought" and seeking to draw valid and 
justifiable conclusions to moral arguments. In the first of 
these efforts, a consequent end-in-view remains untested by 
verification of the means without verification of a given end-
in-view. In the second, while it is not self-contradictory to say 
that "X is believed by consensus to be right, although it is 
wrong," the attempt persuasively to identify consensus with 
"moral" is an instance of overlooking the difference between 
"is'' and 'ought.' In the a priori effort, the argument using 
P to justify Q falls apart if insertion of a different persuasive 
definition, R or •—' R, implies a different conclusion. (More­
over, although, for the most part, it has been assumed with 
McClellan that P is true, suppose that P4, "A race of people, 
by submitting to a thumbscrew from one another, attained to 
eternal bliss and justice,' were true; would that not wreck 
P?) The difficulty of drawing a conclusion to a moral argu­
ment in philosophy of education has not therefore been satis­
factorily surmounted by either the Instrumental, the Con­
sensual, or the a priori effort. 
On the basis of these observations, a moral argument is 
used as was the metaphysical argument—not in the sense of 
an "'argument" that is rationally defensible. The attempt has 
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been made to show a difficulty that may have been unrecog­
nized, when moral arguments were used in each of three 
principal efforts in the philosophy of education.22 In these 
efforts, a basis for misgiving occurs, as it did with the meta­
physical argument, when the "intentional" use of the word 
"argument" shifts into the ''success" use. There is nothing, 
however, that is foolish about any of these efforts to draw a 
defensible conclusion to a moral argument, so long as one 
does not mistake one sense of 'argument" for another. The 
attempt has not been made to show whether a moral argu­
ment can be used but instead to show, in each instance, how 
a moral argument is used. It has been shown that a moral 
argument is used more like Sense I, even though it is intended 
to be used in Sense II (that is, in a rationally defensible way). 
Noting how a moral argument is used may serve as a 
reminder of the difficulty that results from foregoing the use 
of an argument in Sense II. Moral arguments are surely not 
all of the "'peach pie'' kind (noted in Chapter I, which can 
be used whimsically—that is, in whichever way one feels like 
using them). Yet the effort to satisfy Sense II comes up against 
the "is-ought" hurdle, which has not, in any of the instances 
noted, been surmounted. 
What now? Are we at the end of the road? Are meta­
physical and moral arguments in education used in only this 
way? Shall we rest content with using a moral argument (or 
a metaphysical argument) with no way to judge one argu­
ment as against another? Does not the absence of a conclusion 
in Sense II (to a metaphysical or moral argument) warrant 
a counsel of despair? Is it any wonder that one is apt to hear 
the Emotivist contention that there is really no sense in 
asking what is right or wrong, since moral valuations are 
neither true nor false? 23 
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peers, but not necessarily the truth, nor even the right verdict. I am 
indebted for this observation to a friend, Profesor Alfred M. Rifkin. 
13. Isaac B. Berkson, The Ideal and the Community (New York: 
Harper & Bros., 1958) p. 59. 
14. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (New York: 
The Library of Liberal Arts, 1957), p. 134. 
15. See B. Othanel Smith, William O. Stanley, and J. Harland 
Shores, Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, (rev. ed.; Yonkers-
on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book Co., 1957), pp. 531-32. 
16. "In Defense of the Philosophy of Education," Forty-first Year­
book, National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago, 1942), p. 239. 
17. Richard M. Hare, The Language of Morals (London: Clarendon 
Press, 1952), p. 28. 
18. A similar type of syllogism is furnished by Hutchins (see 
Chapter I), also for the Purist use of argument. 
19. "Two Questions about the Teaching of Values,' Educational 
Theory, XI (January, 1961), 12. 
20. William K. Frankena, "The Naturalistic Fallacy," in Wilfrid 
Sellars and John Hospers (eds.), Readings in Ethical Theory (New 
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21. This could and even does, it could be argued, daily apply 
with cruel force in the continuation of educational programs and 
policies that cannot, even under the most charitable circumstances, 
count as "educational." Witness woefully inadequate and often harm­
ful schools for the under-privileged. 
22. Although the difference between "is" and 'ought" is now 
well enough known to bear repetition, quarrying moral arguments as 
here done reveals, it seems, an almost inescapable Heisenberg-like 
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effect in a blending of the one with the other; it may even reach into 
the field of education where, for example, the idea local people 
have of an education for good citizenship seems somehow to imply 
for them a good education, or the idea a philosophical group has 
either of a good Christian or of a technically well-trained person again 
somehow seems to imply being "well-educated," as if either of these 
spelled crowning success in education. It may be that because ongoing 
education is yet a luxury most of the world over, a little bit of it is 
thought to be a good thing, which it surely often is; but to this is 
added the thought that the education given is a final good, as well as 
good through and through, which invariably it never really is. 
23. See, for example, Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth, and 
Logic (New York: Dover, 1950), p. 108. 
Afterword to Part I and Foreword to Part II 
In philosophy of education it is easier to say what arguments 
are unsatisfactory and why than it is to designate what argu­
ments are satisfactory and how one is to judge among them. 
Several educational arguments have been analyzed in Part 
One, and the difficulties of drawing conclusions in this area 
have been observed. In the two types of metaphysical argu­
ments that involve educational definitions and beliefs, several 
logical difficulties were noted, such as attempting to conclude 
with more than was in the premises or drawing an imperative 
conclusion from descriptive premises. It was pointed out that 
these difficulties exist whether one uses the constructive or the 
derivative approach or disclaims both approaches. Three types 
of moral arguments were found wanting for having more in 
the conclusion ("ought") than in the premises ("is") or for 
having empty premises, even though the logic of the argument 
was impeccable (Hare's rule; see Chapter III). 
Thus the impasse discussed in Chapter I was illustrated 
in Chapters II and III. Evaluative arguments issuing in forms 
of "Do X" or "Teach X" seemed uniformly to break down. 
The dilemma appeared to be this: either we adopt the Purist 
but essentially irrelevant criteria, or we get along with 
no criteria at all and consequently with no way to judge 
educational arguments. 
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Several uses of metaphysical and moral arguments were 
criticized in Part One on grounds that they "settled" ques­
tions in one sense, perhaps, but not in another and far more 
significant sense. The criticism was more prophylactic than 
therapeutic: it warned of which arguments to avoid and why; 
it did not positively propose rational canons of criticism for 
use in judging which arguments to admit and which to rebut. 
The account in Part I of metaphysical and moral arguments 
in education might compel us to conclude that we have no 
way out of the Purist-Capricious impasse. Does this mean 
defeat? Have we no criterion by which to judge what qualifies 
as a demonstrable argument because we have no true premise 
from which to infer the truth of the conclusion? Is the 
Purist ideal only a mathematical logician's dream, empty and 
impossible in its application to educational arguments? 
To counter the thought of surrender in the first round, 
let it be remembered here that the Purist use of the word 
"argument,'' as approximated by formal logic and science, 
provides a desirable example of univocity and a model of a 
satisfactory argument. Contrary to Toulmin's appraisal, the 
historical development of the formal model over the centuries 
has been a great feat. 
Logic and science do not, however, give us the criterion 
by which to determine which educational arguments we 
should heed and which we should ignore. The formal require­
ments of argument are too stringent; the Purist use of argu­
ment eliminates educational arguments that we ought not 
to ignore. On the other hand, the Capricious use admits 
arguments indiscriminately. 
The difficulties of assessing educational arguments were 
presented in Part I, on the assumption that knowledge of 
what is wrong precedes discovery of what may be right. 
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An attempt to test the mettle of educational arguments 
with rational canons of criticism will be made in Part Two. 
This attempt will include an indication of the scope and 
limits of reason through an assessment of metaphysical and 
moral arguments in education in a way that is intended to 
avoid the Purist-Capricious dilemma and to move, somewhat, 
toward justifying Sense II of the word 'argument.'' 
It may be anticipated that there is indeed a way out of the 
impasse—small, but sufficient to give some rational basis for 
judging educational arguments. The problem—even if the 
forthcoming solution is wrong—consists in discerning some 
characteristics or canons of criticism X or Y that give us a 
rational basis for judging which arguments to admit and 
which to eliminate or rebut. 
The solution will suggest a third use of argument as a 
way out of the impasse. There may be a use of argument 
that is not so restrictive as to exclude all educational arguments 
and yet not so open as to admit all such arguments indis­
criminately. Some have the idea that the question "Why 
should the humanities be taught?" requires an argument for 
its answer—a set of premises fitted to an assumed logical 
model so that they constitute good reasons for assenting to 
"The humanities should be taught." * That idea is tied neither 
to the Purist mathematical logician's model nor to the Capri­
cious use of argument such as we have found in some 
"'answers" offered by philosophers of education to educational 
questions. Relative to the possible third use of argument 
(which is not like Sense I or Sense II), Israel Scheffler writes: 
We do not consider it a matter of indifference or whim 
just what the educator chooses to teach. Some selections 
we judge better than others; others we deem positively 
intolerable. Nor are we content to discuss issues 
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of selection as if they hinged on personal taste alone. 
We try to convince others; we present ordered argu­
ments; we appeal to relevant consequences and implicit 
commitments.2 
On what grounds do we judge some decisions to be better 
than others? Our third use will not be shown to resemble 
Sense II; but it need not, for that reason, be capricious. (This 
will need proving in future chapters.) Our third use of 
argument suggests a way out of the Purist-Capricious dilemma. 
Although not identical with either the use of argument in 
mathematical logic or with Sense I arguments, this use of 
argument may resemble the kind of philosophical arguments 
for which Frederick Waismann pleads,3 and which Ryle cites 
as the philosopher's tool in trade. It may resemble the philo­
sophical use of the reductio ad absurdum* which Toulmin 
and Hare and other (analytic) philosophers examplify in 
ethics,5 and which, according to one dictionary definition, 
means "to offer reasons for or against something." 6 
Whether we can discover reasons that will satisfy some­
thing like Sense II (while still not Purist) has now to be 
considered. 
1. See McClellan, "Why Should the Humanities Be Taught?" 
2. "Justifying Curricular Decisions." 
3. "How I See Philosophy," in Alfred Jules Ayer (ed.), Logical 
Positivism (Glenncoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959). 
4. G. Ryle, "Philosophical Arguments," in Ayer (ed.), Logical 
Positivism. 
5. Stephen Edelston Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of 
Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). 
6. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. 
Merriam Co., 1953), p. 57. 
Part II. The Place of Reason in Assessing 
Educational Arguments 

IV The Place of Metaphysical Reasons in 
Education 
The view that the metaphysical approach encourages philoso­
phers of education to perpetrate "garrulous absurdities" has 
recently been voiced more gently than it was by Sidney 
Hook. Sterling McMurrin maintains that metaphysics is, in 
principle, irrelevant to education and that it is a mistake to 
think educational theories 'can and should be derived from 
metaphysical premises." 1 This contention (despite some slight 
modification of the ''absurdity" idea) may be dubbed the 
"hard-line,'' "tough-minded," or Purist approach, for it is 
analogous to the Purist use of argument that we have noted. 
If it is correct, it means elimination in toto of any relation 
between metaphysics and education. 
Opposed, of course, to the "hard-line"' or "tough-minded" 
approach is what, after the fashion distinguished by William 
James, may be called the "soft-line"' or "tender-minded" 
approach, which consists in drawing educational conclusions 
from metaphysical beliefs. One difficulty with the use of the 
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hard-line seems to be its comparison of educational arguments 
with arguments in mathematics or science. Its consequent 
exclusion of metaphysics from educational arguments is de­
scribed by at least one writer as an effort to throw the baby 
out with the bath.2 The tough-minded or hard-line approach, 
like the Purist use of argument, which refuses to admit all 
metaphysical and evaluative arguments, excludes too much. 
Frankena's MEM premises 
One proposed solution is Frankena's contention that some 
metaphysical premises are relevant and necessary, although 
not sufficient for implying and justifying educational con­
clusions, and that consequently not all metaphysical argu­
ments are mistaken in principle. He uses a device that he 
calls MEM'S, his abbreviation for metaphysical, epistemological, 
and meta-ethical premises. Taken "together with other true or 
acceptable (factual or valuational) premises," MEM'S, according 
to Frankena, could even be said to be sufficient to justify 
some educational conclusions. 
In suggesting how this might be so, Frankena seems to 
have suggested a way to loosen the vise that has clamped 
philosophy of education between the jaws of Positivism and 
traditional metaphysics. Surely if an argument had premises 
that would both imply and be sufficient to justify an edu­
cational conclusion, it would provide the basis for judging 
educational arguments. We could then show that one argu­
ment is justified, while another is not. If that could be shown, 
we would be able to judge educational arguments without 
"throwing the baby out with the bath.'' If Frankena could 
establish which MEM'S are necessary, we could use these 
together with other necessary premises, moral, factual, peda­
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gogical, etc., to arrive at a basis for judging educational argu­
ments. And we could do this without either admitting or 
banishing all metaphysics indiscriminately, by fiat or by 
persuasive definition. 
It will be useful to examine briefly what Frankena says 
with regard to the use of MEM'S for implying and justifying 
educational conclusions. 
Frankena tries to show that derivation of educational theory 
from metaphysics is not necessarily mistaken in principle; he 
claims that those like Sterling McMurrin, who contend that 
the derivation from metaphysics to education is mistaken or 
''obstinate" or "futile,'' have failed to establish their position.4 
He concedes that some MEM'S seem to have little if any­
thing to do with the aims and methods of education. For 
instance: 
1.	 All that exists is mental or spiritual. 
2.	 The object known is not dependent on its being 
known for its existence or its properties. 
3.	 There are universals, abstract particulars, etc. 
4.	 Intrinsic goodness is a simple, non-natural quality. 
But other MEM premises may have some logical connection 
with theories of education. For instance: 
5.	 Some of our knowledge is innate. 
6.	 There is a God. 
7.	 We have immortal souls and what we believe and do 
in this life makes a difference in what we shall 
experience in the next.5 
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Even though the metaphysical premise may not be suffi­
cient, Frankena says that "it does not follow that the meta­
physical premise is not relevant or even that it is not necessary. 
All that follows is that it is not sufficient by itself." 6 He offers 
one example: 
Consider the theistic belief that there is a God defined 
in the traditional Judeo-Christian way. I too doubt that, 
taken just by itself, it can be said logically to entail any 
conclusions about how or what to teach or why to teach 
it, but I find it hard to believe that it is logically irrele­
vant to such conclusions if it is taken together with other 
premises either of a factual or ethical kind. For example, 
if we add the premise that this God ought to be obeyed 
or that He is the end of all human striving (and yet 
others), it does seem to me that it may follow logically 
that we ought to take obedience to Him or communion 
with Him as an aim of education (at least in non-public 
schools).7 
"More generally,'' says Frankena, 
I am inclined to agree with McMurrin that MEM 
premises, taken singly and by themselves, do not suffice 
to establish any conclusions about the methods and aims 
of education. It does not follow, however, that they are 
not necessary to do so, or that they are irrelevant to 
doing so. It may still be that educational conclusions 
cannot be justified without MEM premises, and it may 
also still be that, taken together with certain other true 
or acceptable premises (factual or valuational), MEM 
premises suffice to justify such conclusions.6 
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Accordingly, 
, MEM premises by themselves probably do not suffice 
logically to establish educational conclusions . , but 
it does seem to me that at least some of them, if true, 
are relevant to such conclusions. 
Moreover, 
Some educational conclusions do presuppose certain 
MEM premises, e.g., that communion with God is the 
end or at least one of the ends of education. If we assume 
that education ought not to seek to promote this end if 
there is no God, then the belief that it ought to promote 
this end requires the premise that there is a God for its 
justification.9 
A Difficulty with Frankena's Approach 
Thus Frankena tries to show that the derivation of edu­
cational theory from metaphysics is not necessarily mistaken. 
One may note how he attempts to avoid the "is-ought" fallacy 
and to refrain from stating more in the conclusion than there 
is in the premises. To the metaphysical premise "There is a 
God," he adds the further statement "God ought to be obeyed," 
and combines these with a premise concerning obedience as 
an aim of education, concluding that obedience to God ought 
to be an aim of education.10 
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Frankena unfortunately involves himself in a difficulty. 
If he means that philosophy X logically implies educational 
conclusion Y, then, given his additional MEM premises and 
factual premises, his conclusion is valid but trivial. If he means 
that the philosophy of X not merely logically implies, but in 
some other significant sense implies and justifies, educational 
conclusion Y, then, given his additional premises, he arrives 
at a conclusion that is perhaps interesting but is invalid. 
To the educational conclusion that obedience to God should 
be an aim of education, Frankena adds the parenthetical 
phrase 'at least in non-public schools.1' When a person asso­
ciated with an ism and backed by its metaphysical belief says, 
"I believe in the philosophy of X," and (with all the logically 
requisite premises to imply teaching for aim Y) concludes, 
"therefore we ought to teach Y in our particular schools," the 
phrase "in our particular schools' is crucial. (Notice its simi­
larity to Frankena's remark in parentheses, "'at least in non-
public schools.") Remove that phrase and one can infer that 
we ought to teach X at large (precisely what the educational 
debate is all about). The proposal to teach X is made not 
merely to teach one's flock but to propagate the faith at large. 
If Frankena's inclusion of the phrase in parentheses is meant 
to confine the teaching to theistic schools, then his implication 
is logical but trivial. Each ism—Lutheranism or Thomism, for 
example—says that its religious philosophy implies its aims of 
education for its own followers and their young. The issue, 
however, is whether to teach X (some religion) at large; and 
this is not settled by logical implication (for reasons subse­
quently to be cited). If Frankena intends that obedience to 
God ought to be an aim of education for schools at large, he 
seeks to conclude with more than there was in the premises. 
If he does not intend this, then he has not shown that meta­
physics is relevant or necessary to an educational conclusion 
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that applies at large. Frankena, it seems, either establishes his 
case by trivializing it or fails to establish that MEM'S even 
imply, much less justify educational conclusions, if more is 
intended than logical implication.11 
The idea that MEM'S, though not sufficient, are necessary 
to imply and to justify educational conclusions does have an 
important consequence: An argument that not only implies, 
but also justifies, one conclusion shows that an incompatible 
conclusion is not justified. It thus provides a basis for judging 
among educational arguments, so that one can say, "This 
argument is justified, that one is not.'' But to justify an edu­
cational conclusion, such as teaching obedience to God, re­
quires more than Frankena has in his premises. One could 
always mount a contrary metaphysical premise, "There is no 
God," and join that premise with other MEM and factual and 
valuational premises to deny that we should teach obedience 
to God. Frankena does not show what is necessary, let alone 
sufficient, to justify an educational conclusion. To state MEM 
premises on behalf of teaching obedience to God, with no 
accompanying argument to show why one cannot mount an 
opposing argument and draw a contradictory conclusion, does 
not seem to justify the first argument. What does it mean to 
"justify'' an educational conclusion, if not to put up the reasons 
why one conclusion is justifiably preferred to the other? 
If one were to equate implication with justification, a 
particular ism could not merely imply, but would also have to 
justify an educational conclusion; its conclusion would apply 
not only to one particular school system but to all school 
systems. The attempt to equate implication with justification 
could be countered by mounting Moore's ''open-question'' 
argument against it. One could argue that to say that X 
implies Y but does not justify Y is not self-contradictory; 
hence, the two are not synonymous. While Frankena did not 
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say that implication and justification were synonymous, he 
shifted by scarcely perceptible steps from "follow logically'' 
to 'establish" to "justified"; as Hume said, in a similar con­
nection, this shift "is of the last consequence.'' It seems incum­
bent on anyone who claims to imply and to justify a conclusion 
that he state his case so as to defend his own conclusion, or 
that he mount his argument against a contradictory con­
clusion.12 It is not enough to attempt to draw a logical im­
plication from God's existence to the conclusion that an aim 
of education is obedience to God. By neglecting the far 
harder task of justifying his conclusion, Frankena has failed 
to show, it seems, even the necessity, let alone the sufficiency 
of some MEM'S, along with other premises, to justify edu­
cational conclusions. 
How—on Frankena's grounds—does one go about testing 
MEM premises? He speaks of their being "true or acceptable 
premises," as follows: 
It may still be that educational conclusions cannot be 
justified without MEM premises, and it may still be that, 
taken together with certain other true or acceptable 
premises (factual or valuational), MEM premises suffice 
to justify such conclusions. . MEM premises by them­
selves probably do not suffice logically to establish edu­
cational conclusions , but it does seem to me that 
at least some of them, if true, are relevant to such 
conclusions.13 
Does Frankena mean that some MEM'S are true? Are some 
MEM premises true and others acceptable? How does one 
establish which MEM'S are true? What is the test? 14 The truth 
of some, but not all, of the premises does not imply that the 
conclusion is true. Only if all the premises are true have we 
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any reason to accept the conclusion as true. (See Chapter I 
on Smullyan's idea of a sound argument.) To show that the 
conclusion is true, Frankena would have to show that the 
premises are also true, for it is the truth of the premises that 
implies the truth of the conclusion. 
Even when the premises are true, the implication is only 
that the conclusion is true, not that it is justified. How does 
one show that, besides being valid and having true premises 
and a true conclusion, an argument is justified? 
While Frankena distinguishes between necessary and 
sufficient premises in relation to a valid educational con­
clusion, his analysis of MEM'S does not show how to justify 
one educational conclusion over another. How would one 
show, for example, that there is a God, or that we ought to 
have communion with Him? 
Frankena refers to premises that are "true or acceptable." 
But a problem like that with "true" premises may arise with 
"acceptable' premises. Frankena simply does not show what 
counts as being acceptable, although it does seem that anyone 
who tries to make a case for ''acceptable'' premises would also 
try to show how he distinguishes between acceptable and 
unacceptable premises. 
Even if we had ''acceptable'' premises, would that suffice to 
show that the conclusion was justified? Imagine the following 
discussion at a principal's conference: 
A.	 A lunch program that meets minimal daily dietary 
needs, since it is nutritionally adequate, meets the 
needs and is therefore acceptable. 
B.	 This program certainly does meet minimum stand­
ards of acceptability, but is the minimum that we 
as a community can give justified"? 
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"Acceptable"' means ''worthy of acceptance'' and also means 
•'minimally passable.'' Moore rebutted the identification of 
pleasure with good by pointing out that "X causes pleasure 
but X is not good" is not self-contradictory; similarly, one can 
answer, "No," without self-contradiction, to the question 
"Practice X is acceptable, but is it justified?" 15 While many 
'acceptable'' practices are also "justifiable," these terms are 
ordinarily used to give a latitude to acceptable but to impose 
a restriction on "justifiable."' "Acceptable'' may mean both 
•'worthy of" and ''capable of"; not so, "justifiable." 
For these reasons, true or acceptable MEM premises seem 
not to be sufficient, nor are they even shown to be necessary 
to justify educational conclusions. The statement that MEM'S 
(plus factual and valuational premises) are true or acceptable 
implies no more than that the educational conclusion drawn 
from them is true or acceptable; it does not imply that the 
conclusion is justifiable. Frankena's syllogism relating to 
religion does not furnish an instance of a necessary premise 
that justifies an educational conclusion because one can easily 
mount an opposing syllogism that negates the opening premise 
and consequently denies the educational conclusion. For 
example: 
The idea of a Christian God is a false idea or fiction. 
One ought not to teach with obedience or allegiance to 
a false idea or fiction as an aim of education. 
Therefore, one ought not to teach with obedience or 
allegiance to the idea of a Christian God as an aim of 
education. 
How can one tell which MEM'S are true, acceptable, or justi­
fiable? How can one choose between one set of premises 
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(MEM) and a contradictory set ( — MEM) in order to justify 
one educational conclusion over its contradictory. Frankena 
does not show how one rebuts a MEM or its contradictory; 
yet this is surely one minimal requirement for being able to 
speak of justifying an educational conclusion. 
A Related Difficulty 
Frankena made a comment on Smith regarding the neces­
sity of metaphysics to education. Smith had said: 
Even if a philosophy of education were derivable from 
a metaphysical position, it would be impossible to build 
the educational program upon it.16 
Smith gave two reasons: 
For one thing, if it were necessary first to agree upon a 
metaphysics before we could agree upon an educational 
program, we should have to close the schools. For another 
thing, the factors determining what an educational pro­
gram shall be are so varied and interrelated that the 
implications of any particular metaphysics will be lost 
as the program is shaped.17 
It is, of course, an empirical proposition whether agree­
ment on a metaphysical view implies the opening or closing 
of schools. According to Smith's proposition, any metaphysical 
view can be made to seem compatible with the operation of 
the schools; no particular metaphysical view is necessary to 
the schools. But that does not mean that "'metaphysics1' is not 
needed; it means only that some given metaphysical view 
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or ism is not required for the operation of the schools. One 
could argue quite plausibly that a completely satisfactory 
education cannot wholly exclude reference to all past philoso­
phy, especially the metaphysics of such great philosophers as 
Plato and Aristotle, etc. Smith gives his own case away when 
he speaks of "a metaphysical position.'' No one argues for 
that any more than anyone insists that governments would 
have to give up their power unless they could establish it 
on the foundations of a particular ethical or metaphysical 
system. Yet it is quite clear, surely, that an ideally satisfactory 
theory of government would not wholly exclude reference to 
all past philosophy, the history of ethics or metaphysics. It 
is equally clear that we do not have to agree on a metaphysical 
or ethical viewpoint before we can have a functioning police 
force, a fire department, a tax structure, a highway system, 
sewage or garbage disposal, and all the rest. Nevertheless, 
one's philosophical conception of man and society requires 
reference, however oblique, indirect, or strained, to meta­
physics—not to "a metaphysical position" but to metaphysics. 
Philosophy as well as philosophy of education requires refer­
ence to the sort of metaphysical dialogue for which Plato, 
among others, has been so responsible and which makes the 
ultimate metaphysical questions from Thales to the present 
perhaps the most ultimately significant questions that the 
mind of man can ask. Frankena's mistake, like Smith's, may 
lie in having confused ''a metaphysics'' with "metaphysics." 
That mistake may explain why Smith's objections to, and 
Frankena's defense of, deriving educational conclusions from 
particular metaphysical doctrines never seem very convincing. 
They both move (Hume's move "of the last consequence") 
from the particular to the universal. But when they deny 
that the conclusion is universal and attempt, instead, to apply 
a particular conclusion only to a particular school system or 
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to a particular metaphysical doctrine, then they succeed only 
in restating the obvious (that, as Christians, they are in favor 
of Christian education for their fellow Christians). 
To summarize thus far: Frankena tries to show that MEM'S, 
while not by themselves sufficient, are sometimes relevant to, 
and even necessary for, drawing educational conclusions. He 
starts with the position that there is a God and adds to this 
metaphysical premise the moral premise that God ought to 
be obeyed. Then he holds that these premises, even though 
they are not sufficient, are necessary to imply the educational 
conclusion that obedience to God ought to be an aim of 
education. The attempt has been made to show that Frankena 
either trivialized or invalidated his conclusion. It would be 
trivialization if he intended to confine his educational con­
clusion to schools of a particular sect (say, Lutherans or 
Thomists). The charge of circularity might then also be in 
order, even though this type of logical implication as a test 
of consistency may play a preliminary sort of role in arguments 
in educational philosophy. It would be invalidation of the 
conclusion if, going beyond his conclusion, Frankena recom­
mended that obedience to God should be an aim of education 
at large. In what sense, then, does Frankena say that some 
MEM'S are necessary to imply and to justify some educational 
conclusions? 
His further attempt to show this—if the MEM, factual, or 
valuational premises are "true'' or ''acceptable"—does not seem 
very successful either, partly because Frankena does not 
successfully pit the MEM'S that he cites against a contradictory 
set of MEM premises that would seem to be a minimal require­
ment for MEM'S to justify an educational conclusion. 
Moreover, it has not been shown in what respect the 
philosophical or valuational premises are "true'' or "acceptable.'' 
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And even if they were "true'' or "acceptable,'' this would 
still not mean that they were justifiable. 
Finally, as to Smith's argument that if agreement first had 
to be reached on a metaphysical position, the schools would 
have to be closed, the attempt has been made to distinguish 
between a particular and a universal. Of course, in a trivial 
sense, the schools would not be able to function if their 
operation had to depend on prior agreement about a meta­
physical position, but neither would any aspect of govern­
ment: a tax structure, a police force, a garbage disposal unit. 
Agreement on a particular metaphysical position, however, is 
not identical with agreement that metaphysics is necessary 
to education; it can be argued that no philosophy of education 
(nor any completely satisfactory education) can completely 
exclude metaphysics. In that sense, metaphysics is seen to be 
necessary to education. 
Frankena's analysis rests, as has been indicated, on the 
mistake of a conclusion that contained more than there was 
in the premises. This was revealed by his assertion that some 
MEM premises can be justified on grounds they are implied 
with true or acceptable premises, although the meaning of 
neither truth nor acceptability was shown. In proposing a 
philosophical scheme for justifying some educational conclu­
sions, however, he suggested what might be required. Accord­
ingly, something can be said for his scheme. If, as a result 
of it, we were able to point even minimally to what would 
justify an educational conclusion, we might thereby direct 
ourselves toward judging educational arguments. If some 
MEM'S could justify some educational conclusions by meeting 
and defeating opposing conclusions, our observation of what 
justifies some MEM'S and does not justify others might afford 
us a basis for judging one metaphysical argument against 
another. If, however, it could not be shown how some MEM'S 
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are necessary to justify some educational conclusions nor how 
one can judge between philosophical arguments in education, 
then this would not be the way out of the Purist-Capricious 
impasse (and there might be no way out at all). 
In sum, Frankena holds that some MEM'S are relevant and 
necessary but not sufficient to imply and justify some educa­
tional conclusions. But how does one choose between one 
set of MEM premises and a contradictory set, •—' MEM? MEM'S 
do not, at least as presented, seem to give us a rational basis 
for deciding between contradictory educational conclusions of 
the kind "Teach obedience to God" and "Don't teach that 
sort of obedience.' And so Frankena's attempt turns out to 
be another effort in behalf of metaphysical argument in 
education that is an argument only in Sense I, "response,"' 
and not in Sense II, "'solution.'' 
It has not yet been shown how some metaphysical premises 
go farther than mere presuasion to imply and justify some 
educational conclusions in, or as in, Sense II. 
Educational Metaphors 
To assess a metaphysical premise in an educational argu­
ment, one might first see the role of the premise in education. 
A metaphysical premise in education is sometimes expressed 
as a metaphor or word picture, delineating the ideal purposes, 
functions, and interrelations of man, society, and the cosmos. 
The metaphor or word picture may even be comprehensive 
enough to include reference to man's ultimate destiny. 
If we could find some characteristic or criterion by which 
to make a critical evaluation of educational metaphors that 
are expressed as metaphysical premises, we would have a 
more satisfactory means of appraisal than Frankena's. We 
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could then say that if this characteristic is present in an 
educational argument, it, rather than its contradictory, would 
count as a good reason for drawing an educational conclusion. 
It may be recalled that Frankena's effort to show the rela­
tionship between metaphysics and education through the use 
of MEM premises did suggest what a justifiable argument 
would look like. But his detailed scheme of justification 
showed no known true or acceptable metaphysical premises 
to help one decide among rival educational conclusions con­
cerning which educational policy ought to be adopted—not 
only for schools of one denomination but for schools for all. 
This was the issue in the educational argument, and on this 
point Frankena clearly did not succeed in showing how MEM'S 
help to justify educational conclusions. 
Although there are no known methods of criticism to 
which metaphysical premises are directly open, the educational 
metaphor has been used to express various metaphysical views 
of the cosmos, of God, of man and society. As Othanel Smith 
has expressed it: 
Any philosophical system will include a picture of 
man and society. In so far as it deals with man's nature, 
his development and his destiny, the system will neces­
sarily have implications for the education of man. And 
these implications when spelled out may be called a 
philosophy of education.18 
SchefHer's study of educational metaphors has shown that 
there are grounds for subjecting metaphors to rational criticism. 
Some analogies may be trivial and some analogies (as in the 
case of the child compared to a plant in a garden) have limits, 
and therefore break down in certain contexts.19 Scheffler shows 
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that metaphysical premises do not have to be considered ex­
empt from the application of rational canons of criticism. 
Thus one way to use rational canons of criticism in assessing 
metaphysical arguments in education consists in a consider­
ation of metaphorical statements or "root metaphors.'' In this 
connection, Frankena did not take note of Smith's comment 
that 'any philosophical system will include a picture of man 
and society,"20 nor did he show in any other way what is 
necessary in order to justify an educational conclusion. 
The notion of a picture or metaphor may provide a clue 
to how some MEM'S help to justify some educational con­
clusions and may give us a basis for judging between one 
set of MEM premises and another. There may be no rational 
way to decide between the metaphysical premises 'There is 
a God" and 'There is no God." But there may be a way to 
employ rational canons of criticism so as to choose between 
one metaphor or picture of the relations of man, society, the 
cosmos, and God, and a rival metaphor that pictures these 
relations very differently. If metaphors could be criticized in 
this way, it might be possible to show how metaphysics is 
necessary, even if not sufficient, to justify a general educa­
tional conclusion or, at any rate, to provide some rational 
way of evaluating a metaphysical premise in an educational 
argument. But Frankena did not examine the metaphorical 
character of metaphysical premises. 
A metaphor suggests an analogy, presented in a pictorial 
and sometimes insightful way, in which something well known 
may illuminate something less well known. According to 
Israel Schemer: 
. We may regard the metaphorical statement as 
indicating that there is an important analogy between 
two things.21 
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Implicit also in the use of a metaphor is the idea of testing 
an analogy, a common and legitimate device in philosophy. 
Scheffler therefore suggests this mode of criticism: 
First, we may reach the conclusion that a given metaphor 
is trivial or sterile, indicating analogies that are, in con­
text, unimportant. Second, we may determine the limita­
tions of a given metaphor, the points at which the 
analogies it indicates break down.22 
Observation of the function of educational metaphors may 
indicate their bearing on the use of metaphysical premises. 
It remains to be seen whether examination of metaphors will 
provide a way of determining which metaphysical arguments 
to admit and will thus help to resolve the dilemma of rigidity 
versus looseness in judging metaphysical arguments in edu­
cation. It will be contended here that an examination of 
educational metaphors does offer a way, at least partially, to 
apply rational canons of criticism to metaphysical arguments. 
Root Metaphors 
Philosophers of education sometimes ask metaphysical ques­
tions that do not call for educational definitions or meta­
physical concepts of the purposes of education; in place of the 
question "What is the meaning and purpose of education?", 
some of them ask, "What is your 'root metaphor' (or social 
or educational metaphor) of the educated man?"23 
Such picture-preferences, generally designated in philoso­
phy of education as root metaphors, are meant to describe the 
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ideally educated person. They are also intended to provide 
a picture of how the individual develops from childhood into 
adulthood. The child has been pictured as a blank tablet 
upon which experience is written or as a statue in the 
making—essentially passive and undynamic; and the child has 
been pictured as a flower that grows after the teacher has 
gone—essentially alive and active but with an unspecified 
aim or direction of growth. The educational metaphor conveys 
beliefs about the way in which the child develops, about the 
role of the teacher,24 about the aims, method, and content 
of education, and about the role of the school in society. Such 
a metaphor may refer, in passing, to a view of the cosmos, 
of the nature and destiny of man (whether naturalistic or 
supernaturalistic), and to some even more abstract meta­
physical categories, such as the one or the many, change 
or permanence. 
When the metaphor has been stated, the next step is to 
begin to spell out a system of education. This initially takes 
the form of an educational proposal, designed to provide 
satisfactory answers to such basic educational questions as 
what, how, or whom to teach.25 The curriculum proposal, 
although not an integral part of the metaphor, is derived 
from the metaphor as a sort of explication or analysans (a 
'spelling out") of what the metaphor intended to convey. 
It is sometimes identified as a deduction or implication of 
what, how, and whom to teach, based on an explication of 
the contents of the metaphor. This sort of implication has 
been called a "formal" or "logical implication" 26 (of the kind 
noted in Chapter II concerning the derivation of educational 
conclusions from metaphysical beliefs or isms). The question 
at this point is whether the proposal is consistent with the 
metaphor or picture-preference of the educated man that is 
actually believed and endorsed.27 Now, it would be incon­
sistent for Hutchins, whose picture-preference is the classical 
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"'cultivation of the intellect," to propose an educational cur­
riculum emphasizing a "life-adjustment" program that would 
interfere with the study of the Great Books. Since Hutchins 
did, in fact, propose the teaching of the Great Books rather 
than "life-adjustment" experiences, his educational proposals 
may be considered "logically implied in" his belief in the 
development of the intellect. For a proposal to be "logically 
implied in' a metaphor or a metaphysical belief—which itself 
may be suggested by a metaphor—the proposal must be the 
articulation of what is contained in the metaphor. It must 
unpack the metaphor, so to speak. An educational philosopher 
uses a metaphor or a metaphysical belief to imply logically 
a proposal that he regards as consistent with his belief. Thus 
a metaphysical belief may allude to an educational philoso­
pher's picture-preference or root metaphor of an ideally edu­
cated person, and when this has been fully explicated ("spelled 
out"), it evolves an educational proposal. 
A root metaphor or picture-preference is used to guide-
in this sense, "imply"—the scope and sequence of one's desired 
educational curriculum. In this use of metaphor, we cannot 
outline the scope of an educational curriculum without re­
vealing our root metaphor or social metaphor. The social 
metaphor is therefore an indispensable condition for effective 
curriculum-making. B. Othanel Smith says: 
It is to be noted that educational purposes go back 
ultimately to social metaphor. Everyone carries around in 
his head a picture of what society is or ought to be. This 
picture embraces, in ideal form, the type of individual 
called for by the society, and the relations envisioned 
among those individuals.28 
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The metaphor serves also to inspire action in the formu­
lation of educational programs that are designed to carry out 
the purposes suggested by the metaphor. An educational 
metaphor does have its deliberative function and exhorts the 
profession to embrace and implement the picture of man and 
society that it contains. 
These metaphors are often theoretically illuminating and 
suggest fertile and far-reaching uses of educational language 
to depict ideal conditions. But when root metaphors are used 
as sufficient or even necessary conditions of an effective edu­
cational program or are presented in a form that is closed 
to appropriate criticism, they invite misgiving. Whatever may 
be a metaphor's theoretically suggestive qualities, a metaphor 
has not been shown to be either a necessary or a sufficient 
condition for choosing one curriculum rather than some 
other,29 any more than has an expression of educational 
definition, purpose, or belief. This may explain what those 
who hold the hard-line approach find objectionable in the 
purported relation of metaphysics to education. 
Philosophers of education can and do give reasons for 
proposing one curriculum rather than another and one course 
rather than another; among those reasons, some subject matter 
may be lighted up by a metaphor—if subjected to appropriate 
criticism—although an overextended metaphor may obscure 
more than it illuminates. The luminosity depends on how a 
metaphor is used. A well-used metaphor may even reveal a 
key to unlocking aims and areas of education that would 
otherwise be hidden. But when a metaphor is used in lieu 
of an argument, shut against appropriate criticism, or when 
any single educational metaphor—alias "purpose of educa­
tion"—is used as either a sufficient or a necessary condition 
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for determining the contents of the curriculum, serious doubts 
may arise. 
The Residual Problem 
According to Smith: 
Educational purposes are rooted in [social metaphors] 
and the settling of disagreements about these purposes 
therefore demands agreement about the kind of society 
people desire. Since consensus about what society ought 
to be has never been attained, and is not apt to be 
reached, the question of educational purposes promises 
to be perennial.30 
While we agree on a 'minimum of knowledge and skills 
to be taught, aimed at reducing ignorance and incompetence 
as much as possible,'' the meaning and purpose of education 
continue to be debated in terms of a "residual concept."31 
The residual problem remains of why one ought to choose 
metaphor X rather than Y. Moving from MEM'S to metaphors 
only moves the problem of deciding between X and Y from 
one form of expression in education to another. The pic­
turesqueness of the metaphor makes it richer than the MEM 
but does not inherently support a choice between metaphors 
X and Y. 
Smith says that every educational philosopher has a meta­
phor in mind; its function is presumably to guide one's 
choice of what, how, or whom to teach. The difficulty, just 
as with educational definitions, is this: If we ask, 'What is 
your social metaphor of education?", Hutchins articulates his 
view of education as the "cultivation of intellectual virtues"; 
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Dewey articulates the ideal of growth; and Kilpatrick ex­
presses his picture-preference that education should seem 
like "life itself." 32 But when one man puts forward metaphor 
X, and another advocates metaphor Y, how does one make a 
choice? 
Unfortunately, as Scheffler points out, educational meta­
phors—unlike physical theories—cannot be judged cumula­
tively or placed side by side for comparison. He says: 
It seems mistaken to try to find a progressive order 
of metaphors in education, each metaphor more adequate 
and comprehensive than the last.33 
However, other ways of testing an educational metaphor 
are suggested by Scheffler's two modes of criticism relating 
to triviality in analogy and to limitation of analogy. These 
modes of criticism may be applied to the metaphors of the 
plant, the block of marble, and the blank tablet. The com­
parison of a child with a plant, a block of marble, or a blank 
tablet may be evaluated as to basic limitations and fruitfulness 
of implications. For example, a child is not inanimate like a 
slab of marble, and thus an initial deficiency appears in the 
comparison. This mode of criticism uses appeal to factual con­
siderations in evaluating comparisons. In the metaphors exam­
ined by Scheffler, facts can be appealed to in order to note any 
limitation in an expression. 
Religious and metaphysical metaphors involving belief or 
disbelief in God and connected with comprehensive and other­
worldly questions are far more difficult to assess because the 
facts necessary for comparison may not be available. Scheffler's 
modes of criticism may be applied to these more troublesome 
sorts of metaphor too. But there are added problems in deal­
ing with metaphors that depict the structure and relations of 
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an ideal society or of the universe at large and that culminate 
in a theological metaphor concerning whether or not there is 
a God. 
There is a marked difference between the metaphors that 
Scheffler examined and those that Smith examined. Scheffler's 
this-worldly, epistemologically-oriented metaphors concern 
comparisons between a single mind or an individual and some 
natural process or product, while Smith's other-worldly, meta­
physical or root metaphors, of the kind that Stephen C. Pepper 
introduced into philosophical discussion,34 concern comparisons 
between an individual or a single mind and society or the 
cosmos at large. The use of root metaphors or basic attitudes 
toward education is not the same kind of thing that Scheffler 
discusses. Dewey's metaphor of the school as the "embryo of 
society,'' for example, or Plato's metaphor of the cave, is far 
more comprehensive in basic outlook than the plant, clay, or 
tablet metaphors of the child cited in Scheffler's epistemo­
logically-oriented account. This difference is not necessarily a 
drawback; it makes it possible to distinguish the down-to-earth 
metaphors studied by Scheffler from root metaphors, as first 
discussed by S. C. Pepper, and first discussed in philosophy by 
B.	 Othanel Smith 
Testing other-worldly root metaphors by factual compar­
isons is vastly more difficult than testing this-worldly metaphors 
in this way. The modes of criticism cited by Scheffler call for 
finding and stating "truths in the phenomena before us.1' 
Dewey's growth metaphor is true to the extent that children 
are in fact alive and growing organisms. By the same criterion, 
we detect the false aspects of the clay tablet and marble slab 
metaphors, in that children are not inert matter. 
The residual difficulty consists in attempting to choose 
among conflicting root metaphors—between those of Dewey 
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and Hutchins or between the Thomist or the Marxist root 
metaphors. 
Educational Bliks 
"Bliks' are another way of expressing root metaphors.35 
A blik is a basic attitude toward the world, "a habitual and 
confirmed way of seeing things." Recent philosophical discus­
sions of bliks pinpoint the difficulties facing educationists, who 
have meager or no modes of criticism by which to judge philo­
sophical arguments in education. Similar difficulties exist for 
religious discourse, which the notion of bliks was intended to 
clarify. A consideration to bliks may suggest a way to assess 
metaphysical premises in education because the philosophical 
dialogue about bliks is focused on applying rational canons 
of criticism to troublesome arguments. The notion of educa­
tional bliks is extended here with the intention of projecting 
an enlarged picture of the problem that we face in evaluating 
metaphysical arguments in education. 
A way to choose among metaphysical and theological argu­
ments has been suggested by R. M. Hare's (and others') dis­
cussions of the blik notion. Hare and others—although they 
differ about how to do it—attempt to tell the difference be­
tween a right and a wrong blik.36 If the method of distinguish­
ing between a right and a wrong blik could be incorporated 
in the criticism of metaphysical premises, it might provide a 
basis for deciding between a MEM and its contradictory, 
— MEM. In other words, if some process could show an educa­
tional blik, which is comparable with an educational metaphor, 
to be right or wrong, that same process could also be used to 
judge metaphysical premises in educational arguments. 
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The notion of educational bliks is not intended to be 
wholly, or even largely, separated from that of educational 
metaphors. There are, of course, differences. A metaphor is 
intended to evoke a picture for comparison with some actual 
or ideal state of affairs. A blik is one's total attitude, but 
that does not preclude its being expressed in pictorial analogies; 
in fact, most of the recent discussions of bliks contain parables 
that evoke pictorial images for comparison with real or 
imagined or ideal states of affairs. There is, we might say, "a 
family resemblance' between metaphors and bliks. 
It is contended here that a distinction between a right blik 
and a wrong blik can be made, can be applied to an educa­
tional metaphor that is used as a metaphysical premise, and 
thus can be used to evaluate a metaphysical premise in educa­
tion. 
Hare parallels the distinction between a right and a wrong 
blik with a difference between a sane and an insane blik. He 
cites as an example of an insane blik the case of a graduate 
student at Oxford who thinks the professors are "out to get 
him," although they show the greatest kindness and concern 
for him. Hare cites his own trust that the steel of his car 
will not fall apart—a right belief, in Humean terms, that 
enables him to continue to drive—as an example of a sane 
blik. Hare conjectures that if he acquired the fear that his car 
would disintegrate for no reason—and regardless of demonstra­
tions of safety, he refused to enter the car—he would have an 
insane blik, out of kilter with reality, wrong. Although Hare 
cites these examples in which factual assertions determine 
whether a blik is sane or insane, right or wrong, he holds that 
bliks themselves do not assert anything. This seems to be a 
regrettable conclusion, for reasons that will be given. 
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A blik, according to some writers, contains or involves tacit 
or would-be factual assertions, which are either true or false. 
Others, including Hare, deny this. 
The view held and defended here is that a blik may be 
intended and interpreted, at least in part, as a true or false 
assertion. A blik may also perform or prompt nonassertive 
functions, such as worshiping, praying, or singing. According 
to this view, a blik may be judged by some reference to what 
it explicitly or implicitly asserts, even though the assertion 
may not be a stated part of some other-worldly picture. 
As to the contention that a blik makes no assertions, it 
seems strange for a religious or metaphysical believer to say, 
"I believe in X, but it doesn't really matter to me whether 
what I believe is true or false." His faith would then rest on 
nothing at all; it would not differ from lunacy. How can one 
believe in God without believing that there is a God and with­
out believing whatever associated assertions concerning an 
afterlife or free will may spring from belief in God? Not all 
articles of faith are assertions, but how can one contend there 
are no assertions on which a believer depends for the credi­
bility of his faith? How can one rule out all reference to 
factual assertions or (using Flew's term) "'would-be" or dis­
guised assertions? It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand 
how a person can believe in God without also asserting that 
God exists. We cannot take him seriously if he denies that the 
statement "God exists'' is true. 
A recent writer calls religious bliks "believe-in"' statements 
as distinct from "believe-that" statements. In this way of speak­
ing, other-worldly religious bliks or "believe-in"' statements may 
be reasonably viewed as depending on factual "believe-that" 
statements.37 Thus, a blik can be seen as only part-assertive, 
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depending on or involving or presupposing a "'would-be'' asser­
tion. It may be assessed in relation to the factual assertions on 
which it depends. 
This sort of factual assessment does not differ appreciably 
from Scheffler's mode of criticizing metaphors, in that a blik 
may reveal an analogy to be tested. The criticism of analogies 
that SchefHer introduced for educational metaphors suggests 
a way to show the role of factual assertions in root metaphors 
or bliks. One can start choosing among educational bliks by 
examining what is purportedly asserted or claimed. Assess­
ment of other-worldly bliks by testing their factual analogies 
or their implied claims for points of possible breakdown may 
provide good reason for concluding that one educational blik 
is right and a rival or contradictory blik is wrong. 
In this connection one illustration may help. In the eigh­
teenth century William Paley offered a metaphor or blik that 
exemplifies both the power and the limits of the use of the 
analogical argument. The topic of the blik is a watch in the 
desert. Since a watch has properties that evidence a high 
degree of organization and workmanship, it cannot be supposed 
that it came into being without a maker. Did it have a maker? 
Surely. Look next at the universe; see how orderly it is. The 
universe also has properties that exhibit a high degree of 
organization and workmanship. Hence, like the watch, it too 
had to have a maker. The analogical argument is: Just as 
there is to a watch something that stands in the necessary 
relationship of watch-maker, there must likewise be, to a 
universe, someone who is a universe-maker. 
If anyone doubts that there is an attempt to make such a 
connection between metaphysics and education and that this 
argument in particular has an appeal that affects the teaching 
of diverse subject matter, he is referred to the following 
official policy statement on "The Development of Moral and 
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Spiritual Ideals in the Public Schools,'' prepared by and for 
the Board of Education of the City of New York: 
The study of science and mathematics involves a process 
of discerning order, system, balance and law in the 
wonderful phenomena of the biological, chemical and 
physical world. Scientists and mathematicians conceive 
of the universe as a logical, orderly, predictable place. 
The vastness and spendor of the heavens, the order and 
precision of the sun, planets and comets, the marvels of 
the human body and mind, the beauty of nature, the 
mystery of photosynthesis, the mathematical structure of 
the universe, the concept of infinity cannot do other than 
lead to humbleness before God's handiwork.38 
The ways of rationally criticizing root metaphors or bliks 
of this kind—by noting the trivial analogies and the limits 
where they break down—recall a criticism long ago acutely 
made by Hume. 
According to Hume, there is no more reason to compare 
the making of the world with the work of a machine than 
to compare it with the growth of a vegetable or a plant. There 
is no less reason to infer that the world is the product of 
generation than to infer that it is the result of human-like 
creation. A watch is made by many hands, while the world 
is said to be made by God. If the analogy were to be carried 
out, the world would have to be thought of as made by many 
gods. But this thought is not what Paley (or the New York 
City Board of Education) had in mind. The watch-maker 
metaphor was designed to show that there is one maker of 
the world. 
Hume observed that argument by design appeals to expe­
rience: the universe is said to resemble things with which we 
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have experience, such as a house or a watch. But on what 
grounds can we infer that the cause of the universe resembles 
the cause of the house or watch? "Is the analogy entire and 
perfect?" Can one infer the maker of the universe by making 
more than a guess or a conjecture? To corroborate such rea­
soning, one must have experienced the origin of the universe. 
We can all see watches being made before our eyes. But "have 
worlds ever been formed under your eye?" 39 
There is, moreover, this criticism: 
If you survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form 
of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so compli­
cated, useful, and beautiful a machine! And what sur­
prise must we feel when we find him a stupid mechanic 
who imitated others, and copied an art which through 
a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, 
corrections, deliberations, and controversies, has been 
gradually improving. Many worlds might have been 
botched and bungled throughout an eternity ere this 
system was struck out; much labor lost; many fruitless 
trials made; a slow but continued improvement carried 
on during infinite ages in the art of world-making.40 
Moreover, how does one know that the world is so orderly as 
to necessitate its having been constructed by a single maker? 
What experience have we to demonstrate that the world is 
basically and predominantly ordered rather than chaotic? 
This approach shows how Scheffler's mode of criticizing a 
metaphor by noting the limits of an analogy may be applied 
to the evaluation of root metaphors or bliks in education. 
Although this is not proof of a mathematical kind, it does 
provide some basis for assessing a metaphysical premise of 
the sort that Frankena uses: "There is a God" or 'There is 
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no God." Hume's criticisms do not imply that there is no 
God, but they do help us to evaluate an educational policy 
prescribing what should be taught on the basis of a precon­
ception of the universe as the handiwork of a maker. Hence, a 
root metaphor or other-worldly blik, as well as the ordinary 
this-worldly metaphor, is subject to test by rational canons of 
criticism. 
Frankena's use of the theological premise shows the rele­
vance to education of metaphysics and theology when such 
premises are opened to criticism, but Frankena does not show 
how these premises are to be criticized. Hence Frankena's 
argument does not go quite all the way to resolve disagreements 
among educational policies. On Frankena's grounds alone, 
metaphysical premises cannot be shown to be sufficient or 
necessary to justify certain educational conclusions. But ex­
tension of Scheffler's criticism of metaphors to theological and 
metaphysical premises more firmly establishes the relationship 
of metaphysics to education. The illustrative statement of the 
New York City Board of Education also shows that, lacking 
the benefits of rational criticism, educational policies are liable 
to be constructed without having had any test of their meta­
physical and theological assumptions. Such policies might seem 
to lend weight to contentions that metaphysics is either basi­
cally irrelevant to education or else has a special privilege of 
exemption from criticism while making an impact on philos­
ophy of education. Exclusion of rational appraisal of the meta­
physical beliefs bearing on education opens the way to the 
Capricious notion that any metaphysics or ism may imply 
any desired educational policy wanted or to the Purist re­
joinder that the metaphysical approach to education is absurd, 
irrelevant, or futile. 
The problem that has been considered here begins with 
the question: Is there a characteristic X distinguishing an 
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educational conclusion that uses metaphysical premises from 
its contradictory and providing a rational basis for choosing 
one conclusion over the other? To choose between conclusions, 
one must choose between a set of premises, MEM, and a contra­
dictory set of premises, •—' MEM. Metaphysics seems by nature 
to be a difficult area for decision-making. For example, it is 
not possible to know which metaphysical statement, "God 
exists,' or "God does not exist," is true. But a metaphysical 
statement may also be expressed as a metaphor or blik. How 
can one distinguish a right or justifiable blik from a wrong 
or unjustifiable blik? Are there grounds for saying Blik X is 
right whereas Blik —X is wrong? 
The procedure for judging metaphysical arguments in edu­
cation is to look to the conjunction of MEM premises, one of 
which may allude to a root metaphor or blik. Ways of criticiz­
ing metaphors or bliks are helpful to a certain extent in 
judging metaphysical premises in education. 
Following Scheffler's lead, this argument has held that a 
root metaphor or blik can be criticized by testing the analogy 
as to whether the intended comparison is of no significance 
and as to whether it breaks down or is otherwise limited. The 
result of the test provides a good reason for believing in or 
acting on one educational metaphor or blik rather than another. 
Schematically, the argument may consist of a set of premises 
MEM, a set of facts, a pedagogical consideration relating MEM'S 
to education, and a practical educational conclusion, which 
will be called T, for the sake of brevity, meaning "Teach X." 
MEM'S, taken in conjunction with pertinent facts and relevant 
pedagogical considerations, presumably can help us choose T 
over some alternative. 
On Frankena's grounds, someone else could just as easily 
advocate other MEM premises, which, when taken in conjunc­
tion with relevant facts and pedagogical considerations, would 
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lead to  — T instead of T. The question is, how does one 
choose between MEM'S? It has been suggested here that one 
must have good reasons for choosing MEM'S and a good basis 
for determining what constitutes the good reasons. Only then 
could one assert that an opposing set of premises, <—-MEM, 
lacked good reasons. That lack would furnish the basis for 
deciding not to act on — T. The determination that each of 
the MEM premises had good reasons for being believed would 
be relevant and necessary, though not sufficient by itself, to 
furnish the basis for deciding to act on the conclusion T, 
rather than on its contradictory. 
As to metaphysical premises, it has been suggested that 
opening educational metaphors or bliks to analogical criticism 
can show the reasons for choosing one blik, or part of a blik, 
over another, A metaphor or blik that has been criticized can 
count as a basis—unless it is rebutted—for a metaphysical 
premise. Such testing would quash Paley's metaphor. One 
way to distinguish a right from a wrong blik is to see whether 
the blik can stand up to analogical testing of Scheffler's kind. 
If it can, then it counts as a good reason, although not the 
only reason, for premising action on the pursuant educational 
conclusion. 
Metaphysical premises, however, are not alone in needing 
rational assessment. Moral premises are also used to justify 
educational conclusions, and difficulties occur in deciding the 
moral ends of living and teaching. Moral premises, as well as 
metaphysical premises, when opened to pertinent criticism, 
may offer reasons for deciding what should be taught. 
A metaphysical belief concerns what the world is like. A 
moral belief concerns how one ought to live. Both aspects 
of belief seem necessary, together with pertinent facts and 
pedagogical considerations, to help us decide what should be 
taught. 
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The next chapter will examine the conjunction of other 
premises—moral, factual, and pedagogical premises that back 
decisions on what to teach. A close look will be taken at 
what may count as good reasons for deciding what to teach. 
The conjunction of good reasons in the premises will pre­
sumably give good reasons for the conclusions concerning 
what should be taught. Such a conclusion, even logically 
assailable, will be less easily assailable than its contradictory. 
There may be such overriding motivations for rebutting even 
good reasons for teaching X that X will continue to be un­
taught; but there may also be this significance in finding out 
what "should" be taught—if it is not taught, one can only view 
that fact with qualms. 
Looking at the conjunction of other premises to back an 
educational conclusion will necessitate looking for a criterion 
by which to distinguish a good reason for a moral premise as 
well as for criteria by which to assess all good reasons for 
deciding what should be taught. 
There may be much to be said generally against meta­
physics in education and in particular against this effort 
designed to rescue us from the Purist-Capricious impasse. 
The contention here has been that rational canons of criticism 
can be employed in the assessment of metaphysical premises, 
expressed either as metaphors or as bliks. Concerning the 
metaphysical approach, which has been described by some as 
a "'garrulous absurdity'' and irrelevant to boot, it is likely 
and not easy to reckon with that the sorts of metaphysical 
views put forward by Thales, Anaximander, Plato, and other 
early Greeks are ultimately the most important thoughts that 
it has been in the power of the mind of man to conceive. 
1. Cf. Hook, in Chapter II. More recently, Sterling McMurrin 
has held that "the chief deterrent to progress in philosophy of educa­
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tion" rests on the "obstinate" and "futile*' assumption that from 
different metaphysical premises differing educational systems and 
methods can and should be logically derived ("What about the 
Philosophy of Education?", Journal of Philosophy, LIX, No. 22 
[October 25, 1962]). Just as Hook (one may suspect) had his own 
unannounced form of metaphysical derivation for educational con­
clusion, so, too, McMurrin has his metaphysical derivation (see 
Chapter II). 
2. William K. Frankena, "McMurrin and Smith on the Philosophy 
of Education," a paper delivered at the American Philosophical As­
sociation Eastern Division Meeting, held in New York City, Decem­
ber, 1962. 
3. Ibid. 
4. The words "obstinate" and "futile" refer to McMurrin's ap­
praisal of the metaphysical approach in education. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. Italics added. 
9. Ibid. 
10. This type of implication is a logical implication noted earlier 
(in Chapter II). It may be recalled that it was said there that a 
metaphysical premise X logically implies an educational conclusion Y 
when it does so in the sense that Y is consistent with X, that Hutchins' 
emphasis on intellectual virtue did not lead to a stress on a 'life­
activities" type of curriculum, and that Dewey, who stresses growth, 
would not stress a Great Books curriculum. 
11. Implication is not the same thing as justification (see Chapter 
V). 
12. This could be used to show that philosophy of education (in­
cluding metaphysics) is essential and not, contrary to Conant, "desir­
able but unessential." See Conant, The Education of American 
Teachers, p. 131. 
13. Frankena, op. cit. (note 2 above). 
14. One of the hard-earned lessons of analytic philosophy seems 
to be that metaphysical statements or premises are not true or false 
in at least the ordinary sense in which we say that "My dog Fido has 
fleas" is true, or "The Empire State Building is the tallest building 
in the world" is true. Statements like "Time does not exist" or "The 
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world is mental or spiritual all over'' are not either true or false in 
the same way, and for this same reason—that we have no way of 
verifying or falsifying them, that is, of knowing whether they are 
true or false. But we do have a way of telling whether Fido has 
fleas and whether the Empire State Building is or isn't the tallest in 
the world. The metaphysical question is simply too large to answer 
conclusively in a Purist manner. 
15. There are numerous examples in medicine, teaching, food 
care, engineering, aviation, and the law, which, as a matter of fact, 
are acceptable without becoming, by implication, therefore justifiable. 
Practices such as flying in questionable weather pass for "acceptable" 
without automatically rating the label "justifiable." 
16. B. Othanel Smith, "Views on the Role of Philosophy in 
Teacher Education,'' Journal of Philosophy, LIX (October 25, 1962), 
639. 
17. Ibid. I later show why agreement, in my view, is irrelevant. 
18. Ibid. 
19. The Language of Education, p. 48. 
20. Smith, op, cit. 
21. Ibid.; and Scheffler, op. cit. See also pp. 47-49 for an elabora­
tion of the role and importance of metaphorical or theoretical state­
ments in education. Scheffler goes so far as to suggest a comparison 
between scientific theory and educational metaphors. "The line, even 
in science, between serious theory and metaphor, is a thin one, if it 
can be drawn at all. . Limitation is no more reason to reject a 
metaphor completely than is the fact that there are alternative theories 
always in itself a reason to reject any given theory in science. A com­
parison of alternative metaphors may be as illuminating as a com­
parison of alternative theories, indicating the many-faceted character 
of the subject." 
22. Scheffler, op. cit., p. 48; see also Smith, op. cit. 
23. For an extended treatment of educational metaphors, see 
Scheffler, op. cit., pp. 47-59. A consideration of root metaphors or 
picture-preferences in education, as Scheffler has shown, is undoubtedly 
a theoretically fruitful way of suggesting insightful comparisons be­
tween well-known things and processes and those that are less well 
known. It is only when this is taken too literally, and when the 
application of a metaphor is unrestrictedly overextended, that it may 
be false and cease to be illuminating. 
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24. The above account is heavily indebted to Scheffler and to 
B. Othanel Smith. The latter was the first to make use of "root 
metaphors" in education. 
Most metaphors depict the child. Dewey, however, besides develop­
ing the growth metaphor, speaks of the school as the "embryo of so­
ciety," and elsewhere compares education in social life to renewal in 
biological life. "What nutrition and reproduction are to physiological 
life, education is to social life." John Dewey, Democracy and Education 
(New York: Macmillan, 1917), p. 11. See also Scheffler, op. cit., for 
a more detailed discussion of educational metaphors that are not in­
tended as metaphysically basic or root metaphors. 
25. Thus educational metaphors, in being used to guide and recom­
mend a given curriculum proposal, also perform imperative or de­
liberative and affective functions intended to coax, goad, guide, in­
spire, move, impel, educationists to act. Since in any school program 
a practical choice has to be made, this choice is not made without 
(tacitly) preferring one educational metaphor over another; nor, how­
ever, is this choice made without considering the educational pro­
posal which is attached to the metaphor (as a sort of rider on a 
contract). 
26. See, for example, Joe Burnett, "Observations on the Logical 
Implications of Philosophic Theory for Educational Theory and Prac­
tice," Educational Theory, XI (April, 1961), 65-70. 
27. The YMCA picture of an ideally educated Christian, for ex­
ample, presumably differs from an Ethical Culture Humanist's, and 
so presumably will the proposed curriculum of either, to the extent 
that is needed for it to be consistent with its avowed beliefs. 
28. From "Basic Issues in American Secondary Education—1956" 
by B. Othanel Smith, in Frontiers of Secondary Education I, edited by 
Paul M. Halverson. Copyright © 1956 by Syracuse University Press, 
Syracuse, New York. 
29. For the same reason that Frankena's Judeo-Christian example 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify the teaching of obedience 
to God at large. 
30. Op. cit. Even if consensus were achievable as to what society 
ought to be, that would not imply that a consensus ought to be the 
basis for answering the question of educational purposes; there was, 
after all, a time when consensus as to the flatness of the earth was 
thought to imply that the earth was flat. (See Chapter III, pp. 72-75, 
for an elaboration of this point.) The lack of consensus, moreover, does 
not show that some aims of education cannot be shown to be better 
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than others, nor therefore, that the problem of deriding educational 
purposes need necessarily be perennial; nor does Smith show, finally, 
that philosophical attention to the aims of education deserves to be 
disparaged. (I have tried to show why not on pages 105-9 of this 
chapter.) 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Schemer, op. cit., p. 52. 
34. Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1948), pp. 91-92. 
35. Hereafter, the word "blik" will, for notational convenience and 
ease, be written without quotes or italics. 
36. See, for example, Flew and Maclntyre (eds.), New Essays in 
Philosophical Theology, pp. 96-130. 
37. Ralph Sleeper, "The 'Meaning of Life' Question: Linguistic 
Philosophy and Religious Belief," Cross Currents, XIV (Summer, 
1964). Sleeper denies that "believe-in" statements depend (logically) 
on "believe-that" statements. Kai Nielsen, Flew, Passmore, Horsburgh, 
and Blackstone, however, disagree with this view. The question of 
whether bliks (or "believe-in" statements) logically depend upon 
"believe-that" statements (or what amounts to the same thing, factual 
assertions) continues to be debated. See for example, W. Blackstone, 
The Problem of Religious Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1963), especially Chapters VI and VII. A strong 
thought (with a possible commission of the ad ignorantiam fallacy) 
is voiced by D. J. O'Connor: "If a religion is true and can be shown 
to be so, then it should be taught. And if it cannot be shown 
to be true, then it ought not to be propagated officially . . " {An 
Introduction to Philosophy of Education, p. 135). I myself confess 
that I find it logically odd for a believer to say, "I am committed 
to religious belief X, but I don't care if it's true or false"; for his 
faith would come to rest on nothing at all and not differ appreciably 
from lunacy. 
38. Adopted in 1956. Italics added. 
39. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. 
Henry D. Aiken (New York: Hafner, 1948), Part II, p. 25. 
40. Ibid., Part V, p. 39. 
V The Place of Moral Reasons in Education 
Thoughts without content are empty; 
intuitions without concepts are blind. 
—IMMANUEL KANT 
Some arguments in philosophy of education purport to guide 
educational programs and policies from a moral point of view. 
Much can be said for the legitimacy of that aim. Metaphysical 
arguments and issues may often appear too abstruse, too 
abstract, too remote from education, or even too unresolvable 
to invite public or professional interest. Some philosophers of 
education may have little propensity for the supposedly deeper 
metaphysical subtleties and hence may elect to banish meta­
physics once and for all. Not for them the terrors of the 
metaphysical jungle! 
There are those who see a special relevance of moral argu­
ments to education and would rather try to work out the 
relationship between morals and education than attempt to 
tread the more tenuous path between metaphysics and educa­
tion.1 
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Moreover, the moral (rather than the metaphysical) goals 
of a society are often quite directly expressed as the goals of 
education,2 and these influence educational policies and pre­
sumably lend direction to the operation of school systems, 
giving authority to educational programs. 
Moral issues impinge upon what is euphemistically called 
in education "The Great Debate"—whether to construct school 
buildings that cost more money; whether to bus children; 
whether to give scholarships only to the gifted; and what 
educational programs to conduct for teachers. 
Since moral practices concern the good or harm that people 
do to each other—and there is a great deal of good or harm 
that can come from schooling—the daily and continuing moral 
role of the schools cannot be overestimated. Gilbert Ryle has 
reminded us that moral questions are an everyday affair; one 
need not tie a string around one's finger to remember the 
existence of moral problems. 
Moral problems and moral arguments, therefore, have an 
urgency that their metaphysical counterparts seem to lack. 
Even though the schools may remain open while we debate 
metaphysics, they may not be able to stay open—witness, in 
some instances, the South—when we disagree sharply on our 
moral purposes. Debates on moral ideals do press directly 
on educational policies and programs, and so we may well look 
for rational canons or criticism for assessing moral arguments 
in education. 
Moral arguments have an even more general bearing on 
education. The age-old problem that Plato presented, of how 
we ought to live, is answered in part by how, morally, we 
educate the young. 
The notion of bliks seemed appropriate for expressing 
metaphysical premises leading to decisions on what should be 
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taught to the young. It is clear that an educational blik, ex­
pressing an ideal for the education of young people in relation 
to society, to the universe, and to their ultimate destiny, 
affects the principles by which we bring up our children. 
There are writers who deny the relationship between meta­
physics and morals, but it is hard to understand how a man 
can live by moral principles that prescribe what ought to be 
and yet not have some metaphysical or theological view of 
whether there is a God or the Idea of the Good. Such a view 
would establish a connection, by way of moral principles, 
between the idea of the other-worldly, or its rejection, and the 
world of man. It would thus include the direction, content, 
and method of the education of man. That, at any rate, is 
what constitutes the once-respected, traditional conception of 
the synoptic and visionary function of philosophy. 
The world view, or "root metaphor,'' or blik triggers a 
program of action to fulfil the ideal. It sets up the target— 
the final or ultimate purpose or end of education. The moral 
principle that is consistent with the metaphysical ideal sug­
gests a program of action designed to bring about the ideal 
(Hutchins' or Dewey's, for example). A moral principle may, 
itself, be seen as the purpose or end of education, with the 
educational program of action proposed as a means to that end. 
This relation between metaphysical and moral ends and means 
seems not to be an untoward extension of Dewey's means-ends 
continuum. For most teachers, the metaphysical view or root 
assumption is put out of sight, and soon educators come to 
think that only moral principles provide the ends of education. 
The metaphysical blik or root metaphor triggers, prods, or 
inspires a moral, intellectual, and physical program of educa­
tion for bringing up the young. In Braithwaite's felicitous 
phrase, the blik is "a spring of action' for the moral and edu­
cational program. 
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The idea that moral and educational principles are validly 
derived from a metaphysical view is logically assailable, and 
the connection certainly should be subjected to rational 
criticism. But that the metaphysical view does give rise to 
moral principles, and these in turn to educational principles, 
is illustrated by the derivation from Thomism of the moral 
principles contained in the Ten Commandments, prescribing 
an agapeistic way of life in the education of the young and 
the conduct of the elders. The fact that isms may be seriously 
criticized in philosophy does not mean that they are not 
"'philosophies of education.'' 
The commandment "Thou shalt not kill" as expressed in 
the Old Testament would not need to be obeyed apart from 
acceptance of some conception of God. Some writers hold that 
the moral principle proscribing murder is rationally defensible 
without commitment to a conception of God. But it would not 
then be the Fifth Commandment backed by the Old Testa­
ment theological blik. 
Whether moral principles are logically or otherwise inde­
pendent of metaphysics continues to be debated in philosophy 
and in educational philosophy. There seems to be an uneasy 
ease in asserting that there is or is not a relation between 
metaphysics and education. The far harder task is to tell what 
the relation is or is not. Following Frankena's lead and, from 
another direction, Scheffler's and Smith's, this study has 
attempted to show how metaphysics and education are related 
and that, at least psychologically, people are apt to derive 
their moral principles from a metaphysical or theological world 
view, no matter how crude and inexplicit it may be. The 
well-known philosopher J. C. C. Smart confirms this view 
by saying: 
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As we shall see, and as has been generally recognized 
in modern philosophy, it is not possible to deduce 
propositions about what ought to be done purely from 
propositions about what is the case. It follows that the 
principles of conduct are by no means unambiguously 
determined by our general philosophy. Nevertheless, in 
their laudable objection to those who would deduce 
ethics from the nature of the world (and in particular 
to some of those biologists who would base ethics on 
the theory of evolution and the like), philosophers have 
tended to obscure the fact that our general philosophical 
and scientific beliefs may strongly influence our ethical 
principles. For example, if one of our principles of con­
duct were that we should do what is commanded by a 
personal God, and if our world view were one which 
left no place for such a God, then this principle of 
conduct would have to be given up, or at least we should 
have to find some other reason for adhering to it. . 
The example of theology was brought up simply to show 
in a vivid way that metaphysics can be relevant to ethics. 
We must certainly not jump from the impossibility of 
deducing "ought" from "is" to the untenable position 
that our general philosophical and scientific views have 
no bearing on our ethical ones.3 
One can go further than Smart by suggesting that there 
is some merit to Frankena's notion that the conjunction of 
metaphysical, epistemological, and metamoral (MEM) premises, 
together with relevant facts, would be necessary to justify a 
decision as to what should be taught. It may well be that 
MEM'S, taken either together or singly, are needed in order 
to decide upon purposes of education—a decision that affects 
the formation of policies governing content and method. 
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Since the purposes of education—whether metaphysical or 
moral—continue to be debated, canons of criticism seem to 
be needed to assess the arguments and so to provide a way 
out of the Purist-Capricious impasse. Under consideration 
next will be how moral arguments, whether or however they 
depend upon a metaphysical view, can be rationally assessed. 
The Teaching of Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes 
We sometimes speak of teaching knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes because we find it convenient to distinguish between 
teaching Johnny that the earth is round, teaching him to 
drive a car, and teaching him to be truthful. Somewhat after 
the pattern of Ryle, we might describe the first of these as 
"teaching-that," the second as "teaching-how,1' and the third, 
which does not derive from Ryle's distinction, as "teaching­
for." The last of these, the teaching of attitudes, is the most 
difficult among all teaching jobs and the one most likely to 
be a "task." Try as hard as we may to teach for the develop­
ment of attitudes, we do not always succeed; it takes more 
training, ingenuity, and effort to teach attitudes than to 
teach either knowledge or skills. 
In the curriculum it is easy to see the specific courses about 
which we can all debate, but it is not so easy to see the most 
hidden attitudes for which we are likely to teach. The courses, 
for example, in a public school may seem very much like 
those taught in a private school. And although there may not 
be a single explicit statement in either school on the subject 
of equality or privilege, the twelve years of exposure to either 
a public or private school exercises a considerable influence 
on a child's attitudes toward these questions. Attitudes thus 
shaped are not likely to be seriously altered by anything that 
happens thereafter. 
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Even though attitudes are more difficult to teach than 
either knowledge or skills, attitudes presumably provide the 
principal reason for teaching knowledge and skills. Then 
how do the attitudes for which we teach guide our choice 
of what knowledge and skills to teach? 
When the question of what to teach is asked philosophi­
cally, it is not quite like the question of what items to select 
in trimming a defense budget or in screening college appli­
cants, where the answer lies in applying correctly established 
criteria. The questions, for example, of whether we should 
teach a Victorian or a Freudian version of Hamlet or whether 
we should teach a democratic or a communist version of society 
cannot be answered in terms of money or space limitation. 
Nor are answers found by making some abstraction from what 
there is to know or by pruning down available resources in 
the culture, on the grounds that one cannot teach everything. 
A fundamental, evaluative argument that is intended to answer 
the question 'What shall be taught?" calls for a rational choice 
among our values, in so far as we have to choose one way of 
life (or one part of a way of life, or some attitude or value 
or blik) over another.4 Once the issue has been made clear, 
in the sense that the alternatives are mutually exclusive, we 
cannot choose both, or part of both, because we cannot teach 
our children to live simultaneously as good Christians, good 
Mau Mau's, good dialectical materialists, and good democrats. 
The attitudes for which we teach, to the extent they reflect 
a way of life that is incompatible with some other way of 
life, include certain areas of knowledge and of skill, and 
exclude others. To choose the strictly fundamentalist Christian 
way of life, for example, would render inconsistent the teach­
ing of the knowledge and skills required to understand 
biologic evolution. Thus, the way of life by which we choose 
to live, as reflected in the attitudes for which we teach, sets 
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the standard for determining what knowledge and skills to 
teach. 
Then for what way of life and for what attitudes or values 
shall we teach? Although the question "For what shall we 
teach?" also raises the question of what knowledge and skills 
to teach, the main consideration now is the type of argument 
that would answer the question concerning attitudes. What 
knowledge and skills to teach may, at least in part, be inferred 
from the attitudes sought. (See the notion of "logical impli­
cation'' in education, in Chapters II and IV.) 
The type of argument to answer the question about atti­
tudes would make use of good reasons for backing one con­
clusion as against another. The question "What shall be 
taught?" is regarded here as a particular instance of the 
general moral and evaluative question. It therefore has features 
in common with the moral or evaluative question. Consider­
ation of it shows how both moral and metaphysical premises 
may be pertinent to deciding what to teach and also what 
distinctive characteristics the evaluative argument has. These 
characteristics would be grossly handled if one were to study 
a straightforward moral or metaphysical argument on the 
assumption that an argument for metaphysical or moral con­
clusions automatically (or deductively) implied or justified a 
conclusion to an evaluative argument in education. The ques­
tion posed by Spencer that we noted in Chapter I, for example, 
is neither through the efforts of metaphysics nor through 
those of morals sui generis answered by an argument in 
Sense II. 
The Use of Good Reasons in Deciding What Shall Be Taught 
When a speaker says, "X should be taught,'' one may start 
with the assumption, which can be later withdrawn, that he 
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has good reasons for believing so. The speaker can use the 
good reasons to imply his conclusion concerning what shall 
be taught. If a speaker says, for example, that patriotism should 
be taught, one may assume he has good reasons for that con­
clusion. Among them may be this (abbreviated as Qi ) : 
Mi Attitudes that
be taught. 
 serve the national interest should 
Ii Patriotism (is an attitude that) serves the n
interest. 
ational 
Tx Therefore, patriotism should be taught.5 
The reasons offered for teaching patriotism include the 
Instrumental Principle, I, which asserts that what is taught 
is an appropriate instrumentality toward an end. The moral 
principle, M, may also stand for the conjunction of MEM'S. 
I, as a means to some end, is a contingent empirical premise 
dependent for its truth on what happens in the world. As 
such, it is open to empirical falsification. If I is falsified, then 
it is withdrawn as a good reason for deciding to act on T; it is 
the actual falsification and not the openness to falsification of 
I that counts against it as a good reason for acting on T. 
Without a contingent premise, the argument would be 
empty.6 While the contingent premise may count as a good 
reason for teaching patriotism, the mere presence of I is not 
sufficient in a practical syllogism to imply that patriotism 
should be taught. The reason for this is not hard to see. In 
conformity with the second of the rules elucidated by R. M. 
Hare, that "no imperative conclusion can be validly drawn 
from a set of premises which does not contain at least one 
imperative premise,'' at least one of the premises in a practical 
syllogism must be imperative.7 Since the conclusion Ti is 
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an imperative and I is not an imperative, M must be an 
imperative in order for the conclusion to be valid. Without 
an imperative in M, no conclusion of the form T can be 
validly drawn; the presence of an imperative in M is a 
necessary condition to imply validly a conclusion of the 
form T. 
Regardless of whether Mx or Ii is true or false (or neither), 
as long as Hare's condition has been fulfilled by the presence 
of an imperative, the premises taken together validly imply 
the conclusion Ti. Since there is, moreover, a contingent 
premise, the argument (abbreviated Qi) is non-empty. 
Satisfaction of the conditions of logical validity and of a 
non-empty argument is not, however, synonymous with having 
good reasons for deciding to act on T. While neither of the 
premises has to be true in order for the conclusion to be 
valid (see Chapter I, section on Smullyan), both must be 
true for the conclusion to be sound. If I is false, it is not a 
good reason to decide that one ought to act on T. 
Even when I is true and M is an imperative premise, a 
difficulty exists. An opposing speaker can use the contrary 
of Mi (.—Mi) along with Ii to imply -— Ti (abbreviated 
— Qi) . Depending on whether we start from Mi or —Mi, 
in combination with Ii, the conclusion Ti or •—• Ti will follow 
logically. Then how does the presence of (some) good reasons 
help us to choose between contradictory conclusions, both 
purporting to answer the question "What shall be taught?" 
The presence of a logically good reason (Hare's second rule) 
in the form of an imperative premise and the presence of a 
factually good reason in the form of a true contingent premise 
—both necessary to draw a valid and sound conclusion Ti— 
do not help us to decide between Ti and <—'Ti. The presence 
of (some) good reasons can accordingly be used to decide 
either for Ti or for ^ Ti, depending on whether one begins 
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with Mi or ~ M i  . But how do we choose between Mi 
and -—-Mi? 
An argument of form Q performs a genuine choice-guiding 
function between contradictory alternatives, then, if it not 
only implies a valid conclusion of the form T but also gives 
us good reasons to justify our deciding to act on T rather 
than — T. 
If the argument is valid, the premises are justified, the 
reasons in the premises justify the conclusion T, and a justified 
conclusion is one that I ought to act on, then I have good 
reason to decide to act on T. 
One may therefore say of an argument like this, "You 
have a valid argument for Ti and since, in addition, your 
reasons (among which are Mx and 10 are good, then you 
have good reason for deciding to act on Ti." But it is un­
nerving in this instance, even though the argument is valid, 
to accept the conclusion as justified and therefore as a con­
clusion on which we ought to act.8 
It is perfectly plausible and logical to say to someone about 
an argument like Qi, "You have given us good reasons for 
teaching X, but we ought not to teach it." If asked "Why?" 
we can say, "The good reasons you gave for teaching X, all 
things considered, do not add up to a good enough reason 
for teaching X, even though your argument is both logically 
valid and non-empty, and even though it may seem logically 
odd or out of place—but not logically self-contradictory—to 
decide that we shouldn't teach X." 
One way of gauging whether it is logically odd to add, 
"But we shouldn't teach X," is to ask, "Why should we decide 
that X is worth teaching?" The task is then to answer this 
type of 'Why?" question with, if not the best reason, at least 
a good enough reason for deciding that X should be taught 
instead of '—' X or Y or Z or any other logically incompatible 
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alternative that conflicts with X. It is important to distinguish 
a good reason from one that, while it is good, is not good 
enough. An argument of this kind performs an evaluative 
choice-guiding function by giving us a good enough reason 
to choose X over ~ X. 
What counts as a good enough reason to choose between 
two contradictory conclusions in answer to the question "What 
shall be taught?" It counts if all the reasons in M and I of 
an argument Q can be shown to be good reasons (and if, 
correspondingly, at least one among an opposing set of reasons 
fails to qualify as good), and if an argument of the form 
Q takes account of, and is relevant to, the practice of teaching 
(unlike an opposing argument). The justification of the 
premises, although it provides a good reason for the justifi­
cation of the conclusion, does not by itself provide a good 
enough reason for deciding that we should act on T. What 
is needed is a good reason to show that the conclusion T, in 
addition to being justified, is relevant to the practice of 
teaching. We have a good enough reason to act on a given 
conclusion T, then, when the argument is logically valid, 
when there is at least a true contingent premise, making the 
argument non-empty, when the premises are justified, and 
when there is a good reason why a given conclusion T is 
relevant. 
A good enough reason for choosing between two contra­
dictory conclusions that reply to the question 'What should 
be taught?" is proposed in the following example (abbre­
viated Q2): 
M2 True accounts of the origin of human life on earth 
should be taught. 
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I2 The theory of evolution is a true account of the 
origin of human life on earth. 
T2 Therefore, the theory of evolution should be 
taught. 
To show that this type of argument presents a good enough 
reason for teaching the theory of evolution, three conditions 
will be discussed: one applies to M, another to I, and a third 
has to do with the practical relevance of the conclusion.9 
The Moral Principle 
What is the difference between Qi and Q2? In Qi we 
have a good reason to imply Ti, but we do not have a good 
enough reason to decide to act on Ti (and correspondingly a 
good enough reason to decide not to act on — T i )  . In Q2, 
on the other hand, we have a good enough reason logically 
to imply T2 and also to choose to act on T2 (and refuse to 
act on —T 2 ) . How is this so? 
In both arguments, I is falsifiable. Hence, we have the 
possibility of depending on or withdrawing I as a good 
reason.10 If either Ii or I2 were falsified, we would have to 
withdraw it as a good reason for deciding to act on T. And 
if we had to withdraw it as a good reason when it was falsified, 
then it would not be a good enough reason to decide the 
question of whether to act on T rather than .—• T. 
We know on what grounds—verification—we can count I 
as a good reason. But what are the grounds for counting or 
withdrawing M as a good reason? R. M. Hare skilfully set 
up two rules for the application of logic to moral inferences. 
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It is now suggested that this third rule be added: There is 
a good enough reason for deciding to act on an imperative 
conclusion T only when all the premises are universal (in M 
and in 1). This rule finds ample support in a general theorem 
of the formal syllogism, which states that "if one premise is 
particular, the conclusion must also be particular." u For the 
conclusion T to be universal, both premises M and I have 
to be universal; if M or I is particular, then the conclusion 
must be particular. Since the conclusion T is universal and 
I is universal, M also has to be universal; if it is not, then it 
must be withdrawn as a good reason. Once M has been with­
drawn as a good reason, premise I, which remains intact, does 
not count as a good enough reason for deciding between the 
two contradictory conclusions, T and •—'T. 
What makes M either a particular or a universal premise? 
We know that a metaphysical premise such as "All men are 
mortal" is universal from looking at the universal quantifier 
"'all." But what are the characteristics of a universal moral 
premise? If there is any sense in which moral principles 
count as universal premises in value-implying syllogisms, it 
seems to be in the sense that premises are capable of becoming 
universal and thus can be said to be "universalizable."' 
In its original formulation, the universalizability principle 
referred to Kant's categorical imperative "Act only on that 
maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law." l" Kant used the example of 
''promise-keeping" to show the moral necessity of affirming 
universal or U-type valuations. If there were no moral obli­
gations to keep promises, the idea of making promises ''would 
become impossible,' and the moral action of wilfully breaking 
a promise would, Kant said, "'necessarily contradict itself." 13 
Later, Kant applied the universal law of our own rational 
making, which he believed necessary to a logical basis for 
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ethics. If universalizability could be named a necessary charac­
teristic of ethical statements and the minimal sense in which 
a moral statement could be called true, then it would be self-
contradictory for a "'good will" to deny a universal moral 
principle such as promise-keeping or truth-telling. A moral 
statement could be said to be true if denial of the statement 
would be self-contradictory; it would be logically impossible 
to express our rational will and at the same time to deny a 
universal law of our own rational making. 
In recent formulations, first by E. A. Gellner and then by 
Hare, a U-type valuation is distinguished from an E-type valu­
ation. (U-type may be associated with the concept of universal 
and E-type with the existentialist focus on the individual.) 
According to Gellner, E-type valuations contain "ineliminable" 
references to individuals, whereas U-type valuations contain 
"eliminable" references to individuals. Examples of the first 
are ''selfishness, romantic love, loyalty; of the second . , 
the impartial judgments of a judge." 14 Since individual refer­
ence is ineliminable in connection with patriotism, it is not 
possible, according to Gellner, to be a U-type patriot. 
In adopting Gellner's distinction, Hare accepts the principle 
of the eliminability of singular terms in U-type valuations 
but argues that while maxims may be E-type or U-type, all 
moral reasons are U-type. According to Hare, the notion that 
there are E-type moral valuations comes from misunderstand­
ing the moral use of the word "ought"' and from "not dis­
tinguishing non-moral imperatives from moral imperatives." 1B 
Hare goes on to make the stronger claim that all moral valua­
tions are universalizable and that there are no E-type moral 
valuations. 
This study does not make Hare's stronger claim that all 
moral valuations are U-type, but does support his other claim 
that universal moral premises are U-type. There are un­
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doubtedly differences between Gellner and Hare and also 
between the recent formulations and the earlier Kantian 
formulation of universalizability. The position here is that any 
universal moral premises in value-implying syllogisms are 
U-type; that a characteristic of U-type valuations is the 
eliminability of singular terms therein; and that the use of 
U-type valuations, limited though it may be, can provide a 
good reason for denying opposing non-U-type valuations. The 
intention here is to show that use of a U-type valuation as 
a good reason to deny an opposing U-type valuation need not 
be self-contradictory. 
To apply the E- or the U-type distinction to M, one can 
often tell whether M is particular or universal by looking at 
its terms, such as national interest.'' According to Gellner's 
notion, if the singularity in Mi is ineliminable, then Mi 
is E-type. 
Which, if either, use of M (Mx or M2) is particularizable? 
Which, if either, is universalizable? There is no absoluteness 
to this distinction. The use of Mi seems more nearly to 
resemble an E-type valuation, and the use of M2 seems more 
nearly to resemble a U-type valuation. 
If the use of Mi to back the conclusion "Patriotism should 
be taught" is restricted to the partisan use—one in which 
particularity is ineliminable—then Mi is not universal and 
must be withdrawn as a good reason for Ti. Although the 
other reasons in the argument may remain intact, withdrawal 
of M means they are no longer good enough reasons to act 
on Ti. 
Application of the third rule requiring universal moral 
premises for imperative conclusions makes it of the first im­
portance to distinguish particularity from universality. With­
out a mark of universality or of particularity, like "the national 
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interest" or "'patriotism," one cannot tell whether M is a 
universal premise. If M is not universal (and it seems not, in 
Mi), then it does not support an evaluative argument in 
education leading to a decision to act either on Ti or —Ti. 
Without universality in M, the totality of the premises among 
which M is found cannot count as a good enough reason for 
deciding either to act on Ti or to act on —Ti. 
What is the test of whether Mi or M2 is universalizable? 
Consider first the ineliminability of "the national interest" as 
a singular term in contrast to "True accounts of the origin 
of human life on earth." Although "the origin of life on 
earth" is singular, nevertheless, in the principle invoked—to 
"teach true accounts" as opposed to false accounts—its singu­
larity is eliminable. If the appeal in Mi is only to partisan 
assent, particularly concerning some special privilege that is 
ineliminable, what we then have is, not a moral principle, 
but an ideological principle—which, in expressing partisan 
allegiance, is not universalizable.16 
Consider next the function of a universalizable principle 
in denying an opposing valuation. It is perfectly plausible, 
for example, to take exception to (or to deny) Mi, since there 
is not a universal moral reason for saying that we should or 
should not teach attitudes that serve the national interest. 
M2, however, being universalizable, gives at least one good 
reason for deciding to act on T2. To deny M2 is, in a sense, 
to say that we ought to teach falsehood; but the idea of teach­
ing falsehood, which ordinarily contains ineliminable singular 
terms,17 is not universalizable and therefore cannot count as a 
good moral reason for affirming the contrary of M2 0—'M2). 
It is not necessarily, however, self-contradictory to deny M2, 
nor is it logically impossible to deny or reject any U-type 
valuation. Notice of universality warns against frivolous rejec­
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tion of U-type valuations, for universality is ordinarily, it 
seems, a good reason—though not the only reason—for affirming 
a moral valuation. 
Imagine, though, that someone says U-type valuations are 
a priori. It has been noted that to identify a collective attitude 
like "consensus" with morality amounts to ignoring the differ­
ence between "is"' and "ought,'' for one can apply the open-
question argument to it without self-contradiction. One could 
say: "You identify consensus with morality, and you say 
that a decision K was consensually arrived at. But was K 
morally right? Would it be self-contradictory to say that K 
was morally wrong? It may be no more than possible that K 
was morally wrong. But so long as that is logically possible, 
then consensus is not a synonym of morality." 
A recent writer shows how even U-type valuations can be 
rejected: 
These definitions must be rejected. . "Right" 
does not mean the same as "in accord with nature" or 
"consistently universalizable,'' because it makes sense to 
ask, 'This act is in accord with nature, but is it right?" 
and "This act is consistently universalizable, but is it 
right?" Even if the answer is always "no," it is still a 
sensible—that is non-self-contradictory—question to ask. 
"Right" cannot mean the same thing as any one of these 
other expressions, else there would be no controversy 
as to whether everything that fulfills the criterion in 
question is also right. If any of these proffered definitions 
were acceptable, then arguing about them pro or con 
would be as pointless as arguing whether a yard is three 
feet. Those who asserted that it was would be defending 
a tautology, and those who denied it would be saying 
something self-contradictory.18 
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A U-type valuation may be rejected or denied without 
self-contradiction by being qualified in one of several ways. 
For example, "Tell the truth" may become "Tell the truth— 
except when doing so would endanger human life.'' Exceptive 
clauses of this kind show that a U-type valuation may be 
rejected or denied in everyday practical application to par­
ticular moral acts. There may, for example, be two U-type 
valuations that contradict each other in terms of called-for 
simultaneous action. For instance, "You should keep promises, 
and so you should return this book now as you promised," 
as opposed to, "I should be considerate of human life and so 
I should care now for my dying mother who needs me.'' Here 
the two U-type valuations are incompatible in application. 
Since I can do only one of the things called for by these 
valuations, I may, without self-contradiction, reject or deny 
the first by saying: "I agree that I should keep promises and 
return this book, but my dying mother needs me. I should 
place priority on consideration of human life over keeping a 
promise. Therefore, instead of returning the book, I should 
go to my mother." 
An exceptive clause denies the application of a U-type valu­
ation; in the foregoing instance, it is by reference to another 
U-type valuation rather than to a non-U-type valuation. 
If the foregoing instance may be used to indicate something 
about M, then when I is U-type, it counts against a non-
U-type statement, such as Mi. Although the denial of M2 is 
not self-contradictory, a universal moral premise can be denied 
or rejected only by some other U-type valuation that is over­
riding. Suppose, for example, that someone says, "Lying is 
wrong," and someone else says, "He lied, but he was not 
acting wrongly.'' The second statement is the contradictory 
of the first and denies or rejects it—unless there is a good 
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reason for the affirmation "He was not acting wrongly.'' What 
could it be? One may have a good reason for the affirmation 
if one appeals to a U-type moral valuation, "Saving lives is 
right," and asserts, "In this case the only way to save a life 
was to lie.'' Thus, "He lied, but was not acting wrongly" 
appeals for its good reason to a U-type valuation. A U-type 
valuation has been denied or rejected in this instance—but 
only by another U-type valuation. Thus, if M is U-type and 
there is a good moral reason to reject or deny its application 
to a given (teaching) act, then M may not have priority 
among all U-type valuations, but its denial is not the denial 
of all U-type valuations. 
U-type principles, then, are deniable—but not by non-
U-type (or E-type) principles. In the sense indicated above, 
even exceptional applications are U-type. A further difficulty 
arises if two U-type statements in M are pitted against each 
other, and neither becomes an exceptive clause to reject or 
deny the other. Then neither is a good reason against the 
other or even against an opposing T statement—unless there 
are non-moral reasons for acting on one conclusion rather 
than another. The practical application of a U-type statement 
in M, as M is used along with other reasons, provides a 
further indirect way for a U-type statement in M to be 
rejected or denied on good grounds, as in Sense II. 
There is another way by which M, if universalizable, may 
be denied. It is logically possible, for example, to imagine 
that the truth about the world is so bad that everyone who is 
taught the truth is led to panic and suicide (the foregoing 
true statement being the sole exception). The only life that 
is humanly endurable is thus a life of illusions and false­
hoods.19 If teaching falsehood in such a world would prevent 
panic and suicide, it could be argued that would be a good 
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reason for teaching falsehood; the prevention of panic and 
mass suicide is an alternative U-type valuation, which might, 
under such circumstances (without self-contradiction) take 
moral precedence over teaching the truth and constitute an 
overriding reason for not teaching the truth. 
The greater empirical likelihood that teaching falsehood— 
except in so hypothetical and far-fetched a situation—would 
lead to the breakdown of society, at least as we care to live 
in it, may be adduced as a reason for teaching the truth. 
The idea of not teaching the truth is ordinarily repre­
hensible to us, and in the absence of an exceptional circum­
stance such as the foregoing fantasy, there is considerable 
oddness about denying that we should teach the truth. Yet 
the denial of M2, though odd, is not self-contradictory. It is 
possible to argue, whether rightly or wrongly, that the avoid­
ance of panic and suicide is a good reason for teaching illusion 
and falsehood instead of truth. M2, therefore, can theoretically 
be rejected or denied without self-contradiction. But without 
some defensible exceptive, or what H. L. A. Hart terms a 
"defeasible clause,1' there is good reason against affirming that 
we should teach falsehood. The logical possibility of denying 
M2 by some other conflicting U-type statement does not, how­
ever, mean that there is every good reason to deny M2 as 
there seems to be for denying Ma. It does border on the 
grotesque to imagine our teaching—on the basis of a con­
clusion arrived at through arguments—falsehood instead of 
truth. Still, the desirability of teaching falsehood under extra­
ordinary circumstances can and ought to be considered; such 
a possibility makes arguments against M2, however odd, not 
self-contradictory. 
A U-type valuation counts as a good reason for affirming 
a moral decision and hence for deciding what should be 
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taught. The universalizability of any U-type valuation is not, 
however, defined as moral in the way that a yard is defined 
as three feet. Universalizability is a good reason for, but not 
a definition of, what ought to be taught. 
Some formidable arguments have been put forward recently 
to suggest that not all moral valuations are U-type. Even 
assuming the desirability of performing U-type acts—great 
moral deeds done by saints and heroes—such acts of superero­
gation,20 although desiderated., may be held not to be uni­
versalizable (E-type rather than U-type), for such acts are 
rare or unique. 
The acts of saints and heroes certainly go beyond U-type 
obligations, and their acts are singular, not universal, in fact. 
Nevertheless, the desideratum intended by those who teach 
or tell about such acts is wider emulation. Universalizability 
is, after all, not synonymous with nose-counting. Even if 
heroic and saintly acts are not expected to be emulated—or 
imitated (Plato's word for it)—by all people, such acts, having 
the highest moral marks, are ideally desiderated by all, so 
long as they have (on Kantian grounds) a rational will. 
"Would that rare and exceptional saintly and heroic virtues 
could be taught'' must have been the cry of every post-Plato 
moral pedagogue whose will and aim has been to engage 
in the teaching of something rare and exceptionally desirable, 
once called virtue. 
The hope implicit in recounting the acts of saints and 
heroes is that, were we of their moral mettle and in their 
circumstances, we too would feel that we ought to do like­
wise. We are not less men for failing to do likewise, but by 
this failure, we fail morally to become great men. We are 
told the story of the hero and the saint in the hope that we 
may, wherever possible, emulate (or imitate) the exceptionally 
desirable act. It is not any less desirable for being repeated 
less often. Civilizations have fallen just because there was a 
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dearth of outstanding moral acts at precisely the times of need. 
The good act is unique; the intention of recounting it is 
to inspire us to consider following the example. Aristotle 
held that if one wants to know what is good, it is best to 
follow the example of a good man. There can be only one 
Socrates, one Gandhi, one Giordano Bruno, one Martin Luther 
King; but heroic acts of the kind they performed can and 
ought to be done over again. The desiderated repeatability 
of saintly and heroic acts attests to their universalizability. 
The exemplary act against some evil or wrong ennobles the 
doer and exhorts us to follow. That we do not have it in us 
to do likewise makes the exemplary act no less worthy of 
reiteration. The difficult task of morally educating more people 
to do likewise seems less impossible because the exemplary 
act has been performed. Moral education gets its impetus from 
the spirited acts that are sometimes told in history books and 
sometimes in fairy tales. Spinoza may have had a similar 
thought when, at the end of the Ethics, he wrote: 
If the way which, as I have shown, leads hither seems 
very difficult, it can nevertheless be found. It must 
indeed be difficult since it is so seldom discovered for 
if salvation lay ready to hand and could be discovered 
without great labor, how could it be possible that it 
should be neglected almost by everybody? But all things 
noble are as difficult as they are rare. 
The saintly and heroic act is thus not in every sense E-type. 
In the intentional sense, ''would that more teachers would 
teach and live and die like Socrates' is not the kind of valu­
ation to be dismissed as unworthy. The will, the intention, 
the appeal that Socrates' example might be made manifold-
it is these that make this judgment universalizable. When 
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we hear of similar moral courage, we are inspired to applaud 
and to follow—witness the heroic examples of Giordano Bruno 
and, more recently, of John T. Scopes of Tennessee. 
Even if we cannot teach people to emulate great and rare 
moral acts in all instances, because of the recalcitrance of 
"human nature,' we nevertheless can and do and should teach 
people to give their wholehearted approval and support to 
heroic and saintly deeds. And we should correspondingly 
teach disapproval of the acts of cowards, scoundrels, and 
sinners. In the sense of appeal to the morality of mankind, 
the acts of the hero and the saint are U-type. 
We cannot all be Socrates, Scopes, Gandhi, Giordano 
Bruno; but (to extend a point made by Charles Stevenson) 
we can be educated to feel approval and support for them 
in their exemplary acts—and, to the extent of our ability, to 
emulate them. 
There is, of course, a great gap between approving of others 
for throwing themselves on hand grenades to save their fellows 
and doing such a deed oneself. We ought therefore to will 
that we ourselves, in circumstances corresponding to those 
of saints or heroes, would not only approve of great acts but 
would do likewise. 
Against the notion that an act of supererogation is E-type 
because it is performed only once, one must emphasize that 
the intention of its being praised is that it be universally 
approved, supported, imitated. In the potential infinitude of 
approval, support, and emulation, even the supererogatory 
act of the saint or the hero is universalizable. 
Universalizing supererogatory acts puts us on the trail 
toward affirmatively answering the question of whether virtue 
can be taught. Without universalizability, moral grounds for 
deciding what should be taught seem to be undercut. 
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To sum up so far: a good reason for affirming M is that 
it is U-type; this counts also as a good reason for denying 
the contrary of M; a U-type valuation need not be regarded 
as logically undeniable; a U-type valuation may be denied or 
rejected if qualified by an exceptive clause, but it is not 
deniable by a non-U-type valuation. Thus a U-type valuation 
like M2 counts as a good reason for affirmation and as a 
good reason against its contrary — M2 ( 'We should teach 
untrue accounts"). The presence of a U-type valuation does 
not, however, make it logically self-contradictory to deny M2. 
The denial of the U-type valuation by a U-type exceptive 
clause may count as a good reason against Mo. There may be 
nonmoral reasons for deciding against T2 (teaching evolution), 
but to reject M2 by saying, "We should teach untruth,'' with­
out an unusually good reason, has a false ring. In a similar 
connection, Ryle observes that "the oddness, if it exists'' in 
such an idea as teaching falsehood "might be one source of 
the strength of the notion of the Moral Law." 21 
Yet the Moral Law need not be airtight. The possibility 
of denying a universal moral principle in some such way as 
qualification with an exceptive clause is crucial to its function 
in a moral argument. A recent writer, J. W. N. Watkins, has 
stated a similar view in advocating that moral principles be 
open to maximum criticism of their unsatisfactory implica­
tions and that it be not assumed, except in a closed moral 
system, that there are no unsatisfactory implications. He said: 
Rational discussion of moral principles consists, not in 
trying (hopelessly) to justify them, but in criticizing 
them; and this means, primarily, examining them for 
unsatisfactory implications.22 
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Finally, against the objection that acts of supererogation are 
thought to be E-type, the intention of their being praised is 
that they be approved, supported, emulated, and repeated. 
Hence they too are U-type. Universalizability, while open to 
denial in particular instances, is held to be a characteristic 
of a universal moral premise and thus a basis for assessing 
and criticizing moral premises in educational arguments. 
The examination of unsatisfactory implications of the moral 
principle in M2 leads to a consideration of the Instrumental 
Principle. 
The Instrumental Principle 
The universalizability of M2 is a good reason for morally 
affirming it. Such a U-type principle is avoided in a Qi type 
of argument, which can begin with either Mi or -—• Mi, 
according to preference, followed by Ilt to conclude with 
either Ti or ^ T i  . The universalizability of M2, on the 
contrary, counts as a good reason against beginning with 
•—' M2. But the presence of Mj does not of itself count as 
a good enough reason to affirm T2 or to deny ^ T  2 . The 
reasons follow. 
There are all sorts of claimants to the title of universaliza­
bility. One can use M2 but, by inserting I2b in place of I2, 
imply a conclusion that is incompatible with T2, as follows 
(abbreviated Q2b): 
M2 True accounts of the origin of human life on earth 
should be taught. 
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I2b The Holy Scripture account of the origin of human 
life on earth is true. 
T2b Therefore, the Holy Scripture account of the origin 
of human life on earth should be (the one to be) 
taught. 
Although universalizability provides a good reason for 
avoiding <—' M2 in a Q2 type of argument, one can always 
use M2 and insert I2b to imply validly T2b. Hence, a U-type 
principle in M, although needed in order to avoid a •—' Q2 type 
of argument, is not sufficient to avoid a Q2b type of argument. 
After all, we only have a good enough reason for teaching 
certain subject matter if there is a good reason against be­
ginning with .—' M and also if there is a good enough reason 
to decide that we should act on T (and deny or reject <•—•' T ) . 
This means we must have good reasons for premise I. There 
must be good reasons for all of the premises in the argument 
in order to have a good enough reason to accept T, a con­
clusion to which it would be logically odd to add, "But we 
shouldn't act on T." 23 
Premise I is empirically contingent and must, therefore, 
be true if it is to count as a good reason. Hence a Q-type of 
argument, in order to constitute a good enough reason, not 
only must have a universalizable moral premise but also must 
have a true, even though contingent, premise. If we had to 
withdraw I either in Q2 or in Q2b as a good reason for 
teaching certain subject matter, we would not have a good 
enough reason for deciding between T and —-/ T. 
For a contingent premise I to be confirmable in experience, 
it must be capable of being falsified.24 In Q2, I2 is falsifiable. 
If I2b were said to be unfalsifiable, then it would have to 
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be withdrawn as a good reason because it would not accord 
with the falsifiability condition of a Q type of argument. A 
fiat forbidding the withdrawal of an empirically contingent 
premise from the argument would militate against its asserti­
bility as a good factual reason. For a factual proposition I to 
be assertible, it must not only be confirmed in experience 
but also must be capable of being falsified or refuted. Objec­
tion, for example, to the assertion that the earth does not 
move would rest not only on grounds that the assertion was 
false but also on grounds that it was regarded as unfalsifiable. 
Although I is falsifiable, the argument, strictly speaking, is 
not. For, in choosing between T and —T, it would not do 
to speak of "falsifying"' a conclusion that is not a factual 
assertion. T is a value judgment; it cannot, therefore, in a 
strict sense, be either confirmed or falsified. 
Although a valuation like T cannot be asserted, it can 
be affirmed. A factual statement like I must be asserted, but 
can be asserted only if it can, in principle, be falsified; 
similarly, a value statement like T can be affirmed as bona 
fide only if it can, in principle, be denied or rejected as 
being wrong (not lightly, of course, but on analogous rational 
grounds). While asserting and affirming are different by 
virtue of what the speaker says in his proposition or decision, 
they are not so different as to exclude any logical similarity 
between what is asserted and what is affirmed. An assertion 
has meaning if there is a way to distinguish the conditions 
under which it is true or false; an affirmation has meaning 
if there is a way to distinguish the conditions under which 
it is right or wrong. Thus, just as a bona fide assertion is 
falsifiable, a bona fide value judgment is deniable or open to 
criticism; the deniability or criticizability of a value judgment 
(of the form T  ) is the evaluative counterpart of falsifiability. 
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The objectionable aspect to the way an evaluative argument 
is used to arrive at a conclusion of type T2b is not its affirma­
tion about a way of life but its insistence that it is undeniably 
right. What was an evaluative conclusion is eroded into one 
that is supported by appealing primarily to extrarational 
ordinances. If, for example, someone uses M2 along with an 
unfalsifiable I to decide "A belief in X ought to be taught" 
(for any value of X), the test question is: "What counts 
against your affirmation that we should teach (for) a belief 
in X?" When, for example, someone affirms, "The teaching 
of atheism is morally wrong,'' the test questions are: 'What 
would it take to deny your contention that the teaching of 
atheism is morally wrong? If there were no God, would it 
still be wrong? Is it wrong under any and all conditions?" 
(Note here the connection between metaphysics and morals, 
discussed in Chapter IV.) If the antiatheist denies that any­
thing can dissuade him from what he believes, then he seems 
not to be making a rational appeal to a morally good reason 
for his contention that the teaching of atheism is wrong. 
When the believer (or, for that matter, the disbeliever) says 
that nothing can dissuade him from his belief, then he is 
using a fiat to rule out a conclusion of the form •—' T (such as 
prohibiting the teaching of atheism), but he is not thereby 
giving us a good enough reason for prohibiting the teaching 
of a particular subject matter or for concluding against T. 
This may explain why metaphysical and theological arguments 
between atheists and theists are liable to break down: refusal 
by either or both to accept the conditions that would settle 
the argument. 
Moreover, insistence by adherents to a T2b type of affirma­
tion that it cannot be denied does not mean that it cannot be 
denied on rational grounds. Undeniability here is merely the 
 162 The Place of Reason in Education
contention of believers that nothing can count against their 
affirmation. The difficulty is that while believers thus affirm 
with certainty that their belief is right, disbelievers find it 
possible to deny it with just as much conviction. There is 
no logical, and even sometimes no factual, impossibility of 
denying the affirmation of believers. A statement that is not 
permitted by its believers to be falsified may, in point of fact, 
even be shown to be false. Suppose, for example, that M2, 
"True accounts of the origin of life on earth should be taught," 
were used in conjunction with I2b, "The Holy Scripture is a 
true account of the origin of life on earth,'' as a presumably 
good enough reason for deciding to act on the conclusion T2b, 
"The Holy Scripture should be taught (as giving the true 
account of the origin of life on earth)." Then, since the 
Holy Scripture is demonstrably a false account of the origin 
of life on earth, and a conjunction is true only if both its 
conjuncts are true, T2b, the implied conclusion, could not be 
said to be true. Once it was established that the Holy Scripture 
is a false account of the origin of life on earth, I2b would be 
falsified and consequently withdrawn as a good reason to act 
on the implied conclusion Tab. (Otherwise, one would have 
to add the premise that falsehoods should be taught.) Since 
there is a good enough reason for a conclusion T only if the 
conjunction of premises taken together count as good reasons, 
the conclusion T2b would have to be denied or rejected. Each 
of the premises in Q2b must be a good reason, in order that 
the conjunction of premises taken together can provide a 
good enough reason for teaching certain subject matter. The 
falsification of I2b—like unfalsifiability—would count against 
using it as a good reason for deciding to act on T2b. This 
account may also take a step toward demonstrating how a 
metaphysical or theological world view or blik may be shown 
to depend indirectly and in part upon tacit factual assertions, 
163 The Place of Moral Reasons 
a view very close to Flew's assertion-oriented view on bliks 
(see Chapter IV). 
The Pedagogical Principle 
Although M may be universalizable and I may be true 
(although falsifiable), it may not be logically odd to add, "But 
we shouldn't act on T?" Why one may still question acting 
on T has to do with the third condition for good enough 
reasons, relevance to teaching. 
Even though M is U-type and I is true though falsifiable, 
acting on T—to teach certain subject matter—may nevertheless 
be irrelevant. T may not take into account the practice of 
teaching. There are some LJ-type values that seem highly 
desirable teach. Consider, for example, Q4: 
M4 Children should be taught to make wise decisions. 
I4 Never drinking alcohol when driving is a wise 
decision. 
T4 Therefore, children should be taught never to drink 
alcohol while driving.25 
There is nothing wrong with the argument: M4 is U-type 
and I4 is falsifiable. But can T4 be taught? The difficulty of 
deciding whether what is proposed is teachable points up the 
rule of relevance, or the principle of pedagogy. In effect, this 
asks: Is there a method for teaching certain subject matter in 
such a way that it is learnabler1 M and I may be perfectly 
good reasons for deciding on a conclusion T but may not take 
into consideration the actual practice of teaching. Proposing 
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that certain subject matter should be taught does not auto­
matically mean that it can be taught. To say that it can be 
taught means (among other things) "taught meaningfully." 
To say that a lesson is ''taught meaningfully,'' as that expres­
sion is understood in modern pedagogy, means that the lesson 
can be, through known teaching methods, successfully learned. 
The pedagogical rule of relevance attempts to guard against 
faulty or inadequate motivation, trivialization of instruction, 
and undue indoctrination.26 The first and third factors are 
well enough known and so only trivialization is exemplified 
in Q5 and Q6: 
M5 The truth should be taught. 
Is The truth is that red tulips grow in Holland. 
T5 Therefore, the fact that red tulips grow in Holland 
should be taught. 
Or: 
M6 The truth should be taught. 
I6 The truth is that Plato ate his breakfast at 8:04 
A.M. on his 50th birthday. 
T6 Therefore, the fact that Plato ate his breakfast at 
8:04 A.M. on his 50th birthday should be taught. 
To recall an earlier remark about "approval," the driving-
drinking argument might be saved by our proposing that we 
teach people to disapprove of drinking while driving. Even 
this would be difficult, but it certainly would not seem 
possible without relevant attention to appropriate motivation, 
165 The Place of Moral Reasons 
non-trivialization, and no undue indoctrination. (Note how 
the question of what to teach feeds into the question of how 
to teach). 
Concerning the tulip and Plato examples, it can be 
imagined that in certain contexts the conclusions to teach that 
red tulips grow in Holland and that Plato ate his breakfast 
at 8:04 A.M. on his fiftieth birthday might seem important; 
but it can be more readily thought that such facts would make 
for dull or trivial teaching. 
It is easier to designate what is trivial than what is signifi­
cant, although recent studies of explanation and justification 
in scientific and moral philosophy are warrant against complete 
despair on the teaching of significant ideas.27 
Applying the pedagogical condition as a good reason for 
deciding to act on teaching patriotism means that the pro­
ponent of that argument not only affirms the premise on 
attitudes and asserts the premise on national interest but also 
presupposes "Patriotism is learned by being taught"; or "If 
patriotism is taught in school, then it can be successfully 
learned." The pedagogical condition thus adds another empiri­
cally contingent assertion to considering whether the argu­
ment offers a good enough reason to decide to act on either 
the conclusion or its contradictory; it makes an assertion 
contingent on whether what is taught in school is in fact 
learned. Such a claim is especially difficult to maintain in 
connection with teaching attitudes and most especially in 
connection with teaching those exceptionally rate attitudes 
that "dedicated" teachers are said to have in mind. Exemplary 
moral learning is so seldom achieved as to be considered 
well-nigh unteachable. But the uncharacteristic virtues like 
those of the hero or saint, if learned, are thought to bring 
about such overwhelming human good and to diminish human 
ills so greatly that they are regarded as eminently worthy of 
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emulation and come to be earmarked as universalizable. This 
is why, in relation to what it means to be moral, such attitudes 
with the highest moral rating are ideally desiderated. The 
desirability of teaching rare virtues leads to a question that 
is beyond the scope of this work: How do we test whether 
virtue can be taught? That is precisely what makes the 
pedagogical condition so difficult to follow; it says that if there 
is no method for teaching meaningfully, so that what is 
taught is learned, the pedagogical principle is unsatisfied. In 
the presence of the three-pronged considerations of relevance, 
the pedagogical principle is not easily satisfied. 
Since the pedagogical condition, like the instrumental 
premise, is empirically contingent, it too is falsifiable; if P is 
falsified, we must withdraw the assumption that it is a good 
reason for deciding to act on T, for its falsification {not its 
falsifiability) would also count against the conclusion. 
The pedagogical condition is not, strictly speaking, neces­
sary in order for M and I logically to imply T. But if it 
is violated—if what shall be taught cannot be taught mean­
ingfully or in principle learned successfully, so that we have 
-—• P—then a pedagogical condition for deciding to act on T is 
not fulfilled. Hence the falsification of the pedagogical condi­
tion counts as a good reason against deciding to act on T.28 
If there is no method for teaching a subject matter mean­
ingfully, the pedagogical principle is unsatisfied. If what is 
taught is only memorized and not genuinely learned, then it is 
pedagogically irrelevant. 
Thus, even if M is universalizable and I contingently true, 
a good enough reason for choosing to act on T may still be 
lacking if the pedagogical principle is either used unfalsifiably, 
by not functioning as an empirical rule of relevance, or else 
is falsified. 
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Note that a good enough reason is one that helps us to 
''act on1' one conclusion rather than another. An argument 
may be perfectly valid, M may be universalizable and I may 
be true; but if there is no method for teaching a certain sub­
ject matter meaningfully, then the rule of relevance is un­
satisfied. If something that is taught is not genuinely learned 
but is indoctrinated or memorized, then it is pedagogically 
irrelevant. If a proposal is made that we should teach a certain 
subject matter, yet takes no account of the conditions of learn­
ing and the practice of teaching, then the proposal, for all 
that it may be perfectly valid, perfectly moral, and perfectly 
true, may also be perfectly irrelevant. (The kind of moral 
platitude noted in Q4 or Q5 may, without further pedagogical 
considerations, be precisely of the kind that fails to satisfy 
the pedagogical rule of relevance.) 
The Use of a Good Enough Reason for Deciding What 
Shall Be Taught 
A Q type of argument gives a good enough reason for 
deciding to act on one of two contradictory answers to the 
question "What shall be taught?" if there is a universalizable 
moral principle, and if the answer is open to denial through 
the falsifiability of the instrumental premise and relevant 
pedagogical considerations. The rule of relevance, in particular, 
commits the proponent of a T-type conclusion to draw upon 
counterarguments against it, and to show under what condi­
tions in the instrumental or pedagogical premises he would 
withdraw his proposal for acting on T. The welter of objec­
tions that a Q2 type of argument withstands helps to furnish 
its choice-guiding function and enables us to say that in Q2 
we have a good enough reason for choosing between T2 and 
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r—' T2—a conclusion to which it would then be logically odd to 
add: "But we shouldn't act on it." 
There is a sense in which we can use the openness to 
falsification of both the instrumental and relevance assertions 
to check, albeit indirectly, on whether M performs the job of 
a genuine U-type principle (affording a basis for denial and 
rejection, if it does not.) Whether M is particular or uni­
versal depends on how its terms such as ''national interest" or 
''truth" are used: we get a significant clue as to how M is 
used by observing with what other premises it is joined. We 
get an idea of how the expression "true statement" is used 
by looking at I. In I2bs, "true statement" is used as part of an 
unfalsifiable sentence. We test the expressions in M, albeit 
indirectly, by seeing how they are used in I. The terms in 
the argument must be used in the same way throughout the 
argument. The use of M is indirectly tested by whether the 
argument as a whole is open or closed to rational criticism of 
its unsatisfactory implications. To the extent that it is open 
or closed, the argument as a whole gains or loses application. 
An argument that is, as a whole, empty and bereft of applica­
tion, because its unsatisfactory implications are not permitted 
to be criticized, endangers M with erosion into a worn-out 
platitude. Although we may pay lip service to it, M no longer 
does its job of distinguishing sharply between what should 
and should not be taught. A Q-type of argument gains in 
application to the extent that M can be taken in conjunction 
with another true premise and a pedagogical consideration, 
both of which are open to pertinent forms of rational criticism 
of their unsatisfactory implications. 
The openness of the argument as a whole to the foregoing 
criticism enables M to be used to inveigh against nearly un­
detectable and infrequently exhibited non-U-type principles 
that sometimes filter into the moral language of education. 
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If M is sharpened in this way, we then endow our keenest 
moral perceptions with the power to guide our choice of what 
shall be taught. 
By way of synopis and conclusion, let it be repeated that 
the presence of M and I, although necessary to imply T in 
a valid argument, is not a good enough reason for deciding to 
act on either of two contradictory alternatives—T or .—T. 
Needed are good reasons to imply T and also a good enough 
reason for deciding that we should act on T and reject .— T. 
A good enough reason consists of a valid, non-empty argument 
with premises that are backed by good reasons to furnish, in 
turn, a good reason for believing in the conclusion, and, if 
pedagogically relevant, to furnish a good reason to decide 
to act on T rather than —T. 2 9 
A good enough reason for teaching a certain subject matter 
would, then, imply a conclusion to which it would be logically 
odd to add, "But we shouldn't teach that." But what counts as 
a good enough reason to guide our choice between two contra­
dictory alternatives? The example of Q2 gives, or comes close 
to giving, an example of a good enough reason to decide 
between T2 and — T2; this is in contrast to both Qx and Qzb, 
although in each case on different grounds. In Qi, instead of 
starting with Mi, one can begin with -—- M and, by combining 
it with Ii (assuming relevancy to be true) decide not to act 
on Ti. Not so with Q2, because M2 is universalizable and a 
U-type principle counts as a good reason against denying M2. 
But one can also use M2 along with I2b to imply T2b, which 
is logically incompatible with T2. Although a U-type principle 
is necessary against a Qi argument, it does not work against 
a Q2b argument. A U-type principle, though it counts as a 
good reason to act on T, is not by itself a good enough reason 
to decide between T and — T. As was noted, additional rea­
sons are needed, such as I, a contingent premise, and the 
The Place of Reason in Education 170 
empirical rule of relevance to test whether what is taught is 
learned. The test of empirical assertibility is the falsifiability of 
both I and relevance, and the openness to criticism of the 
argument as a whole. (The importance of having a way to 
criticize rationally an evaluative conclusion of the form T is 
understood if in teaching values of any stripe we allow, in 
Isaiah Berlin's phrase, final ends of life to collide.) 
In Q2b, 12b is unfalsifiable. So Q2b does not count as a 
good enough reason to choose T2b over ~ T2b. While a moral 
principle, taken together with other good reasons, guides our 
choice of what to teach, the absence of these good reasons for 
acting on a T-type conclusion can be used to rebut the decision 
to act on T. 
In an argument that is closed to criticism, M fails to func­
tion as a U-type principle. (This is the point at which to 
mention the salutary effect of the Instrumentalist position 
noted in Chapter III, for it inveighs against closed moral 
systems and against such arguments as Q2b, in which I2b is 
not permitted to be falsified. According to the Instrumentalist 
means-end notion, a valuation like M2 means no more than 
its relation to other statements in the argument.) Once an 
argument is closed to criticism, it becomes empty and bereft 
of application; soon M deteriorates into a mere platitude.30 
M is then not doing its job of inveighing against non-U-type 
principles in the moral language of education and hence is not 
assisting our moral perceptions to guide our choice of what 
should be taught.31 (This may also explain what is objection­
able about the traditional metaphysical approach in education, 
as noted in Chapters III and IV: these isms are not open to 
criticism of their unsatisfactory implications.) 
Does the question "What should be taught?" have an 
answering argument that resembles Sense II? It seems to have 
such an argument when we have a good enough reason to 
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decide between two contradictory conclusions that purportedly 
answer the question. What is needed is a good enough reason 
to decide between alternative arguments. 
But even though good reasons, difficult as they are to find, 
are available, a good enough reason is in practice well-nigh 
unobtainable. Some comfort might come from asking why, in 
Zeno's paradox, the hare keeps chasing the tortoise that he 
cannot catch. At any rate, when next we encounter an answer 
to the question "What should be taught?", we might ask how 
that answer follows from the reasons given in its defense. By 
this simple mode we are apt to see that what we are told 
should be taught does not always follow from the reasons 
given—or, if it does, so does its contradictory. 
If, in the face of genuine difficulties, we do not care to 
seek a good enough reason for deciding what to teach, there 
may be no serious harm in it. Perhaps we shall then all go 
about our various ways saying, "We have an argument to 
answer the question What shall be taught?'"; and un­
doubtedly, we shall have an argument—only it will have to 
be written within inverted commas (like sense I). 
Other conditions for assessing the use of moral arguments 
in education are undoubtedly needed. In defense of the view 
that moral reasons do apply to evaluative arguments in educa­
tion, this study has tried to show how several canons of 
criticism may be used to assess one conclusion of the form T. 
The conclusion may come close to being backed by a good 
enough reason, so that it can rationally be chosen over some 
alternative conclusion of the form T that is not nearly as well 
backed by good reasons. 
Evaluative arguments in education may still go on being 
treated, on the one hand, like "I like peach pie," indiscernibly 
hortatory, or, on the other hand, like a quest for a philosopher's 
stone,32 indiscriminable or inapplicable; neither treatment pro­
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vides rational canons of criticism suitable to the assessment of 
evaluative arguments in education. A view that there is no 
way out of the impasse between Sense I and Sense II, between 
the Capricious and the Purist, may become buttressed by the 
notion that there is "'nothing good or bad, but thinking makes 
it so.1' Is it any wonder that under such auspices, old or new, 
virtue cannot be taught? 
1. See, for example, B. Othanel Smith, "Views on the Role of 
Philosophy in Teacher Education." 
2. See, for example, Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public 
Schools (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1951). 
3. J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1963), p. 3. 
4. In this connection, see Paul Taylor, Normative Discourse 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), chap. vi. 
5. "Patriotism" is used here the way John Dixon uses it in C. 
Winfield Scott and Clyde M. Hill (eds.), Public Education under 
Criticism (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1954). The "patriots" 
believe in "My country, right or wrong." 
If Ix is a particular premise, then T would be a particular con­
clusion, which would raise the difficulty brought about by the fact 
that Frankena's MEM'S (chap, iv) yield a particular conclusion. If the 
conclusion is particular, then each group can teach its values to its 
members (e.g., Lutherans, Thomists, Idealists, Experimentalists), but 
they have decided nothing between them as to what should be taught 
at large. 
If one starts off with a particular premise but thereupon draws a 
universal conclusion, then there is more in the conclusion than there 
was in the premises. Hence, the Q form of argument here used assumes 
that the premises and conclusion are both universal, an assumption I 
argue for in Section 3 of this chapter. 
6. The contingent premise is not, however, particular. If premise 
I is particular, not only does the conclusion have to be particular; but, 
while it is possible to verify an I proposition, it is not possible to 
falsify it. Only a universal proposition can be falsified. See J. Urmson, 
Philosophical Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 113, for 
this difficulty in Popper's account. 
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7. The Language of Morals, p. 28. According to this rule, "is" is 
not synonymous with "ought." If "is" meant the same thing as "ought," 
it would be self-contradictory to say "X is the case, but X ought not 
to be the case." One could then not take exception to what was the 
case and yet ought not to be the case. One could then argue from 
"Hitler killed six million Jews" to "See, that proves it's right." Or one 
could point to some instance of segregated schooling, and say "That 
proves it's right" (see Chapter III). 
8. Therein too lies the difficulty that arises if one confuses logical 
implications with justification, which seemed to be the case with some 
philosophers of education discussed in Chapter II, and also with 
Frankena's MEM'S discussed in Chapter IV. The reason I boggle in 
the case of Q, being used as if it were not only valid but justified is 
that (a) validity is not justification (which may also explain the 
Purist-Capricious impasse in Chapter I) and (b) for forthcoming 
reasons I shall maintain that Q1 is, though valid, not justified. 
9. The argument here is set up to take into account Frankena's 
MEM'S in as much as his MEM'S can be used for either the meta­
physical or moral argument. 
Note, too, that I2 assumes a general empiricist or materialist world 
view that appeals to scientific facts for the paradigmatic use of "true."' 
Hence, the relation of metaphysics to morals, epistemology, and educa­
tion, which cannot but be (tacitly) involved in deciding whether to 
teach biological evolution or not. 
10. See Chapter IV for an elaboration of the use of factual assertions 
in conjunction with MEM'S to back evaluative conclusions, and especially 
the criticism there of Paley's metaphor or blik. 
11. Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic 
and Scientific Method (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1934), p. 80. 
If the conclusion is regarded as particular, and I is a particular 
contingent premise, then M would have had to be universal, because 
of the theorem that states, "If both premises are particular, there is 
no conclusion." But a particular premise cannot be used to imply a 
universal conclusion, and if T is universal, then both M and I have 
to be universal. The chief difficulty with Frankena's MEM arguments, 
as suggested in Chapter IV, consists in the particularity of the con­
clusions (e.g., Teach a Judeo-Christian conception of God in non-
public, sectarian schools'). The main educational difficulty discussed 
in Chapters I, II, and HI seemed to be the attempt to draw a universal 
conclusion from particular premises. Frankena's MEM'S do not overcome 
this difficulty. 
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If the conclusion is universal, the premises must be universal. Also, 
if premise I were particular, it would be verifiable but not falsifiable. 
If I were universal and M particular, then the conclusion would again 
be particular. For T to be universal, M and I must therefore both be 
universal. 
The reason this rule refers not only to logical validity is that there 
is no logical requirement to have a universal conclusion, but it is, it 
will be argued here, a necessary condition of the kind of evaluative 
argument in education in which one wants to know how one ought 
to decide between opposing arguments. 
12. Thomas Kingsmill Abbot (ed.), Kant's Critique of Practical 
Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics (6th ed.; London: 
Longman's, 1909), p. 47. 
13. Ibid., p. 47. 
14. E. A. Gellner, "Ethics and Logic,'' in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, New Series, LV (London: Harrison & Sons, 1955), 
157-78. 
15. Richard M. Hare, "Universalizability,'" ibid., pp. 295-312. 
16. If, for the limited purpose of trying to detect universalizability, 
M is reformulated to read, "We should teach . X," one can then 
look to the scope and limits of "we." There are, it seems, two main 
uses of "we" in education. There is, first, the use of "we" to express 
partisan assent to, or advocacy of, an educational point of view or ism 
(see Chapters II and III for some similar instances in metaphysical 
and moral arguments). There is, second, the use of "we" to express 
allegiance or consent to vaguely formulated ideals, as in "We hold 
these truths to be self-evident. . " and "We, the people. . " 
The former is somewhat like the advocate's use of "we"; the latter 
is somewhat like the verdict-giving use of "we." (This distinction bears 
similarity to the two senses of argument noted in Chapter I.) On 
occasion, a "we" sentence in one sense will shift almost imperceptibly 
into another sense. See, for example, J. Dixon, "What's Wrong with 
U.S. History?" in Scott and Hill (eds.), Public Education under 
Criticism, p. 153; also Arthur Eugene Bestor, Educational Wastelands: 
The Retreat from Learning in Our Public Schools (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1953); and Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public 
Schools, pp. 33-34. For a philosophical consideration of "we" sentences, 
see M. B. Foster, " "We' in Modern Philosophy," in Basil Mitchell 
(ed.), Faith and Logic (London; Allen & Unwin, 1957), pp. 210-19. 
One reason, however, for looking to singularity in terms other 
than "we" in a value-implying syllogism is that, if M is reformulated, 
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using "We" in M as well as in the conclusion, the syllogism is invalid, 
because the middle term is undistributed: 
Mj We should teach attitudes that serve the national interest. 
Ij Patriotism (is an attitude that) serves the national interest. 
Tj Therefore, we should teach patriotism. 
I am indebted to two former colleagues: to Professor Arnold Berleant, 
for pointing out a difficulty that occurs when using "we," namely, 
that the middle term is undistributed; and to Professor Joseph La Lumia 
for suggesting the alternative formulation whereby the middle term is 
distributed. 
The reason is that in a BARBARA figure, the A proposition does not 
distribute its predicate, and a rule of the syllogism says that the middle 
term must be distributed in the premises at least once. In using the "we" 
formulation above, the middle term "national interest" is undistributed. 
Bearing the above qualifications in mind, there are some advantages 
to considering M as a "we" sentence—namely, that "we" in "We 
should teach X" focuses upon the intentional and performative aspects 
of teaching. In the first person plural, as with the first person singular 
("I know" or "I do"), commitment is expressed; although in the plural, 
allegiance is pluralized, and alludes to those doing the teaching— 
namely, the profession of teachers—rather than to other groups who 
purport to decide what to teach. Because there are so many difficulties 
with the use of "we," moral and otherwise, which have not even been 
touched on, M is here used as it appears in the argument in the body 
of this work. 
17. It is ordinarily an anomaly to prescribe that falsehoods be 
taught, for the idea of teaching falsehood, if universalized, would 
generally be self-defeating. 
18. John Hospers, Human Conduct: An Introduction to the Prob­
lems (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1961), p. 572. 
19. This ingenious example was originally suggested by Professor 
Philip Phenix. 
20. J. O. Urmson, "Saints and Heroes," in Abraham I. Melden 
(ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1958), pp. 198-216. 
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expense of c, and the argument is that they thereby go counter to 
common usage. The same argument applies to those who, like Scheffler, 
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and to this end even indoctrination, but not unduly. See Scheffler, 
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chap. ii. 
29. This may well be the point to remark that the initial dis­
satisfaction with the Purist use of argument as presented, for example, 
by Smullyan in Chapter I, is not, as Toulmin held, that the logician's 
ideal is too abstract but, rather, that its rules and modes of rational 
criticism are insufficient adequately to criticize unsatisfactory impli­
cations of evaluative arguments in education. 
30. Q gains or loses application depending on whether or not 
it can be rationally criticized, i.e., whether or not it is open to maximum 
criticism of its unsatisfactory implications; and if it is not, then M, 
even though it is "universalizable," likewise withers. 
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conclusion can be used to criticize and even rebut the decision that 
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VI. The Rebuttal Notion 
The difficulty that has been noted in philosophy of education 
is the absence of rational canons of criticism by which to assess 
philosophical arguments in education. This lack permits the 
existence of a situation in which someone concludes a given 
argument with X, while someone else concludes the same 
argument with <—'X or Y. Which is right? How does one 
assess the arguments? An outstanding illustration of this 
difficulty is the type of argument used in philosophy of educa­
tion to answer Spencer's question, "What knowledge is of 
most worth?" An answer is used as a response, in Sense I, 
and then is treated as if it were a solution, in Sense II. This 
often nearly imperceptible shift from Sense I, response, to 
Sense II, solution, is "of the last consequence"; nevertheless, 
it occurs in philosophy even more generally than in philosophy 
of education. 
The attempt to apply canons of criticism from mathematics 
or science, however, does not seem to be a useful way to 
assess educational arguments because the rules and strictures 
in these terms are too restrictive to apply to the criticism of 
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educational arguments. The logician's idealized model of argu­
ment has been called here the Purist use of argument, and 
the whimsical kind of argument often used in philosophy of 
education has been termed Capricious. 
It would be fine if criteria did exist to help us assess edu­
cational arguments in order to distinguish between those 
arguments one ought to heed and those one should ignore or 
rebut. No criteria, however, seem suitable. In the absence of 
formalized canons of criticism, we may have to live with the 
preliminary step—uncovering the difficulties that lie in the 
way of rationally criticizing educational arguments that purport 
to answer the question 'What should be taught?" An argu­
ment in Sense I is like a debate or quarrel;1 in Sense II it is 
like a formal proof.2 The difficulty with Sense I is that the 
use of argument in education is not readily open to criticism, 
and hence there has arisen a "democracy" among arguments 
in which anything goes. The difficulty with Sense II is that 
there are no criteria for criticizing evaluative arguments or 
proving conclusions that purport to answer a question like 
Spencer's. An argument in Sense II is valid, sound, and 
rigorous (Smullyan); to be rigorous it must be "correctly 
annotated." The Purist ideal furnishes a purely univocal 
standard for criticizing and assessing arguments. 
We have considered Toulmin's appeal to the use of ordi­
nary arguments in various working contexts, emphasizing the 
jurisprudential context. We found this to be helpful but too 
unrestrictive. One obtains a verdict in a law court; but is it 
necessarily true or right? How does one assess educational 
arguments? 
A main difficulty seems to be that arguments that begin by 
being used in Sense I sometimes slide into Sense II and are 
suddenly made to look as if they were proofs. Hume expressed 
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concern with a similar shift from "is' to "ought,1' which he 
found also to be ''of the last consequence." Abraham Kaplan's 
lead in distinguishing among ethical theories has been followed 
in terming Sense I and its tendency to shift to another sense 
the Capricious use of argument. We find many examples of 
this phenomenon in philosophy of education (as noted in 
Chapters I, II, and III). Opposed to the Capricious use is the 
strict use of argument in Sense II—as a formal proof or 
empirical confirmation—and this has been termed here the 
Purist use of the word argument. 
The questions are these: Are there any rational canons of 
criticism that can be used to evaluate educational arguments? 
How, in particular, does one answer Spencer's question in a 
way that is more like Sense II than Sense I? Or is Spencer's 
question to be answered in the same way that one answers the 
question "How do you feel about Communism?" If there are 
no rational canons of criticism by which to assess evaluative 
arguments in education, then the use of arguments in Sense 
I strengthens the view that ours is an Alice-in-Wonderland 
sort of world, in which any argument will do as well as any 
other. Yet an argument intended in Sense II fails if, among 
logically incompatible alternatives, there is no way to decide 
which one is right, or at least which one can be criticized. The 
result is that we either have too many arguments, none of 
which is intended as a valid, sound, and rigorous proof, or 
else we have at least two logically incompatible arguments, 
both of which are intended as proofs—with no way to choose 
between them. That is the dilemma of the philosophical argu­
ment in education, which has been called here the Purist-
Capricious impasse. 
How metaphysical and moral arguments are used in edu­
cation was considered in order to ascertain in detail the nature 
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of the difficulty of assessing educational arguments. It was 
noted that these arguments are intended to be demonstrated, 
and their conclusions not only implied but also justified. A 
difficulty in each instance was that more appeared in the con­
clusion than there was in the premises. A metaphysical argu­
ment, in particular, consisting of a definition or belief, was 
concluded in Sense I, although Sense II was clearly intended. 
Consideration was given next to three prominent efforts 
to use moral arguments. These, too, were not used in such a 
way as to put Spencer's question to rest. Was there no way out 
of the Purist-Capricious impasse? 
Summary of Attempted Solution 
A suggested way out was Frankena's notion of MEM'S 
(metaphysical, epistemological, and metamoral premises). 
Frankena argued that some MEM'S were relevant and even 
necessary, although not sufficient, to imply and even justify 
some educational conclusions. His method was not as help­
ful, however, as his format; for we were still left with the 
dilemma of not knowing which MEM to choose—between, for 
example, one that says there is a God and one that says there 
is not. Frankena did not succeed in showing how to assess and 
criticize MEM'S. 
It was observed that metaphysical premises in education are 
sometimes expressed as "'root metaphors'' or pictures depicting 
man, society, and the universe in ideal terms. Noted, also, was 
how SchefHer's two modes of criticism could be applied to 
educational metaphors. According to Scheffler, analogies can 
be criticized for being trivial, and they can be shown to be 
limited or to break down in their application.3 
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The discussion of metaphors was extended to involve 
"bliks,'' metaphors writ large, more like the "root metaphors" 
that Othanel Smith discussed than the epistemologically-
oriented metaphors that Scheffler discussed. The problem 
Frankena had left with us was whether or not there is a God, 
which was also a problem of the fundamental kind noted in 
Chapter I. It was argued that root metaphors or bliks, by 
encompassing the relations of man, society, the universe, and 
God, were open to the type of analogical criticism suggested 
by Scheffler. This was illustrated by Paley's metaphor and by 
a board of education policy statement; in applying Hume's 
analogical arguments to Paley's metaphor, some criticisms 
were made of this kind of world view. The educational policy 
statement revealed a direct relationship between metaphysics 
and what is taught; and the possibility of criticizing the meta­
phor or blik seemed to take a step toward showing that 
metaphysics is not necessarily irrelevant to education. 
The possibility of criticizing metaphysical premises, al­
though helpful, was not, however, regarded as sufficient to 
decide between contradictory educational conclusions. There 
was also needed a rational basis for criticizing and assessing 
moral premises and the relevant factual and pedagogical con­
siderations that are used to support one educational conclusion 
as against another. It was maintained that an evaluative argu­
ment performs a choice-guiding function if it provides a good 
enough reason for deciding that one conclusion to teach 
certain subject matter should be acted on rather than another. 
But what counts as a good enough reason, so that it would 
become logically odd to say, "But we shouldn't teach that 
subject matter"? 
Three considerations were proposed as what counts: univer­
salizability in the major premise; falsifiability in the minor 
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premise; and a pedagogical principle in criticizing and as­
sessing the conclusion. These were proposed for application to 
the argument if it were to provide a good enough reason to 
decide that one conclusion of form T ("Teach X") should 
be acted on as against another. 
This proposal does not result in a proof, pure and simple, 
but it is hoped that it may be something to reckon with. An 
argument, accordingly, need not be merely a futile quarrel 
or debate, nor need it be a sterile proof or demonstration. An 
argument may also consist (as Webster's Dictionary suggests) 
of a set of reasons for or against some contention, and this 
may provide a way out of the Purist-Capricious impasse. 
Thus, an evaluative argument in education may be used as 
a quarrel or debate, or as proof or demonstration, or as a set 
of reasons for or against some contention. The difficulty with 
the first—a quarrel—is that there is in education often no 
rational way to criticize or assess it, much less settle it. The 
trouble with the second is that there are no proofs for 
criticizing or assessing difficult evaluative arguments that 
purport to answer the question 'What should be taught?" 
The third use of argument, which gives reasons for or against 
a conclusion, may provide a way out of the Purist-Capricious 
impasse. This may be referred to as the third sense of an 
argument or Sense III. While not rigorous or strict, an argu­
ment in Sense III may be thought of as ''cogent.'' A cogent 
argument is defined as one that is compelling, convincing, or 
telling to the mind or reason.4 
A cogent argument is not as strict or rigorous as the kind 
Smullyan describes, for it offers no airtight proof. It may be 
that we cannot hope for a wholly rigorous argument in edu­
cation or even for one that is conclusive and not open to 
rebuttal. It may be enough that a cogent argument, in appeal­
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ing to reason, is a telling argument, a strong enough one to 
rebut an opposing, less cogent argument. (Cogency, unlike 
rigor, is a matter of degree..) 
Calling educational arguments cogent does not make them 
so; it still remains to be shown whether, in fact, they are. In 
this connection it would seem a gross anomaly to suggest that 
the premises of an argument might furnish a good enough 
reason for deciding what to teach and at the same time be 
not compelling to the mind and convincing or, in short, cogent. 
It does not, accordingly, seem an untoward strain of language 
to suggest that an argument that is backed by a good enough 
reason is by that very fact a cogent argument. 
This third sense of an argument need be neither rigorous 
nor capricious. An argument is identified by some writers as 
giving reasons of the sort Schemer meant when he spoke of an 
"ordered argument" to support a decision concerning what to 
teach,5 and which James McClellan further specified as 
follows: 
'Why should the humanities be taught?" requires 
an argument for its answer, a set of premises . in 
such manner that they consititute good reasons for as­
senting to "The humanities should be taught." 6 
We cannot hope for a wholly rigorous argument, but a 
cogent argument will do as well for our purposes. It may not 
be conclusive, but it is to be hoped that it will appeal to 
reason as a telling argument that puts adversaries on notice 
that now it is their move. It has this proviso—such an argu­
ment must be open to the maximum criticism of its own un­
satisfactory implications. We can—and it is contended that 
this is a way out of the Purist-Capricious impasse—offer rea­
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sons for or against, as well as for and against, our conclusions. 
The lack of rigor and the readiness to give rigor up for 
cogency in an educational argument may not be completely 
regrettable, if one remembers Aristotle's observation: 
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clear­
ness as the subject matter admits of, for precision is not 
to be sought for alike in all discussions. And we 
must . . not look for precision in all things alike, but 
in each class of things such precision as accords with 
the subject matter, and so much as is appropriate to the 
inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the 
right angles in different ways; the former does so in so far 
as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter 
inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he 
is a spectator of the truth.7 
Because a cogent argument is not rigorous, it may be said 
to be "non-cognitive'' and therefore to fail to satisfy Sense II; 
but what is wrong with an evaluative argument, if it is 
nearly cognitive? It may at least be more like Sense II than 
Sense I, although if one prefers a rigorous argument for decid­
ing what should be taught, one can always wait for Godot. 
As to the central problem of this study, what, if anything, 
counts as a rational argument to answer the question "What 
should be taught?", there may be a solution other than the 
Purist and the Capricious uses of the word "argument.'' This 
solution would be a good enough reason with a requisite 
degree of conclusiveness to help us decide between two contra­
dictory conclusions, both of which purportedly answer an 
evaluative question such as, "What knowledge is of most 
worth?" or, 'What should be taught?" In the effort to criticize 
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and assess evaluative arguments in education, the attempt was 
made to show that a good enough reason would count as a 
cogent argument in defense of an evaluative conclusion in 
education. 
The rub is that a good enough reason may in practice be 
nearly unobtainable. Attempting to cite a cogent argument in 
order satisfactorily to answer Spencer's question (in Sense III 
or like Sense II) may very well be like the hare attempting 
to catch the tortoise or the geometer attempting to square the 
circle. If, however, the effort to show that there is a place 
for cogent evaluative arguments in education is likewise 
doomed, that is to say, is impossible or interminable or un­
decidable, that has yet to be demonstrated. In this study an 
attempt has been made to show that a good enough reason 
counts as a cogent evaluative argument in education and that, 
therefore, the effort to answer Spencer's question and the effort 
to use an argument to answer the question "What should be 
taught?" need not be doomed to a counsel of despair and need 
not be judged futile or interminable. 
The Rebuttal Notion 
Although it has been argued here that there are no strict 
proofs in evaluative arguments, the reader should not be left 
empty-handed. There is a limited sense in which an evaluative 
argument, such as that used to answer the question 'What 
should be taught?", may be rebutted. If an evaluative argu­
ment in education is intended to be concluded in Sense II 
and is then shown not to be concluded in that sense but in 
a way very much more like Sense I (capriciously), we would 
have a reason to rebut that use of such an argument. 
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We do not say to Spencer and McGucken, "Stop arguing as 
to what knowledge is of most worth.1' We say, "If you intend 
to use an argument strictly in Sense II, as with an argument 
purporting to decide what should be taught, and expect a 
conclusion that is like Sense II, but without mustering up a 
good enough reason for choosing one conclusion over another, 
then your argument gives a reason for rebuttal." The absence 
of a good enough reason for deciding to act on one or another 
conclusion is a reason to rebut the argument—but only, it 
should be added, in the limited sense that the argument, 
which was intended to be concluded in Sense II, has been 
shown instead to have been concluded on grounds that more 
nearly resemble Sense I.8 
An argument is rebuttable when its conclusion seems like 
an ironclad Sense II but its backing, proving on inspection to 
be flimsy, actually produces a conclusion more like Sense I. In 
taking on an aspect for which it has no backing or credentials, 
this use of argument has undergone an imperceptible shift, 
which it seemed suitable to call capricious. The use of an 
argument is to be rebutted, in short, when it appears like 
Sense II but is really more like Sense I. Even this limited 
rebuttal notion may show the difference between a flimsy argu­
ment, which is more like Sense I, and a cogent argument, 
which is more nearly like Sense II than Sense I. 
The rebuttal of an evaluative argument does not, however, 
banish all its uses in education, nor does it make an argument 
that fails at one time to measure up as cogent (backed by a 
good enough reason) an argument that is forever wrong. The 
observed absence of a good enough reason does not mean that 
the deficiency cannot be remedied; it is logically possible for 
the rebutted conclusion to turn out to be the right one after 
all, if overriding reasons arise (see Chapter V), and this 
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possibility cannot be ignored in evaluative arguments. Good 
reasons and even reasons that for a time are good enough do 
not accordingly stamp an argument as conclusive in the same 
sense as proofs do. (A good enough reason is the halfway 
station between proof and caprice.) 
The rebuttal notion is therefore also limited by the pos­
sibility of giving a good enough reason to a conclusion where 
formerly there was none. Rebuttal constitutes only a form of 
criticism, and as such it is not infallible. Neither, however, is 
imperviousness to criticism. Indeed, one earmark of an 
evaluative argument, for which analogous work was begun by 
Karl Popper's work on falsification, is that an open evaluative 
(or philosophical) argument, whether theological, meta­
physical, moral, esthetic, or educational, is open to rebuttal. 
This means that rebuttal conditions accompany a proposed 
argument in such a way that in the language game of arguing, 
the rules of that game show what counts as a "checkmate" 
(akin to the deniability notion set forth in the preceding 
chapter.) 
Concluding Remarks 
One may still ask: "What is a rational argument? Is it one 
that rules out metaphysical or moral premises?" 
A rational argument need not be one that rules out meta­
physical or moral premises. There are too many instances of 
rigorous arguments with successfully proven conclusions that 
are exceedingly dull and quite irrelevant to the problems of 
life; and we probably all know other arguments on tenuous, 
even shaky premises—hypotheses, principles, Ideas or Forms 
(as Plato called them)—purporting to answer questions such 
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as, "How ought we to live?" or, "What is the world made of?" 
that may not successfully answer the questions, but seem to 
be both interesting and important. Arguments that attempt to 
answer these questions may for a time appear unsubstantiated, 
even implausible. Some rigorous arguments may demonstrate 
extremely trivial conclusions, while some less substantial argu­
ments may provide the flimsiest sort of support for a significant 
conclusion. 
The hesitation to rule out metaphysical and moral premises 
in an educational argument may be best explained by empha­
sizing something said earlier: One cannot be sure that the 
sort of metaphysical views put forward by Thales, Anaxi­
mander, Plato, and the early Greeks may not be ultimately the 
most important kinds of thoughts in the power of the mind 
of man to conceive. It should now be added that, for the 
education of man, it is doubtful that the idea of the Moral 
Law—with appropriate built-in qualifications—is very much 
less important. Yet, as premises, neither metaphysical nor 
moral arguments are capable of certain proof. Other arguments 
abound that are rigorous and thus rational, but they are also 
trivial in that they have no appreciable bearing on deciding 
what one ought to teach—that is, how one ought to teach the 
young to live. 
In the effort to assess what counts as a rational argument 
in education, therefore, metaphysical and moral premises have 
not all been ruled in, nor have they all been ruled out. Instead, 
the attempt in this study has been to do two things: to apply 
rational canons of criticism toward assessing metaphysical and 
moral arguments in education; and, in this connection, to stress 
maximum criticizability of unsatisfactory metaphysical and 
moral implications. As J. W. N. Watkins suggests, this activity 
seems allied with doing the critical part of philosophy; the 
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synoptic or visionary part, perhaps the more precious and diffi­
cult to come by, remains largely and regrettably untouched 
here. 
The job of clearing the ground a little does not permit the 
luxury of constructing an airtight proof, or of judging either 
a metaphysical or moral argument in education once and for 
all. The job of quarrying for a cogent evaluative argument 
in education is intended to provide us with the power to 
criticize and assess what ought to be taught, with a view to 
preventing some harm that might otherwise be done. 
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Prophylactic criticism distin­
guished from therapeutic, 90 
Counts, G., 32, 33 
Defeasible clause, 153 
Definitions: educational, 45-46, 
61, 112; persuasive, 46, 47, 
57-58, 63-65, 81, 83, 97, 176; 
programmatic, 47, 64 (Schef­
flers conception of criticized, 
64 n. 13) 
Demonstration; see Argument: 
use of 
Deniability condition, 160-63, 
189; see also Falsification 
Denial, 153, 157 
Deontological or Intuitionist view­
point, 75 
Derivative approach; see Meta­
physical approach in education 
Desideratum, 71, 154, 155, 166 
"Desirability characterization,'' 
70-72 
Dewey, John, 17, 20, 28, 47, 65 
n. 24, 69, 117-18, 131 n. 24, 
135 
Educational arguments; see Argu­
ments 
Educational conclusion, 126-27, 
129 n. 10 
Educational definitions; see Defi­
nitions 
Educational ends, goals, or pur­
poses, 9-12, 68, 71, 131-32, 
134, 137-38 
Educational metaphors; see Meta­
phors 
Educational policies, 66, 67, 68, 
87-88, 110, 125, 134 
Educational proposals, 65 n. 24, 
113, 114, 131, 167; curricular, 
68, 113 
Educational purposes in relation 
to metaphors, 109, 112-16 
Educational theory; see Theory 
197 
Emulation, 156, 166 
Ends of education, 68, 71; ex­
pressed as goals, 134 
Evaluative arguments in educa­
tion, 5, 16; see also Arguments: 
evaluative 
Evaluative meaning, 77 
Exceptive clause, 151, 152; see 
also Deniability condition 
Explication, 113 
Falsification, 141, 145, 159, 160, 
162-63, 166, 170, 183; see also 
Deniability condition 
"Family resemblance," 120 
Flew, Anthony, 52, 121, 163 
Foster, M. B., 174 n. 16 
Frankena, William K., 83, 96­
111, 125-26, 136, 137, 182 
Gellner, Ernest A., 147-48 
"Good enough" reason, 143-48, 
159, 160-63, 167-72, 183, 
188-89 
"Good" reason, 140, 141, 143-48, 
149, 151, 153, 159, 162, 165, 
167-72 
Gowin, D. Bob, 62 n. 7 
"Great Debate" in education, 9­
12 
Hare, Richard M., 4, 68, 77, 82, 
89, 92, 119-21, 141-42, 145­
48 
Hart, H. L. A., 18, 153 
Heidegger, Martin, 60 
Hook, Sidney, 9, 13, 49-50, 55­
57, 65 n. 20, 67, 95 
Home, H., 60, 61 n. 1 
Horsburgh, ]., 132 n. 37 
Hospers, John, 150 
Index 
Hume, David, 22, 34, 55, 57, 74, 
102, 106, 120, 123, 125, 180, 
183 
Hutchins, Robert, 10, 12, 28, 47, 
114, 116, 135 
Ideological principle distinguished
from moral principle, 149 
Implication, 51-52, 55-56, 58, 
59, 65, 68, 100, 113-14; causal, 
57; definitional, 57; educational, 
50-51, 57, 60, 65-66 (in Sense
I, 60; in Sense II, 59); formal,
57; logical, 49, 100. 113, 129; 
material, 57; metaphysical, 64; 
persuasive, 52, 57, 58-59; pro­
grammatic, 57, 58 
Indoctrination, 164, 165, 167, 
176 n. 26; and Scheffler's defi­
nition of teaching, 176 n. 26 
Instrumental effort, 69, 176 n. 25 
Instrumental Principle, 158-63, 
166 
James, William, 95 
"Justifiable" premise, 103-4, 107­
8, 110 
Justification, 44, 55, 58-59, 79, 
84, 100, 110, 144; see also 
"Good enough" reason 
Kant, Immanuel, 38, 133, 146, 
154, 176 n. 25 
Kaplan, Abraham, 33, 35, 181 
Kilpatrick, W., 117 
Komisar, P., 64 
Logic: formal, 14; as "generalizedjurisprudence," 17; see also 
Argument 
McCleUan, James E., 62-64, 79, 
84, 185 
Index 
McGucken, William J., 26-28,

33, 34, 35, 38, 188

McMurray, Foster, 62 n. 7

McMunin, Sterling, 95, 97-98

Maritain, J., 64 n. 12

Mayer, Martin, 11

Metaphor: Dewey's, of the school

as embryo of society, 118;

Plato's, of the cave, 118; other­

worldly, 118; see also Meta­

phors; Bliks

Metaphors, 109-19, 126-28, 130­

31; educational, 109-10, 112,

115, 117, 126, 131; epistemo­

logically-oriented, 118; meta­

physical, 114-15, 118; "root

metaphors," 112-15, 118, 221;

social, 112, 114; theological,

118; see also Bliks

Metaphysical approach in educa­

tion, 49, 125; constructive, 49,

53, 60, 89; derivative, 49, 52,

60, 89

Metaphysical arguments, 59—60,

67, 96, 112, 119; canons of

criticism applied to, 112; in

education, 59-60, 67, 119; in­

tentional and success uses of

distinguished, 84-85; in Senses

I and II, 61; see also Argument

Metaphysical beliefs; see Beliefs

Metaphysical premise, 98-99,

109-12, 119, 124-27, 129

Metaphysics, 48-49, 56, 67, 105­

7; see also Metaphysical ap­

proach in education

Mill, John Stuart, 20

Moore, George E., 38, 47, 68,

79, 101, 104

Moral acts, 151

Moral arguments, 72, 83-85, 134;

in education, 69

Moral education, 155

Moral language, 168

198 
Moral premises, 127

Moral principle, 145, 148-49; see

also Ideological principle

Moral reasons, 171

Morris, Van Cleve, 33

Nagel, Ernest, 173 n. 11

Nielsen, Kai, 132 n. 37

Nowell-Smith, 43

O'Connor, Daniel J., 53, 132

n. 37

"Open question" argument, 79,

87-88, 101, 150

Overriding reason, 151, 153, 188

Paley, William, 122, 123, 127,

183

Pepper, Stephen C, 118

Pedagogical principle, 163-67;

see also Rule of relevance

Perkinson, H., 62 n. 7

Persuasive definition; see Defini­

tions

Phenix, Philip, 175 n. 19

Philosophical arguments in educa­

tion, 109; see also Arguments

Picture-preference, 113—14

Plato, 106, 118, 128, 134, 154,

189

Policy statement, Board of Edu­

cation, New York City, 122-23,

125

Popper, Karl, 176 n. 24, 189

Principle of Defeasible Partiality,

73

Proof, 184, 189, 190

Prophylactic criticism distin­

guished from therapeutic, 90

Purist-Capricious impasse, 37, 90­

92, 109, 128, 138, 172, 182,

184, 185

199 Index 
Question: answered by metaphysi­
cal argument, 60—61; answered 
in Senses I and II, 27; intended 
in Senses I and II, 27; mean­
ingless, 60-61; metaphysical, 
60; philosophical, dilemma of, 
31; should" type, 63, 72 
Questions: answers to factual, 
formal, metaphysical, philosoph­
ical, 33; deliberative, 24, 25, 
63; difficulties in answering, 39;
in education, 32; evaluative, 24, 
25, 32, 35, 140; factual, 24-25, 
54; formal, 24, 25; inquisitive, 
24; mathematical, 25; meta­
physical, 24, 44; philosophical,
24, 33, 34; scientific, 25 
Raup, R. Bruce, 72, 73, 86 n. 9 
Rebuttal notion, 179, 187-89; see 
also Deniability condition 
Reductio ad absurdam, 44, 59, 92 
Religion: clarifying concept of, 
45; teaching of, 62 
"Root metaphor," 112-16, 119; 
see also Metaphors; Bliks 
Rule of relevance, 163—67; see 
also Pedagogical principle 
Ryle, Gilbert, 31, 44, 92, 134, 
138, 157 
Scheffler, Israel, 12, 31, 62 n. 4, 
91, 110-12, 117, 118, 122, 
124-27, 130 n. 21, 136, 176 
n. 26, 182 
Sheed, F. J., 75 
"Should" questions; see Questions 
Sleeper, Ralph W., 86 n. 7, 132 
n. 37 
Smart, J. C. C, 136-37 
Smith, B. Othanel, 64 n. 14, 105, 
106, 108, 110, 111, 114, 116, 
118, 131 nn. 24 and 30, 136, 
183 
Smullyan, Arthur, 14, 16, 17, 19, 
20, 23, 36, 103, 142, 180, 184 
Social metaphor; see Metaphor 
Solution; see Answer 
Spencer, Herbert, 25-28, 32, 33, 
34, 35, 37, 38, 44, 140, 180, 
187-88 
Spinoza, Benedict, 155 
Stevenson, Charles, 46, 63 n. 9, 
156 
Supererogatory acts, 156 
Synoptic and visionary function 
of philosophy, 135, 191 
Task words, 31 
Teaching, 163-172; of atheism, 
161; of attitudes, 138-40; defi­
nition of, 176 n. 25; of doubt­
ing, 176 n. 25; of evolution, 
145; of falsehood, 149, 152-53, 
157, 162; of knowledge, 138­
40; "meaningfully," 164, 165, 
166 (method for, 167); of moral
attitudes, 165-66; of patriotism, 
141, 148; performative aspects 
of, 174 n. 15; persuasive defini­
tion of, 176 n. 26; related usages
of, 176 n. 26: skills, 138-40; 
and "teaching-for," "-how," and 
"-that," 138-40; three condi­
tions of, 164, 176; of true ac­
counts, 158-63; of truth, 152­
53 
Test distinguished from testimony, 
74-75 
Theory: educational, 62-63, 99, 
130; scientific, 63 
Thomas, L. G., 70, 86 n. 8 
Toulmin, Stephen, 16-20, 23, 43,
77, 90, 92, 180 
Uncharacteristic virtues, 165 
Universal premises, 146, 148-49 
200 Index 
Universalizable principle, 146-58,

183; distinguished from E-type

valuation, 146-48, 152-56; and

U-type valuation, 146-58

Use of argument; see Argument 
Value judgment, 15

Verification principle, 35

Waismann, Frederick, 62 n. 6, 92

"Warranted assertibility," 72

Watkins, J. W. N., 6, 157, 190

"We" in education, 174 n. 16

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 60

Woodring, Paul, 9, 176 n. 25
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reasons for or against some contention. 
The difficulty with the first is that there 
is, in education, often no rational way to 
criticize or assess it; the difficulty with 
the second, that there are no rational cri­
teria for assessing evaluative arguments 
that purport to answer the question "What 
should be taught?" The third use of argu­
ment, Mr. Bandman believes, may rep­
resent a way out of the impasse posed by 
the other two. An argument in the third 
sense may be thought of as "cogent"—one 
that is compelling, convincing, or telling to 
the mind. The meaning of a cogent argu­
ment in education is explicated and illus­
trated through a critical treatment and 
extension of the "good reasons" approach 
in ethics. Critical reference is also made to 
the Ordinary Language analysis of recent 
metaphysical and theological arguments. 
Bertram Bandman is associate professor 
of Philosophy at Long Island University. 
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